The **ARI Working Paper Series** is published electronically by the Asia Research Institute of the National University of Singapore.

© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each Working Paper. ARI Working Papers cannot be republished, reprinted, or reproduced in any format without the permission of the paper’s author or authors.

**Note:** The views expressed in each paper are those of the author or authors of the paper. They do not necessarily represent or reflect the views of the Asia Research Institute, its Editorial Committee or of the National University of Singapore.


**Asia Research Institute Editorial Committee**
Michelle Miller – Chair
Eric Kerr
Creighton Paul Connolly
Valerie Yeo

**Asia Research Institute**
**National University of Singapore**
AS8, #07-01, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent,
Singapore 119260
Tel: (65) 6516 3810
Fax: (65) 6779 1428
Website: [https://ari.nus.edu.sg](https://ari.nus.edu.sg)
Email: arisec@nus.edu.sg

The **Asia Research Institute (ARI)** was established as a university-level institute in July 2001 as one of the strategic initiatives of the National University of Singapore (NUS). The mission of the Institute is to provide a world-class focus and resource for research on the Asian region, located at one of its communications hubs. ARI engages the social sciences broadly defined, and especially interdisciplinary frontiers between and beyond disciplines. Through frequent provision of short-term research appointments it seeks to be a place of encounters between the region and the world. Within NUS it works particularly with the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Business, Law and Design, to support conferences, lectures, and graduate study at the highest level.
The Familiar Face of the State:  
Affect, Emotion and Citizen Entitlements in Dehradun, India

Tanya Jakimow
School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Australia

Municipal Councillors (MCs) are the ‘familiar face of the state’ in Dehradun, India: the first port of call for citizens seeking to claim entitlements from the state. The way MCs respond to the requests of their constituents is a major factor in the uneven distribution of government welfare and services. This article seeks to contribute to understandings of citizen entitlements by drawing attention to the role of affect and emotion in shaping the interactions between MCs and ‘voters’. I examine the ways citizens consciously or unconsciously engender emotions and affective responses, and the effect these have in mobilising MCs. Attention to the at times involuntary nature of these responses suggests a need to go beyond the instrumental and calculative motivations of municipal councillors, to consider the way they are compelled and animated to meet the demands of some citizens, but not others. The ability to affect, and the ways one is affected, are tied to social identities and self-making projects of both MC and ‘voter’, resulting in uneven (mal)distribution of state resources. A focus on women MCs hints at the gendered nature of these affective mobilizations, and the need to rethink conventional understandings of local governance.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The fieldwork was conducted with the assistance of Panchayati Rule and Gender Awareness Training Institute (PRAGATI), Dehradun. I am very grateful for their help and friendship. The research was funded by an Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Award (DE130100468). I wrote this paper while on a sabbatical research fellowship at the Asian Research Institute. Thank you to all at ARI for providing such a stimulating environment in which to work, and for the feedback provided on my seminar paper. Most importantly, my sincere gratitude to the inspiring Parshads of Dehradun who gave their time and shared their knowledge for this project.
INTRODUCTION

As we sat chatting with Kashi, a municipal councillor (MC) in Dehradun, a local woman approached. Using ‘toon’, the familiar form of ‘you’ to greet Kashi, she went on to explain that she was holding a puja, and that the local mandir (temple) required cleaning. Her tone was polite, but firm enough to indicate that rather than consider this a favour, she expected this work to be completed without fuss. Kashi nodded. She did not smile, but nor was her annoyance apparent in her voice as she replied that she would send someone to clean the hall. As the woman departed, Kashi shook her head and in an incredulous tone asked us to observe the expectations of the people. “They expect that I should do each and every work. If she is the one holding the puja, and it is such a small place, then she should clean it herself. Every day people come to me with such work, morning to night, expecting me to do each and every thing”. Kashi nonetheless called the maid who comes to her house daily and asked her to sweep the mandir.

The scene raises a question under-explored in the literature on urban governance: Why do MCs comply with the ‘unreasonable’ demands of some citizens and not others? The ethnographic material from Dehradun problematizes the prevailing explanation for these actions; that is, that MCs are motivated by electoral calculations. In this article, I point to the affective and emotional animations and compulsions that influence MCs’ actions, and hence uneven citizen entitlements. I build upon McFarlane and Desai’s (2015) approach to ‘sites of entitlement’ that draws attention to the way moral economies shape citizens’ access to government services, in two ways. First, I argue that MCs’ moral and ethical responses are tied to investments in self-fashioning, requiring attention to the ways the personal biographies of MCs shape responses to moral claims. Second, in pointing to the involuntary nature of some responses, I argue that voters’ differential capacity to engender emotions and the force of affective configurations in MCs’ encounters with voters, are overlooked determinants of citizen entitlements.

This article contributes to two areas of research. First, the inability of the state to provide welfare and services for the urban poor has been a necessary focus in urban studies (de Wit 2017; van Dijk 2011a; 2011b; Heller 2015; McFarlane and Desai 2014; Shekhar Swain 2012, among others). The limited capacity of the Indian state to meet the demands it creates (Berenschot 2010; Gupta 2012), results in the personalisation of citizenship. Local politicians are key intermediaries in determining who gets what, trading privileged access to resources for votes from the urban poor (Chandra 2004; Piliavsky 2014). Less explored are the ways middle-class and elite ‘voters’ expand their entitlements beyond the normative responsibilities of the state by engendering emotional and affective responses in elected representatives. Second, in exploring this expansion, this paper responds to Gupta’s call for research that examines “the emotional and affective relations between people and states” (2015: 8). The extant literature on the affective dimensions of the state (Arextaga 2003; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Laszczkowski and Reeves 2015) has focused on people’s subjective experiences of the state, and the way that the state is reproduced, or becomes a ‘social fact’ through affective intensities. I take a different approach, considering the ways the ‘state’ is also susceptible to being imposed or impressed upon in the encounters between citizens and the human agents of the state.
The findings are based on five months (non-consecutive) of fieldwork between May 2015 and June 2016 in Dehradun, Uttarakhand, North India. We interacted with and observed the activities of MCs, known locally as Parshad or ward member, conducted formal interviews, and held a workshop for women Parshads in June 2016. Most critically we co-constructed ten in-depth profiles with women Parshads, entailing a series of formal interviews and participant observation. These profiles were critical to understand the resonance and intensity of the scenes that we were observing, and to interpret Parshads’ narratives of their encounters with citizens. Biographical details matter for the way people are affected or moved, at the same time that emotions can only partially be communicated (Beatty 2010). An intimate understanding of these women’s lives alongside direct observation informs my interpretations, at the same time that I recognise the difficulty of researching emotions and affects necessarily means there is a degree of speculation. Of the ten women profiles, three held seats reserved for scheduled caste women (RSCW), one for other backward class women (ROBCW), three for women (any caste) (RW), and three hold unreserved seats (UR). Seven were Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) members, two Congress and one Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). Two Parshads had been elected one or more times (2T), the rest, once (1T). I have obscured or omitted details that would threaten the anonymity of respondents.

Although I focus on the experiences of women, I reject the compartmentalization of this article into one merely about gender and governance. Gender is important, in that the gendered selves and social identities of women municipal councillors make them susceptible to affective animations and emotional mobilizations in ways that are different to men. This argument is, however, tentative; my empirical material lacks detail of male ward members, and therefore I have no clear point of comparison. In acknowledging these limitations, I highlight the implicit masculine bias of the majority of the literature on Indian local political actors, in which the exclusion of women is barely mentioned, or only warrants a footnote (c.f. Price and Ruud 2010). The overlooking of women’s experience is remarkable given that a third of all seats in local urban governance are reserved for women for women in India as per the 74th Constitutional Amendment. In Dehradun, women currently occupy 29 out of 60 seats. Even given a handful of ‘proxy’ women, a large percentage of residents access the state through female Parshads. In centring their experiences, I highlight how a focus on men has obscured our understandings of urban citizenship.

1 The author conducted the interviews in Hindi with the assistance of PRAGATI. Initial review of data was done using English translations, with in-depth reading of passages done in the original Hindi. Several interviews were conducted by PRAGATI while the author was in Australia.

2 I use the local terms Parshad and ward member when referring to the empirical material from Dehradun (where ‘municipal councillor’ is not used). Following conventions in the literature, I use municipal councillor when referring to that literature, or when making statements that apply to municipal councillors more generally.

3 The bias towards the BJP was a product of their greater success in recruiting and electing women ward members. As there is only one BSP Parshad in Dehradun, I have not indicated the party of any Parshad as this would threaten the confidentiality of this ward member.

4 Proxy Parshads refer to women whose husbands’ (or other family members) are the de facto Parshad. While people assume the number of proxy women is high, our research revealed that only 3 out of 29 fulfilled this characterization. Many more ran for election to fulfil their husband’s ambitions, but have since taken on an active role themselves (see also John 2007).
CITIZEN ENTITLEMENTS

Citizenship in India entails, among other things, differential rights to the resources, services and security provided by the state. I follow McFarlane and Desai (2014) in viewing entitlements as distinct from rights. Whereas “rights generally take the form of legally binding statements, entitlements are produced through social relations and based on people’s experience and perceptions” (2014: 3). An individual may have a legal right to a certain resource, but not be able to access it; other individuals may draw upon sources of legitimacy—for example social norms of sharing—to make claims that exceed legal or formal rights. McFarlane and Desai’s (2014) ‘sites of entitlements’ approach is a useful starting point to analyse the ways differential citizen entitlements are produced. ‘Sites of entitlement’ are:

the always coexisting principles, laws and norms with social and spatial differences in the everyday production of claims. Sites of entitlement are characterized by changes over time, often require ongoing negotiation, and are frequently characterized by uncertainty and ambivalence (McFarlane and Desai 2014: 2).

Entitlements are contested, negotiated through everyday practice, dynamic, flexible, malleable, ambiguous and constituted by social relations. According to McFarlane and Desai (2014), moral economies are a critical factor in the production of ‘sites of entitlement’, understood as: the “collectively understood informal regulations around expected behaviour and an individually held sense of what is expected that may or may not coincide with that shared collective view” (2014: 2).

The sites of entitlement approach seems particularly well suited to examining differential access to urban services in India, where citizen rights do not necessarily bear close relation to entitlements. Van Dijk (2011a) argues that the personalised nature of Indian bureaucracy (see also Gupta 1995), coupled with the state’s low infrastructural power, results in structural and cultural holes between citizens and the state, described as: “gaps between both the formal–legal channels of entitlement actualization (and informal channels) and differently positioned places or collectivities” (Van Dijk 2011a: 307). McFarlane and Desai (2014) note that the local state, including government officials and politicians, is critical to people’s understanding of entitlements, and the ways these translate into concrete access to services. Municipal Councillors play an important role connecting citizens to government resources in the context of scarcity (de Wit 2017; Heller 2015; Berenschot 2010; Shekhar-Swain 2012; Van Dijk 2011a; 2011b), and therefore critical actors in producing sites of entitlement. Van Dijk (2011a) shows the centrality of MCs in Mumbai in helping people engage government authorities, in the process integrating some people, while excluding others in ‘networks of urbanization’.

The personalisation of access to state resources highlights the importance of the relationship between citizens and elected representatives for entitlements. Politics is framed by a relational morality: “a set of ideas about how those who govern and those they govern should relate to each other” (Piliavsky 2014: 28). In India, the relational morality between MCs and their constituents is characterised by patronage and clientelism (Berenschot 2010; de Wit 2017; Piliavsky 2014; Price and Ruud 2010; van Dijk 2011a; 2011b). Politicians promise access to state resources, or else provide direct monetary rewards in order to garner votes, and in turn, voters expect that their support will be rewarded through privileged access to the state (Manor 2016). The premise of the relationship is one of mutual exchange, with politicians successful when they channel resources to clients, while clients must be able to offer something in return, such as votes, labour, political loyalty or fees (van Dijk 2011a). Relationships may have a more pronounced normative element, in which the political leader takes on a style of ‘Lord’ or ‘social worker’, working in a disinterested fashion (Price and Ruud 2010). This is most often viewed cynically, however, as a leadership ‘style’ used to effectively garner
political support (Alm 2010; Berenschot 2014; Price and Ruud 2010). Instrumentality and electoral advantage are the primary motivations shaping MCs’ differential responses to citizens.

It is electoral calculation that directs most of MCs efforts towards poorer constituents. The poor face social handicaps (de Wit 2017) in accessing the state, making them loyal clients to those who can provide it. Patronage in this way need not be exploitative, and indeed can help groups on India’s peripheries access critical state resources (Manor 2000). The middle class vote less than the poor (Banerjee 2014), and are not dependent upon political intermediaries to access the state. Instead they have sufficient social and cultural capital to directly approach government officials (de Wit 2017), and prefer to work through organisations separate from electoral politics (such as Resident Welfare Associations) to advance their interests (Chatterjee 2008; Baud and Nainan 2008). The dichotomy between ‘political and civil society’ (Chatterjee 2008) or ‘new and dirty politics’ (Harriss 2008) has been shown to be fluid (Johnston 2014), yet the majority of the literature examines citizens manoeuvring for state resources in such terms. The poor are able to reduce the gap between rights and entitlements—that is, so that access to services and resources are closer to their actual rights as enshrined in law—through electoral politics. Although rarely phrased as such, the middle class expand their entitlements beyond their formal rights by either side-stepping elected representatives, or increasingly putting forward their own candidates from non-partisan organisations (Baud and Nainan 2008; Lama-Rewel 2007).

Contra this common narrative, I draw attention to different scenarios in which entitlements are negotiated. I demonstrate the ways voters increase their entitlements in excess of what they offer in return (their vote), the ways middle-class residents claim entitlements in excess of their rights through elected representatives they played no part in electing, and the ways MCs help poor people claim rights in the absence of electoral advantage. My contention is that when Parshads take actions to either fulfil or ignore claims to state resources, they are doing so not only in terms of a rational calculation of electoral advantage, and not only as being the right thing to do in terms of moral relationality or moral economy, but also responding to the affective intensities of encounters with citizens and as a means to deal with their own feelings engendered in such encounters. In doing so I highlight the non-instrumental and opaque causes for politicians’ behaviour that operate below consciousness and for which no explanation can be offered (the affective), as well as how the desire to manage negative and positive feelings compel or animate certain actions (the emotional). I thereby aim to build upon McFarlane and Desai’s (2014) ‘sites of entitlement’ by drawing attention to the role of affect and emotion in the ongoing production of differential entitlements.

The personalized nature of the Indian state takes on a different meaning when examining affect and emotion. The resonance, intensity and practical significance of emotions and affect are individual, a product of one’s life experiences, relations, dispositions and social positionings. Emotion is complex, embedded into “interwoven lives”(Beatty 2014: 552), while affect is not unmoored from one’s identity within discursive structures (Ahmed 2004). The affect I speak of is not the ‘resolutely anti-biographical and pre-individual’ (Thrift 2008: 7) affect of non-representational theory (see Hemmings 2005 for a critique), but rather is closer to Wetherell’s (2012) notion of ‘affective practice’. Affective configurations are in part socially produced, infected by the symbols and discourses of a given socio-historical context. The way people are imposed upon, or affected, is also not random; rather “individual affective styles and trajectories” (Wetherell 2012: 123) condition the ways people respond to particular affective configurations, the affective slots that they occupy in social encounters, and those they resist. Methodologically, this requires attention to biographical details, alongside attentiveness to affects and emotions that resist articulation, or can only imprecisely be communicated (Beatty 2010). The in-depth profiles alongside attentive experiencing of social encounters (author name 2016) aims to reveal affective and emotional dimensions of Parshads work.
PARSHADS OF DEHRADUN

Dehradun is the provisional capital of Uttarakhand: a Himalayan region carved out of Uttar Pradesh in 2000. Its population of just over one million is expanding rapidly due to migration from the hills and other parts of North India. During the summer months, the main roads are clogged with traffic from holiday makers escaping the heat on the plains, passing through Dehradun to the hills of Uttarakhand. High population growth places a heavy burden on city infrastructure, resulting in growing bastis (informal housing colonies), and stresses on roads, electricity, water and urban transport (Mittal 2014). Dehradun’s recent ranking of 61 out of 73 of India’s cleanest cities epitomises the transformation from a city of orchards and grey hair (referring to the lychee trees that were common to the city and its attractiveness to retirees), to one of traffic jams and rubbish. Dehradun is increasingly resembling other ‘neoliberal cities’ in India, with a focus on attracting investment through ‘middle-class’ facilities while neglecting the needs of poorer urban residents.

As a state capital, Dehradun has been granted Municipal Corporation status. Its governing body is the Nagar Nigam, comprised of 60 wards, each with an elected Municipal Councillor (Parshad) and between 5,000 and 12,000 ‘voters’ (adults registered to vote). Dehradun Nagar Nigam (DNN) is significantly smaller (and less resourced) compared to other municipal corporations. MLAs have access to development funds, but Parshads received only 5 lakh in 2015 ($8,000 USD), significantly less than other MCs across India. Further, unlike their rural counterparts in Uttarakhand and MCs in other cities in India (de Wit 2017), Parshads receive no honorarium or sitting fee. According to some Parshads, the lack of funds is partly a result of the failure of the (at the time) Congress controlled state government to devolve state funds to the BJP controlled Nagar Nigam, meaning that the municipal corporation must rely on House Tax for its solvency. The BJP won back control of the state government in a landslide in February 2017, but at the time of writing it was too early to discern if the change in government will address this issue. Fresh elections to the Nagar Nigam are due in the first half of 2018.

The official duties of Parshads reflect their limited power. They are responsible for waste removal, with oversight of the (underpaid and understaffed) sanitation workers. They liaise with other government departments, most notably electricity and water, to report supply issues, and ensure street lighting is in good order. They utilise their funds for small development works, and cooperate with other agencies (such as the state Public Works Department) to facilitate larger scale infrastructure projects. MCs are also signatories to a range of documentation required by the Indian

---

5 At the time when Uttarakhand (then Uttaranchal) gained statehood in 2001, it was on the basis of the unique mountain identity of the region. Dehradun, which is located on the plains, was the largest city and therefore granted temporary status as capital, with the plan to move to Gairsin, a hill station, once facilities were developed. This promise has not yet been fulfilled.


7 In contrast in 2006, MCs in Ahmedabad received 9 lakh rupees per year of discretionary development funding (Berenschot 2010); In 2017, MCs in Delhi received 30 lakh (Chhettri 2017), and in 2016, Bhopal MCs protested to lift their development fund from 20 to 30 lakh. http://www.pressreader.com/india/hindustan-times-gurgaon/20170331/281547995732482 http://www.hindustantimes.com/bhopal/bmc-passes-budget-ward-development-fund-hiked-to-rs-25-lakh/story-yRo8wTv0096aguaRc0hcoL.html accessed 11 May 2017

8 At the time of research, Congress held the state government, while the DNN was dominated by BJP. Some people claim that for this reason, the former has not financially supported the latter. In the March 2017 state elections, the BJP won 57 out of 70 seats, with Congress securing only 11. Elections for the DNN are due in 2018.
state (Chandra 2004): such as domicile certificates, income certificates, pension forms, electricity applications and so on. Parshads also play an ‘intermediary’ role (Berenschot 2010), helping citizens with ‘social handicaps’—such as illiteracy, poverty, caste status (de Wit 2017)—to access the state through its often recalcitrant and indifferent bureaucrats (van Dijk 2011a; Ciotti 2012; Shekhar Swain 2012). Like MCs in other cities (van Dijk 2011a; de Wit 2017), Parshads’ unofficial duties go far beyond their official ones, including dealing with family disputes, attending functions, gaining school admission, and so on.

As the lowest level of urban governance, Parshads are the first port of call for citizens. Dipti (UR-2T) explains that unlike MLAs, “everyone can approach the ward member for any problem big or small. They expect that ward members will help them as they consider them a part of their family” (Dipti UR-2T). Parshads are familiar in the sense that they are accessible, near in terms of distance and a certain ease in social niceties, leading me to describe them as the ‘familiar face of the state’. The term ‘face’ comes from Navaro-Yashin’s (2002) ‘faces of the state’ used to describe the polymorphic nature of the state, its ubiquity, and the way that it is present in seemingly ‘un-state-like’ representations, gestures and actors. My use of the term is in a sense more literal, in that the ‘face’ is a human face, one that people look in to, and respond to. The mutual displays of emotion, and the ability to affect the other, are an important part of the relational modality of the state (Thelen et al 2014). This familiarity inflects the affective engagements between Parshads and their constituents, or ‘voters’, with consequences, as I will argue, for citizen entitlements.

**AFFECTIVE FORCE OF THE VOTE**

Devani (RW-1T) was sitting at home, caring for her son. A man approached the door, and without greeting her said that his wife had run away two days ago. He was agitated, and spoke in an aggressive tone. Devani replied, “Why are you telling me this? You should go to the police station to report it”. The man would not budge, and screamed: “I have voted for you and you are the ward member, and until you accompany me to the police station, then I will not leave this spot”. After some harsh words directed at Devani, she gave in. She called her mother-in-law to look after my son as she accompanied the man.

This everyday scene is distinctive from accounts of MCs in the literature due to Devani’s initial reluctance to help the man. After all, it is not unusual for MCs throughout India to see such visits as one of their primary responsibilities, if not an opportunity to gain the electoral support of constituents and/or demonstrate their influence and competence (Berenschot 2010; Ciotti 2012; van Dijk 2011a). Why then does Devani resist helping him, and later complain to us about his persistence in making her accompany him? In 2016, four years into their five year term, many Parshads were like Devani, at the end of their tether, running around night and day to perform the work requested by voters. There was a sense that the expectations of citizens far exceeded Parshads’ responsibilities, with what was a *reasonable* claim contested in the social encounters between elected representative and voter. In this scene, it was the harsh words, the insults and threats that made Devani finally accede to the man’s demands.

Similar experiences were shared by all the female ward members we spoke to. Many worked quickly to end the discomfort they experienced from a voter screaming at them. Devani is explicit about how anger prompts her to respond differently to her constituents:
First we need to remain calm in front of them, because if we answer then a fight will ensue, so it’s better to stay quiet. I just listen to them and do their work...we first try to complete the work of loud people and then take up the work of people who are sitting quietly. And many people are aware of this fact, that if they are loud, then the Parshad will complete their work first, and so they purposefully become loud.

Common to Parshads’ self-representations (but less so in actual observations), Devani presents her response as calmness in the face of an enraged. She does not argue the details as to what is a legitimate demand, but seeks to end, or not escalate the feelings engendered in the encounter.

Bimla (RSCW-1T) too says that anger has been an overwhelming aspect of her first term as ward member. Bimla is Scheduled Caste: a government classification that identifies historically and presently marginalised groups (otherwise known as dalit or ‘untouchable’). Seats are reserved for SC, and other backward classes (OBC) in accordance with their population. Bimla holds a seat reserved for a SC woman. She comes from a low socio-economic background, with education up to tenth standard. Prior to being elected, she had no experience dealing with bureaucracy, and lacked connections with government officials or businesses. She experienced a sharp learning curve in her first 18 months, as she struggled to cope with new responsibilities in arenas outside of her comfort zone. In her third year she had found her feet, and had come to enjoy the ability to get things done. She beamed as she took us around her neighbourhood, introducing the people she had helped in tasks as simple as getting a pension.

Bimla’s constituents have high expectations of Bimla that she will help them:

People scream at me to get their work done and if I am unable to do their work, then again they shout at me and say that we have voted for you, so do our work...They create a fear inside us. They cannot put fear in the government officer. People talk politely and with good manners with the officers, like we do too. Towards me it is like ghar ki murgi daal barabar [the house hen is equivalent to lentils, or ‘familiarity breeds contempt’]...[Parshads] don’t get any money from anywhere. If we are making phone calls we are using our husband’s money...Still people dominate us a lot...We feel that these things happening to us are wrong. What have we done? You have given us a vote at one time, but we are serving you for five years.

Bimla does not claim that all people treat her with contempt, and on other days she says people speak to her with respect. Being on the receiving end of anger is, however, a common occurrence.

There are several revealing elements of Bimla’s generalised account of her encounters with voters. She describes a difference in the way that people speak to her compared to government officials, and partially attributes this to her familiarity. This familiarity can be read in different ways: of sharing a socio-economic status, caste identity, or being co-located in the neighbourhood. Being in a social encounter with the ‘familiar face of the state’ enables a display of anger, whether this is a performance or expression of genuine feeling. Gender, according to Kashi (ROBC-1T), also makes women Parshads more likely to be targets of abuse: “They think, she is a lady, so by speaking loudly we can get our work done by her”. Devani, Bimla and Kashi all respond to the negative feelings evoked in such a scene, and in doing so, privilege the needs of those people able to display anger, or
engender discomfort. As the ability to display certain emotions is uneven (Ahmed 2004), affect becomes a medium through which social norms translate into access to resources.9

Bimla articulates her response to these displays of anger as one of fear. Bimla is the only one who describes her reaction using this term, leading to the question of what makes her susceptible to being affected in this way, and/or why does she cognitively process her response as fear. I suggest that her early experiences when she felt that she was drowning in her role are significant, as is her relative lack of political background. What she does not know about her role, her responsibilities, and the desires of her party, creates uncertainty, anxiety, that can quickly manifest as fear. That maybe she should be doing more for the people, or maybe she should be more competent, casts a shadow over her interactions, resulting in an ambiguity as to what are ‘reasonable’ expectations. Anger, screaming, has a particular intensity within this context, affecting Bimla, making her fearful, and, desiring an end to these negative emotions, she agrees to the demands of voters.

For Bimla, demands are connected to the act of voting “they say we have voted for you, so do our work”. It is common for Parshads to state that people become angry as they have legitimate expectations tied to the act of the vote, or else use the fact they have (or said they have) voted to make demands (as seen above with Devani). Although voters use their vote as a claim or a threat, and Parshads often suggest that they are doing works to be elected next time, I argue that the affective force of the vote goes beyond its instrumental value. Studies on elections in India point to the emotional intensities that voters experience when going to the polls, when they “experience an individual sense of rights and duties as citizens” (Carswell and de Neve 2014: 1049). I suggest that these affective dimensions do not disappear after elections, but rather circulate in later scenes associated with them. Hence India’s “sophisticated, assertive voters” (Manor 2016: 330) continue to press their representatives. I am more interested, however, in the resonance of the emotionally charged experience of being elected that continue to influence the behavior of elected representatives throughout their term. The mentioning of the vote, and the entitlement that comes with it, was very effective at mobilizing Parshads to meet demands.

This effectiveness was despite many Parshads considering the expectations of voters as unreasonable. Bimla suggests this when she mentions the burden on her financially in meeting their demands, and explicitly when she states: “We feel that these things happening to us are wrong...You have given us a vote at one time, but we are serving you for five years”. The encounter between the Parshad and voter thereby reveals the tensions and contestations over what is the moral obligation of the Parshad in return for the vote. The vote can be considered a ‘gift’, within the moral economies of electoral politics. Voting is often called matdan, or the dan (gift) of the mat (vote, also means belief). This is not the dan of the ‘free gift’: the giving without an expectation of return that has religious significance for Hindus and Buddhist (Bornstein 2012; Parry 1986). Rather in the context of patronage democracy (Chandra 2004) the gift of the vote is reciprocated by the leader through access to state resources. As long as the ‘debt’, or obligation is not repaid, it enables domination (Bourdieu 1990).

The ‘vote’ therefore inflects the affective configuration between voters and Parshads, empowering the former with a sense of entitlement, and engendering insecurity in the latter. As a consequence of the undetermined ‘reasonable’ (that is moral) return of the vote, Bimla feels dominated. Voters (consciously or not) make use of this ambiguity to press their claims; Bimla’s moral obligations to voters become ripe for contestation and expansion. The emotional intensities of scenes with angry

---

9 Parshads accounts of whether men or women are more likely to display anger are very mixed. Some say men are more likely due to their opinions about women Parshads, others say that as women do not understand the Parshad’s role, they become more agitated.
and aggressive citizens influence how these are negotiated and reconciled. Bimla’s life experiences and biographical details influence the resonance and intensity of these scenes, and hence how she responds. Fear (of failing, of not upholding her obligations) is the mobilizing force, rather than moral obligation or instrumental value. The vote is the symbol that enables the engendering of fear, with an affective force that exceeds the act itself.

AFFECTIVE FORCE OF CLASS

We were having a casual conversation with Indrani (RWG-1T) on the front porch of her home. During the morning hours this space serves as her office, and is equipped with two charpoys and a couple of plastic chairs. It was just after lunch, we were sleepy, leaning on the back wall as the fan lazily circulated the air. We were interrupted as Indrani answered a phone call. By this stage I was used to her tone, which sounded to me as if she was consistently angry, snapping at people, yelling at them to get her work done, or in this case, yelling that she would not do their work. She hung up and launched into a tirade against one of her constituents.

That was the colonel. He does not have light [electricity] in his home. He asked me if I had light in my home, and if I was sitting under a fan comfortably. I told him to call the electrician but he is deriding me, telling me that I should go myself and climb the pole and fix the problem….I told him he can call the authorities himself. We are just the means to reach the solution. But some people are so arrogant

Indrani did not seem to be a woman easily swayed, but as I turned to say goodbye, she was already getting on her scooter, ready to yell at someone in the electricity department.

Indrani regularly acts as an ‘intermediary’ between citizens and the state, to connect her constituents to government services. There are differences, however, in what are seen as legitimate and illegitimate demands for her time. Ongoing problems with service provision are grounds for her intervention. The ‘poor’ lack the ability to approach government or other officials successfully on their own, requiring her help. People such as the colonel, with significant cultural and social capital are, however, able to get things done themselves. Their requests are considered illegitimate, often described as a devolving of menial tasks that they themselves do not want to do (see author name).

By complaining about the former Colonel, Indrani is referring to the unreasonableness of his expectation in a context of escalating demands from middle-class voters. A question arises as to why the former Colonel approached his ward member to fix a problem he could easily resolve himself, as is commonly presented in the literature (de Wit 2017; Baud and Nainan 2008). I have not met the Colonel and could not ask him directly, and am in any case more interested in how Indrani interprets and is affected by his demands. Her pathway to becoming Parshad provides some clues. When the seat was reserved for women, Indrani requested the party ticket, but it was given to a female relative of a man high up in the party hierarchy, and of whom the Colonel is a supporter. Indrani ran as an independent, won the election, then shifted her allegiance back to the party. She tells us that some people from her own party continue to undermine her, taking credit for her work, and questioning her ability to get things done. The perception that women lack the capabilities to be ward member hangs over female Parshads in Dehradun (see also Ghosh and Lama-Rewel 2005; John 2007). The Colonel’s demands can therefore be interpreted as provocations, teasing Indrani about her lack of ability, engendering a sense of insecurity. Indrani knows she is capable, yet feels compelled to demonstrate it again and again.
Although these circumstances are particular, many Parshads complained that middle-class residents, described as those ‘living in posh areas’, were more demanding than poorer residents. They expected better services, infrastructure to support middle-class needs (such as driveways to park their cars) and for Parshads to do their menial tasks (see author name). Unlike in the above circumstance, their claims are not based on the vote, as middle-class people across India consistently fail to turn up to the ballot box; Dehradun is no exception. The lack of electoral calculation or moral basis to their claims, raises the question as to why Parshads accede to their demands in the first place. Many keep to the politician’s script that it is their duty to look after all the people in their ward. But is there more to it? And how are middle-class residents able to command a greater share of resources than poorer residents?

It is useful to examine who does not give in to the demands of the middle class. Aditi (UR-1T), a middle-class Brahmin, refuses to give in to what she perceives as unreasonable demands. Padma (UR-2T), who is in her second term in an unreserved seat is confident in her abilities. She claims that most demands come from the poor, while middle-class people assist her in her work. Aditi and Padma’s class background, confidence in winning unreserved seats, seemingly changing the nature of the demands made on them, or the way they are affected in such encounters. Rachna (RW-1T), in contrast, is part of the aspirational lower-middle class. She has a relatively low education, attaining only tenth standard, but she is far from shy. I personally feel intimidated by her assertiveness, magnified by her loud voice and formidable physical presence.

Rachna nonetheless complains that she is constantly having to run around after middle-class residents.

There are more complaints from posh areas. Residents expect me to go to their homes to hear their complaints, rather than coming here. They expect me to cater to everything that they ask for... Rich people are more distempered/upset if the work will not be done. They are eager and quick to complain...They are aware and they know that their demands will definitely be fulfilled if they talk to us in a particular manner, whereas the poor people are unaware and give us respect.

Rachna describes the qualitative difference in how rich and poor residents approach her. We saw several examples of the latter. People would sit on the veranda and wait for Rachna to finish what she was doing, and then meekly ask for her signature. Rachna’s own response displayed her occupation of the affective slot of ‘superiority’ to their ‘deference’, reinforced through her use of the diminutive verb forms: ‘Ha, bol’ (yes, speak), her tendency to make them wait, and her quick dismissal of claims that fell outside her responsibility.

What compels such an assertive woman to go to the houses of better-off residents and meet their unrealistic demands? The question is perhaps best pondered when going to her home that also serves as her office. Our driver sets us down on the main road, before driving off to find a place to park in this congested part of town. We walk under the hot sun, needing to ask directions even on our third visit to find her home through the tangle of lanes. Her family occupies the second story of a small brick house; the staircase is very steep, and my colleague pauses for breath. I present these details to give a sense of how unlikely it would be for a constituent of high socio-economic class to come to the home of Rachna. There are no caste barriers here, just class ones. Does this create a level of embarrassment that prompts Rachna to visit the home of richer constituents? If so, she does

10 The greater tendency for the poor to vote is a widespread phenomenon across India (Banerjee 2014). For recent anecdotal evidence from Dehradun, see http://www.dailypioneer.com/state-editions/dehradun/poor-rich-divide-in-voting-approach-also.html (accessed 3 May 2017).
not share this with us. Indeed she cannot give a reason as to why she goes. She is adamant that rich people do not vote, so she is not courting their political support. She is compelled for reasons that remain unclear to us, and perhaps impenetrable to her own reasoning. I speculate that the class difference between Rachna and people in posh areas has an affective force that influences her response.

‘Class difference’ is not a simple equation, in which higher class residents compel lower class Parshads to meet their demands. Rather, the difference in economic standing has to be close enough to engender discomfort or embarrassment. The difference with how rich people interact with Bimla (RSCW-1T) is instructive. As noted above, Bimla is often the recipient of angry demands, but from poor, not middle-class constituents. The latter come to her only if they need a signature, and make no other demands: “when they have work for me they will talk nicely, and once their work is done, if I pass by their house, they will refuse to recognise me”. Bimla does not suggest that she is offended by what could be considered a snub. Rather she puts this down to a simple calculation that they do not need much from her, and so there is no need to maintain close relations. Unlike her ‘familiarity’ with people of lower-socio-economic class, she is not familiar to the middle-class, and the transaction remains business like. Bimla’s low caste, low class status makes her distant, and she does not receive unreasonable demands. At times, however, class differences can engender different emotions and desires that shape Parshads’ response to citizens.

AFFECTIVE FORCE OF DOING GOOD

As we spoke with Padma (UR-2T) in her front room, she received a phone call from a man living in the adjoining ward. Several minutes later, a man in scruffy clothing was standing before ‘Madam-ji’ requesting her to write a letter for an electricity connection. It was not the first time he had come to Padma about the connection. The Parshad from his own ward had delayed writing the letter, and then requested 500 rupees. Once the man had the hand-written letter, he found that the electricity department would not accept it because it was illegible. He then came to Padma and asked her to add a line verifying what the letter said, adding her own stamp. The electricity department did not accept this, and requested a new letter. In desperation, the man went to the mayor, who told him that any ward member, not only his own Parshad, could write a letter verifying his address and need for connection. He had returned to Padma to get this work completed. Exceptionally polite to ‘madam-ji’, the man directed anger at his own Parshad. “We voted for him so that he can do our work. But after becoming elected, he does not do any work at all”. The man is Muslim, and voted for a Congress Parshad. He admitted that he would not vote for the BJP: the party to which Padma belongs. If he was in Padma’s ward, however, “I would vote for her because she is a good human being”.

After the man left, Padma discussed the payment demanded by the Parshad from a poor man. “Some ward members ask for money for every small thing they do…But I am of the opinion that if you are doing social work, you should not be bothered with earning money”. She pulled out a large book from under the table in which she wrote the work just completed. She is visibly pleased when we ask her to show us, turning the large pages full of inscriptions. The instrumental purpose of the ledger is not clear, but its emotional effect on Padma is evident. Writing in each entry reinforces her status as an experienced and competent ward member. The large volume has its own affective presence, communicating the quantity of the tasks she has completed through its weight; I can barely lift it on to my lap and cannot help but be impressed. Each inscribed task also represents the warm feeling of doing good, and while the entries are prosaic, for Padma re-reading them, they invite a memory of people such as the Muslim man on whose life she has positively impacted in small ways.
Padma’s actions are seemingly not without electoral calculation. The BJP’s ability to mediate between different groups and the state has enabled them to build support among groups whose interests are counter to its ideology and policy positions (Berenschot 2014). The question is, were electoral considerations the only factor? The man does not live in Padma’s constituency, and by his own account would never vote for the BJP: in Uttarakhand, the BSP is the second choice for Muslim voters unsatisfied with Congress. Instead I suggest that Padma’s self-narrative as a social worker animated her to help the man as best she could. This is not only a self-representation; the consistencies in her self-narrative and actions suggest that ‘social worker’ is an intrinsic part of who she believes herself to be. Her enthusiastic and active membership of the BJP is woven into this self-understanding, so that she sees party work as an extension of her social work. That seva (or service to the people) is part of party ideology and a common political idiom (Beckerlegge 2015; Ciotti 2012) does not negate the centrality of it to her sense of self. Rather it further animates her to undertake work consistent with its underlying ethical principles.12

The term ‘social worker’ is often treated as a euphemism for ‘fixer’ or broker: someone who mediates between citizens and the state for political support, albeit with the pretence of disinterestedness (Piliavsky 2014; Price and Ruud 2010; Alm 2010). The reduction of motivations in terms of cost-benefit calculations negates the importance of this identity—being someone who helps others—to one’s self-understanding and self-making projects. In a rare, non-cynical account of small time politicians, Fischer (2016) reveals the way people choose leaders who not only serve their interests, but also share their values, and the importance of internal and intrinsic motivations for people to stand for leadership positions. Fischer’s (2016) findings are consistent with an analysis of the profiles and backgrounds of many ward members in Dehradun.13 I would go further, however, in stating that activities to help others is not only a motivation, but core to their very way of being (see also Ciotti 2012). They are not only motivated through values, but also animated through the alignment of acts with self-understandings or ambitions for self-realization.

Recent literature has explored the affective mobilization of volunteers, humanitarian workers, and supporters of development programs (Hoffman 2014; Malkki 2015; Muehlebach 2012; Schwittay 2014). These works explore the impulse to help others not through calculative terms, but as visceral and emotional responses to people in need. They show the intensity of affective attachments to particular projects of improvement (Schwittay 2014), or to ideas of present or desired ways of being (Malkki 2015), and the ways these intensities animate action. Attention to the affective does not mean a turn away from the importance of social and cultural scripts for action. Rather the techniques to instil certain sentiments are seen as a newly recognised form of governance, which contributes to the constitution of ‘caring’, ‘self-sacrificing’ or ‘hard-working’ subjects (Muehlebach 2012; Rose 2000). The point is therefore not to suggest that individuals escape discourse, but rather to go beyond the view of human beings as instrumental, self-interested individuals (Rose 2000). I argue for the productiveness of bringing these insights to understand municipal councillors, who

---


12 I use ethics purposefully here, referring to Foucault’s (1986) ethical self cultivation. The party and broader national discourses around seva are, I suggest, a part of the regimes of truth, which shape self-fashioning projects.

13 See also Jeffrey and Dyson (2016) for civic-minded youth engaged in ‘prefigurative politics’, who are not elected representatives.
despite being politicians, are nonetheless emotional beings with affective responses to lived experience.

The ways people are affected are rarely straightforward, however, and analysis reveals how the animation to help others is often entangled with other aspects of lives and being. Bimla (RSCW-1T) also belongs to the BJP, and is aware that Muslim people will never vote for her or her party. She nonetheless accompanies them when they go to get their pensions. She faces criticism and opposition from her party: “many times objections are raised...The people of our area, who are my family, told me to not to go with Muslims, but I believe, aren’t Muslims also human beings”? Bimla tells us that she is animated to help poor people, as she too has experienced poverty and knows how small things such as a pension can make a difference. Leaving aside the possibility that Bimla is overstating her willingness to help Muslims, there are seemingly other factors that mobilise her.

As noted above, as a first-time ward member with low education, Bimla underwent a sharp learning curve. Becoming competent has been life changing, and doing things right brings an affective charge. We have observed the way she lifts and swells when she is able to get things done, even the act of filling out a pension form. Helping a Muslim person is another opportunity to experience this high. I am not discounting her empathy towards poor Muslims, but rather highlight how these animations are entangled with other emotions emanating from the biographical details of her life. Such animating forces are particularly intense for women, many of whom had little skills and knowledge in negotiating government departments, but who now proudly tells us the work they can do. This is another dimension to the mediated state (Berenschot 2010): its impenetrability produces emotional highs for the people who can engage it successfully. For women in particular, this seems an important animation mobilizing them to work for their constituents.

CONCLUSION

The literature on affect and emotions has drawn attention to the energies that animate behaviour that is opaque and inimical to one’s goals and intentions (White 2017). This line of enquiry has yet to penetrate our understanding of politicians, who remain resiliently instrumental, calculative and largely self-interested individuals in ethnographic accounts. In our opening scene, Kashi complied with the demands of a constituent to have the temple swept for a private function. She did so despite her opinion that this was not her responsibility, nor a moral act, nor even one that would bring her political advantage (she was not standing for re-election). Her action had an emotional logic—to avoid an uncomfortable scene—or perhaps an affective force—a nonconscious compulsion that she could not explain—but not an instrumental purpose. In attempting to reveal the ways Parshads are affected in such encounters, I point to the differential power of citizens to negotiate, and in many cases expand expectations of the state.

The differential power to affect, and the differential susceptibility of Parshads to be affected, thereby influences entitlements: the resources and opportunities that citizens can access from the state. In this paper I have sought to extend Macfarlane and Desai’s (2014) approach to ‘sites of entitlement’ by drawing attention to the importance of emotions and affects as important elements in the contestation and reconciling of claims. Moral economies—the way morality shapes resource distribution and class relations (Palomera and Vetta 2016)—only partially captures these elements; that too, only if we extend morality to not only include informal and formal regulations, but also moral sensibilities: the embodiment of moral orders (Throop 2012). What moral economies fail to capture, are those actions that are contra, or part of emergent moral orders. Explicit attention to the affective intensities of encounters between MCs and voters reveals capillary forms of power that work through the body, with personalised effects. The entitlements that emerge from these
encounters may shape moral economies in a complex and contingent relation (Macfarlane and Desai 2015), but the importance of personal biographies also hints at their containment to the particular assemblages of each encounter.

In describing encounters and narratives of encounters between Parshads and citizens, I have also revealed as yet unobserved, or perhaps overlooked aspects of municipal councillors everyday experiences: being screamed at, embarrassed, or appealed to by voters and non-voters alike. It is an open question as to whether such experiences are missing in the literature is because they are peculiar to women Parshads in Dehradun, or seen as not being worthy of exploration by researchers. As other studies have also commented on India’s increasingly assertive voters (Manor 2016; Witsoe 2011), my impression is that the emotional responses to these demands have been overlooked, rather than absent. The literature on urban development and citizenship in general has tended to celebrate an assertive citizenry, one that will demand their ‘rights’ and keep elected representatives accountable. I have highlighted two negative elements of this phenomena. First, it is not only the urban poor who demand that MCs fill the gap between entitlements and rights, but also the middle class, who demand entitlements that exceed both legal and moral claims. Second, I draw attention to the ways MCs are often bearing the burden of increased citizen expectations, in terms of time, financial costs and emotional labour.

As the empirical material has focused on women, an unanswered question is whether there are gendered differences in the ways men respond, and the emotional responses they engender in others. Emotions are social, and hence attuned to gendered identities (Ahmed 2004). Similarly, Muehlebach (2012) argues that state efforts to mobilize sentiments of an ‘ethical citizenship’ animate women to undertake feminised forms of volunteer work and care. Further, gender shapes affective practice (Wetherell 2012); just as the contact between individuals evoke certain affective intensities on the basis of colour (Ahmed 2004), the gender of individuals shapes social encounters, so that people respond to, or are impressed upon by a woman in different ways to a man. Institutional constraints also play a role. Experiences of gaining new skills and knowledges, or the unspoken questioning of competencies, shape the way women are affected by certain scenes. To say that women are affected in different ways is not, however, to fall into the stereotype of women being more emotional, and therefore less, (or more) able to govern (see Goetz 2007). Rather it is to point to the way the institutional context influences women’s life biographies (Goetz 2007; Mueller 2016) and socio-historical gender ideologies shape affective configurations (Wetherell 2012).

The diversity of Parshad responses indicates the folly of any essentialist reading of women’s experiences as elected representatives. The evidence is overwhelming that caste, class, age, and so on, are as significant as gender in determining women’s actions and the constraints and opportunities she faces as a political leader (Ghosh and Lama-Rewel; Goetz 2007; John 2007; Mueller 2016). I have attempted to unravel some of these differences, in particular drawing attention to the ways class, and to a lesser extent but inextricably connected, caste, influence the types of encounters women Parshads face, as well as their responses. Again, attention to a broad spectrum of male municipal councillors would further help us to understand the ways emotion and affect shape urban governance, and this remains an area for future study. I am adamant, however, that this article is not (solely) a story of women in governance, but of how citizens engage with one face of the state. The differences and similarities across genders serves as an illuminating point of comparison, which as Manor (2016) notes, is critical to the scholarship of India. Women Parshads are not a side-story, but critical to understanding urban governance and citizenship more generally.
REFERENCES CITED


Beckerlegge, Gwilym (2015); Seva: The focus of a fragmented but gradually coalescing field of study’,  Religions of South Asia, 9(2): 208-239.


Shekhar Swain, Satyarupa (2012) ‘The Unequal Access to municipal services and the role of local elected representatives’, N-AERUS, XIII.


