Aarush Yendamuri
The shortlisted essay for the UWCSEA-APP Peace Essay Competition

The region of Kashmir is considered to be one of the largest territorial disputes worldwide, with claims from the two largest powers in the South Asian region: India and Pakistan. Since their independence in 1947, the two bordering states have fought four wars, encountered numerous military incidents and competed in an arms race to nuclear weapons, an example of the security dilemma that persists in the location (Jalil 21). Presently, mainstream media reporting of violent confrontations has declined, but the potential for terrorism and armed skirmishes still remains high. This conflict, therefore, revolves around antithetical ideologies of governance, the rhetoric of religious antipathy and the geopolitical significance of Kashmir.

The complexities of this issue stem beyond the two state actors, more specifically the role of third-party intervention. The Simla Agreement in 1972 legitimised the Line of Control (LoC) as the de facto border between India and Pakistan, yet in that same agreement, India formally rejected the use of foreign intervention, allowing for solely bilateral discussions with Pakistan (Trehan). However, an exception can be directed at the United Nations (UN) and its peacekeeping mission: UNMOGIP. This observer group performs investigations on both sides of the LoC and is the first potential means to alleviate the threat of regional conflict. The presence of a UN body in the region can only be seen as a deterrent, serving as a potential deterrent for state-sponsored violence. In order to achieve that, the UN Security Council could authorise increased presence in the Kashmir region, which may be unlikely given the dynamics of the council and the mutual disagreement by both India and Pakistan on the UNMOGIP’s mandate.

The inability of direct UN mediation pushes for the ability to achieve positive peace through bilateral means. Kashmir is one of the few states in India that are Muslim majority, which was one of the major factors in the state acquiring autonomy and independent governance up until 2019 when the Hindu nationalist BJP government revoked these freedoms. The abolishment of Article 370 triggered a backlash from Pakistan’s higher officials, with Prime Minister Imran Khan unwilling to engage in diplomacy until India rescinded its decision (“The Economic Times”). However, in early 2021, delegations from both states agreed to “dial down the rhetoric,” which constituted both military and verbal actions (Miglani and Shahzad). This historic joint statement was the first step that allows for the solution of demilitarisation, which in this case would be the gradual decline of military presence across both sides of the border in the form of an official treaty. An agreement between both actors to curtail skirmishes would be pivotal in reducing instability in Kashmir, allowing both states to address the threats posed by local insurgency and terrorist groups. Eventually, the war on terror would be a mutual goal for both actors to address collectively, rather than infighting between them.

The recognition of the Line of Control as the official border between the two countries, or a different, recognised boundary is arguably the most likely solution to the conflict. Pakistan’s claims to Azad Kashmir and India’s claim to Jammu and Kashmir stems from the Radcliffe line drawn post Independence, drawn by an individual who had never visited South Asia and was unfamiliar with the demographics of the region (Pillalamarri). With the options of independence and autonomy quixotic, a newly agreed-upon border would prevent the movement of both militaries outside their respective sovereign territories. The challenges, however, lie in the wish for the LoC to be a soft border rather a demarcation line of sovereignty by the people. In a report by Chatham House, the majority of

residents from both sides would be in favour of the LoC as permanent if “people or trade could move freely,” with 38% of people strongly opposing any “permits or passports needed to cross the border” (Bradnock 22-23). The lack of support for a permanent, hard border adds an element of complexity to this solution, with the soft border idea unlikely in the interest of national security. Instead, both states should use this as the starting point in achieving negative peace, which compounded with the next solution will serve as a fundamental basis in alleviating conflict.

The recognition of the Line of Control as official boundaries in Kashmir would be beneficial to both states, which leads to the role of the geographically significant Indus river being divided evenly. The balance of power is tipped in favour of India, with the “regional hegemon being the upper riparian” in the river (Briscoe 2). Pakistan’s heavy reliance on the Indus can be attributed to the vast agricultural land in the region, meaning that any concession of the region would lead to a huge water shortage (“Al Jazeera”). Therefore, alongside the officialisation of the LoC, India will need to guarantee water supply into Pakistan for any form of consensus to be found on the issue, which will need to come in the form of a legally binding agreement given the lack of trust between the two states. In return, India will benefit from the free flow of the Indus river to produce hydroelectric power, a renewable energy source that could help mitigate the energy crisis emerging in the country, with currently over 70% of Indian electricity relying on coal (Mukharji).

The conflict in Kashmir revolves around the geographic, demographic and legislative breakup of the region. The solutions do not rely on one clear path, but a conglomerate of ideas that point towards a peaceful Kashmir. All things considered, however, the conflict's conclusion relies on the role of both state actors and their approaches to bilateral communication. History suggests that neither party is willing to cease territory, but the proposed shift pushes diplomacy over military power. The conflict cannot and will not be solved by addressing each dispute individually, but rather an umbrella solution that addresses the root cause of this dispute: the border.

Works Cited

Jalil, Ghazala Yasmin. “Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia: Pakistan’s Quest for Security.” Strategic Studies, vol. 37, no. 1, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 2017, pp. 18–41, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48535985.

Trehan, Jyoti. “Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism in Kashmir.” Journal of Financial Crime, MCB UP Ltd, 1 Mar. 2002, https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/eb026018/full/html?skipTracking=true.

“Mea: Statements: In Focus Articles.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005%2FSimla%2BAgreement%2BJuly%2B2%2B1972.

“Mandate.” UNMOGIP, 5 July 2017, https://unmogip.unmissions.org/mandate.

“Pakistan's Top Leadership Criticises India for Revoking Special Status of Jammu and Kashmir Two Years Ago.” The Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistans-top-leadership-criticises-india-for-re voking-special-status-of-jammu-and-kashmir-two-years-ago/articleshow/85068399.cms?from=mdr.

Miglani, Sanjeev, and Asif Shahzad. “Exclusive India, Pakistan Held Secret Talks to Try to Break Kashmir Impasse.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 14 Apr. 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/exclusive-indian-pakistan-held-secret-talks-try-break-kashmir- impasse-2021-04-14/.

Pillalamarri, Akhilesh. “70 Years of the Radcliffe Line: Understanding the Story of Indian Partition.” – The Diplomat, For The Diplomat, 21 Aug. 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/70-years-of-the-radcliffe-line-understanding-the-story-of-indian-p artition/.

Bradnock, Robert W. Kashmir: Paths to Peace - Chathamhouse.org. Chatham House, May 2010, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/0510pp_kashmir.pdf.

Briscoe, John. War or Peace on the Indus? 3 Apr. 2010, https://johnbriscoe.seas.harvard.edu/files/johnbriscoe/files/108._john_briscoe_war_or_peace_on_t he_indus_201004.pdf.

Al Jazeera. “Kashmir and the Politics of Water.” News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 1 Aug. 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/8/1/kashmir-and-the-politics-of-water.

Mukharji, Arunoday. “Why India Is on the Brink of an Unprecedented Power Crisis.” BBC News, BBC, 11 Oct. 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-58824804.

 

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.