Byron Chong

Byron Chong is a Research Associate at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG) at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has traditionally regarded itself as the central organisation for multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia. However, there is a growing perception that ASEAN-centric multilateralism is no longer able to address the myriad of challenges facing the region to deliver the outcomes desired by its stakeholders. In the face of China’s rising belligerence in the South China Sea, ASEAN’s response has been associated with political deadlock and inaction. Nor has it demonstrated leadership and initiative amidst the return of great power competition, instead showing passivity and timidity. All this has raised questions over ASEAN’s continued relevance to the region’s multilateral security architecture. Indeed, the clearest sign of growing exasperation with ASEAN-led multilateralism not just within Southeast Asia, but across the wider Indo-Pacific, has been the growing prominence of minilateral arrangements. Unlike multilateralism which traditionally aims for greater inclusivity, minilateralism places emphasis on selective groups collaborating on specific issues that can allow them to act more swiftly and decisively.[1] This trend thus reflects a growing preference for efficiency over inclusiveness, contradicting not just ASEAN’s traditional model of consensus-based multilateralism, but also its much-vaunted ‘centrality.’ In fact, some scholars have gone further to suggest that minilateralism could “overshadow and eventually challenge” multilateralism.[2] 

What does this mean for the future of ASEAN, and indeed, the very perception of multilateralism in Southeast Asia? The paper will seek to answer this question in the following sections. It will begin with a brief historical background of ASEAN, discussing its reliance on norms and the expansion of ASEAN-led multilateral mechanisms in the region. Next, it will examine some of ASEAN’s longstanding institutional weaknesses, which were once considered relatively minor but have been exacerbated by significant shifts over the past two decades, seriously undermining ASEAN's effectiveness as a multilateral organisation. The paper will then present a brief outlook for the region—a bleak future that will likely see deepening fissures between Southeast Asian states, and ASEAN becoming increasingly inconsequential and overshadowed—assuming that current trends continue. The final section will propose a set of recommendations for ASEAN to avert, or at least mitigate this grim outcome, by focusing on strengthening cohesion and unity among its members, and gradually rebuilding its image and reputation.

 

Historical Background

Established in 1967, ASEAN was designed primarily as a platform where the highly diverse countries in the region could manage their mutual distrust and engage in dialogue and cooperation despite simmering disputes and disagreements. To encourage participation, ASEAN adopted a loose structure that gave its members a high degree of autonomy. This was a consequence of the region’s colonial past, which left many Southeast Asian governments especially sensitive to issues of national sovereignty or any perceived interference in their domestic affairs. The group’s Secretariat was thus deliberately designed to be weak and ineffective, with little authority over its members. Eschewing a legalist approach, members were instead encouraged to adhere to a set of accepted norms for state behaviour. Known collectively as the ‘ASEAN Way’, these norms encompassed principles of informality, organisational minimalism, non-interference, non-use of force and consensus-style decision-making.

As globalisation trends began to accelerate in the late 1980s, so did the expansion of ASEAN-led multilateralism. Increasing economic interdependence between states gave rise to the need for better trade integration and policy coordination. In parallel, expanding connectivity networks led to a host of cross-border challenges such as terrorism, piracy, illegal migration and the spread of infectious diseases, all of which, had to be managed through multilateral cooperation. Thus, the following decades saw ASEAN spearhead various new mechanisms and initiatives to address these issues, like the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000 focusing on financial cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993 and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in 2010 for defence and security engagement, as well as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) in 1997 and East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 for more broad-based cooperation.

Notably, despite ASEAN’s aversion towards external interference in domestic affairs, it was a strong proponent of open regionalism and inclusive multilateralism. Its approach was one borne of pragmatism: encouraging the participation of extra-regional powers such as China, Japan, Australia and the United States (US) within ASEAN-led mechanisms gave these external actors a voice in regional affairs, while ensuring ASEAN itself remained in the ‘driver’s seat’. Of particular concern was China—not only was in close geographical proximity to Southeast Asia, but its immense economic and military footprint easily dwarfed the entire region. As such, there was a concerted effort to enmesh the Asian giant within ASEAN institutions like the ARF and the EAS as a means of socialising it into accepting regional norms and constraining its behaviour in the interests of Southeast Asian states.[3] 

Similarly, ASEAN has sought to encourage US engagement in its multilateral initiatives. Washington’s interest in Southeast Asia, however, has waxed and waned over different presidential administrations, and its attendance at ASEAN meetings has remained patchy at best. Regardless, the US has shown support for ASEAN-led multilateralism when it aligned with its own interests—to uphold American preponderance and prevent the emergence of a potential adversary.[4] It was this view that encouraged the US to participate in the EAS in 2011, as well as the first US-ASEAN Summit in 2013. ASEAN’s focus on open and inclusive multilateralism was aimed at creating a conducive environment where smaller states could not only shape the broad contours of the regional order, but also exert a certain level of influence over the preferences of larger, more powerful states.

 

Longstanding Problems

ASEAN-based multilateralism, however, has been far from perfect. Its emphasis on the need to maintain consensus has turned decisions on sensitive security issues into slow, painstaking processes, that often result in either deadlock, or a watered down compromise that caters to the ‘lowest common denominator.’[5] This has led some ASEAN members to form their own intraregional subgroupings, formally or otherwise, in order cooperate and address certain pressing challenges. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore for example, organised their own trilateral maritime patrols in the Malacca Straits to combat piracy and smuggling in 2004. This was expanded to include air assets in 2005, and the involvement of Thailand in 2008.[6] Similarly, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines launched the Trilateral Maritime Patrol in 2017 to counter militancy and transnational crime in the Sulu Sea.[7] Unlike ASEAN’s ponderous and often ineffective decision-making mechanisms, such internally driven minilateral arrangements were able to deliver expeditious and effective solutions to challenges faced by members.

Nor have ASEAN-based institutions been particularly successful at managing potential trouble spots across the wider Indo-Pacific region. The ARF, for example, was envisioned to be “a central pillar in the evolving regional security architecture.”[8] Yet, despite being one of the few organisations in the world that counts both North and South Korea, as well as China and the US, as its members, it has rarely been used as a platform to discuss security issues on the Korean peninsula or Taiwan Straits. The emphasis on consensus means that any issue deemed too sensitive or provocative for any member is off the table, which, ironically, makes it difficult for the ARF to get involved in regional flashpoints—its entire raison d'etre. That said, the ARF is not completely without any redeeming qualities as it does serve as a useful venue for officials to meet on the sidelines when their formal bilateral diplomatic processes stall.

While these problems have always been present within ASEAN, they were not initially seen as particularly significant problems for the organisation. What mattered to regional stakeholders—be it member states or extra-regional powers—was ASEAN’s ability to ensure a productive and effective multilateralism capable of securing their interests. So long as this was achieved, they were willing to overlook ASEAN’s flaws—with minor misgivings—and continue to support ASEAN centrality and leadership in regional affairs. Major shifts in global and regional dynamics over the last two decades, however, have upended this. ASEAN’s flaws have become increasingly difficult to ignore and have seriously undermined its position as the supposed custodian of the region’s multilateral security architecture.  

 

Global and Regional Shifts

China’s emergence as an economic power represents one of the most significant shifts in the international political system over the last two decades. Its rise has been accompanied by an increasingly assertive posture on issues related to its sovereignty and territorial claims. In the South China Sea, where China has long-standing maritime disputes with four ASEAN member countries (i.e., Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei), there have been recurring incidents of Chinese survey and coast guard vessels using violent harassment tactics—such as ramming and using water cannons—against vessels of other nations. This has continued despite China’s long-standing participation in the ARF, APT, and EAS, highlighting the failure of these ASEAN-led institutions in moderating its behaviour.

To make matters worse, ASEAN has been unable to formulate an effective response—hampered by its need to base decisions on consensus. As the largest trading partner of virtually every country in Southeast Asia, Beijing has been able to apply a combination of political pressure, economic coercion, and financial inducements against ASEAN members to support its position. Hence, while claimant member states are keen to protest China’s actions, non-claimant members often prefer to remain silent to avoid Beijing’s wrath.[9] In 2012, Cambodia sided with China instead of its fellow ASEAN members and blocked the issuing of a joint statement that would have addressed Beijing’s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea.[10]

ASEAN’s position is further complicated by the intensifying rivalry between Beijing and Washington. With ASEAN seemingly incapable of managing China’s belligerent actions, the US has increasingly taken steps to do so in order to protect its own interests—often at ASEAN’s expense. For example, Washington supported the establishment of two alternative minilateral groupings—the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad), consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the US and the AUKUS partnership, involving Australia, the United Kingdom and the US—which were widely seen as coalitions targeting China. These arrangements not only jeopardised ASEAN's centrality but also heightened tensions and raised concerns about a potential “regional arms race and nuclear proliferation.”[11]

Even the concept of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) touted by the Quad members, though wrapped in language of cooperation, has been viewed as promoting exclusivity through its emphasis on collaboration amongst ‘like-minded partners,’ contradicting ASEAN values of open and inclusive regionalism.[12] In 2019, ASEAN saw the need to issue its own ‘Indo-Pacific Outlook’ as a means of not just reaffirming its central role in the regional architecture, but also reiterating its continued support for key principles like inclusivity, openness and a rules-based framework.[13] Regardless, ASEAN has demonstrated very little ability to influence the policy decisions of both China and the US over the region and has been relegated to that of a mere bystander in their escalating geopolitical rivalry. Indeed, though Washington and Beijing have continued to pay lip service to ASEAN centrality in the region, their actions largely say otherwise.

This diminishing view of ASEAN has even prompted some middle powers to seek institutional leadership by initiating their own minilateral arrangements. Some examples include Australia’s proposed Asia-Pacific Community (APC) in 2008, followed by Japan with its East Asian Community (EAC) in 2009, and South Korea’s Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) in 2013, though none of these initiatives have gained much traction.

 

Future Outlook

If ASEAN fails to address its shortcomings, the future outlook for Southeast Asia's regional order—and for ASEAN itself—appears bleak.

First, states with a stake in the region are likely to increasingly prioritise their own self-interests, acting in ways that bypass ASEAN or even undermine its position. Washington’s decision to support alternative arrangements like the Quad and AUKUS was aimed at countering an increasingly antagonistic China, and gave little, if any, consideration to ASEAN or its principles. Even ASEAN’s own members have increasingly sidestepped the organisation. The Philippines, frustrated by ASEAN’s failure to check China’s actions in the South China Sea, filed a case against Beijing with the International Court of Arbitration in 2013 without first consulting the organisation.[14] Similarly, rather than relying on ASEAN, Vietnam has sought to safeguard its claims in the South China Sea by strengthening security relations with external powers like the US.[15] The danger in sidelining ASEAN is that states would increasingly resort to military means to cope with the region’s evolving security dynamics, leading to worsening tensions.

Second, the growth of minilateralism around the region is likely to persist. So long as ASEAN members believe that they can more effectively resolve their problems within their own intra-regional groups, they will continue to do so. Similarly, if the US-China global competition continues to intensify, we might also see an increasing number of competing China- and US-led minilateral groupings around the region. Rising geopolitical tensions would, in turn, drive middle powers like Australia, Japan, and South Korea to step up their efforts in forming and leading their own minilateral initiatives to better safeguard their interests and enhance their international standing.[16]

The expansion of minilateralism across the Indo-Pacific could have both positive and negative consequences for the region. For instance, internally driven minilaterals (i.e., those composed solely of ASEAN member states) have shown themselves to be highly efficient at tackling specific challenges and help to fill gaps in ASEAN's capabilities. Externally driven minilaterals however, could potentially be used by competing major powers to build their own spheres of influence in the region. Not only would this intensify their rivalry, but would also promote factionalism in the region as Southeast Asian states are increasingly forced to ‘pick sides.’[17]

Southeast Asia’s Mekong region for example, has no less than five minilateral mechanisms led by different external powers—China, India, Japan, South Korea and the US—which could “potentially weaken ASEAN centrality and unity” and even create divisions between maritime and mainland states.[18] To make matters worse, competing externally driven institutions may begin prioritising goals and agendas specifically to counter their rivals, and place less emphasis on actually tackling the region's challenges.[19]

Nevertheless, that does not necessarily mean that the presence of more externally driven minilaterals will be inherently detrimental for the Indo-Pacific regional order. Some have argued that the existence of more rival institutions might lead to greater competition to provide public goods, which would be a net positive for the region.[20] Moreover, institutional balancing might be a more stable, and thus preferable, form of international competition. This is because the means of competition would shift to rules and norms-setting and divert energies away from more aggressive strategies like alliance-building and strengthening military capabilities, lowering the risk of escalation and miscalculation.[21]

Third, ASEAN’s ability to implement new initiatives would be increasingly compromised. A diminishing sense of obligation towards ASEAN, coupled with the growing availability of alternative minilateral arrangements, would only further erode ASEAN’s ability to ensure its members comply with agreed targets and commitments. States will give less priority to an increasingly irrelevant and ineffective ASEAN, particularly if it no longer serves their interests, or conflicts with their commitments to alternative arrangements that better align with their needs. Divisions within the grouping will grow, making it increasingly unable to reach consensus and implement its plans.

If all this does come to pass, will it mean the end of ASEAN? Perhaps not. As Mark Beeson notes, “established organisations are very difficult to kill off.”[22] Sunk costs in time and resources make governments hesitant to simply abandon a longstanding multilateral arrangement, even if its original purpose is now fulfilled by other, more effective organisations. Moreover, few leaders would be willing to propose such a decisive move that does not provide any clear benefits to the initiating party, and could even inflict serious reputational costs. More likely, ASEAN will simply limp on, though it will be increasingly regarded as inconsequential, and be forced to come to terms with the spotlight shifting to other regional institutions.  

 

Recommendations

To avert such a grim future, ASEAN must be willing to make changes and address its problems. The following recommendations aim to achieve two separate, but interrelated goals for ASEAN: rebuild its image and strengthen cohesion within the group. Realising these goals is necessary for the organisation to begin regaining international support and improving its institutional effectiveness.

 

Prioritise Achievable Results

The first step is for ASEAN to repair the damage to its image due to its past failures. The continuing perception of ASEAN as a weak organisation can easily result in a self-fulfilling vicious cycle, whereby its members increasingly ignore their obligations. A contributing factor to this is the ASEAN Way, which purposely aims to have weak control over members. Unfortunately, instituting greater central control, either within the Secretariat or some other ASEAN mechanism, would be counterproductive as it would likely just generate suspicion and pushback from members.

Instead, ASEAN should take a different approach: aim to first enhance its reputation by focusing on obtaining achievable results. For example, it could concentrate its efforts on initiatives that would elicit the highest level of interest and cooperation, and the least amount of resistance from members. This could include areas of common regional concern like managing humanitarian disasters, disease pandemics, cybersecurity, transboundary crime and extremism.

At the same time, ASEAN should also be more flexible in how it approaches different issues. While tackling region-wide issues may benefit from the involvement of multiple stakeholders, addressing more specific challenges might be more effectively managed through smaller-scale collaboration. For instance, rather than all ten ASEAN members being involved in the South China Sea negotiations with China, it has been suggested that a minilateral grouping of just the four ASEAN claimant states could be formed to represent the bloc’s position. By removing the disinterested non-claimant states from the equation, coordination and consensus would be easier to achieve, and the negotiation process could be streamlined.[23]

Thus, ASEAN must be versatile and nimble in coordinating its approach towards different problems and prioritise attaining achievable results to gradually rebuild its reputation. It is only by rehabilitating its image that states would once again see any benefit in supporting and participating in its initiatives. ASEAN could then leverage on this positive momentum to gradually pursue more challenging and complex problems.

 

Adapt to the Changing Global and Regional Environment

To remain relevant, ASEAN should not remain set in its ways. It must be willing to adapt to the evolving global and regional environment, and proactively find ways to bolster its role and influence.

The emergence of alternative minilateral arrangements in the region for example, is a reality that ASEAN will not be able to change. Rather than being concerned about the threat they pose to its centrality and seeking to compete against them, ASEAN should instead aim for a mutually beneficial co-existence. It should embrace and support minilaterals that contribute important public goods to the region like maritime security, economic development, and environmental sustainability. In this regard, internally driven minilaterals could serve to strengthen ASEAN’s role in the regional architecture, by not only encouraging the development of regional solutions and enhancing cohesion through a sense of ownership and commitment to collective goals, but also helping ASEAN bridge gaps in its capabilities in a more discreet manner.

Similarly, with externally driven minilaterals, ASEAN should focus on identifying potential areas of cooperation and finding ways that the institutions could mutually complement one other. Given that externally driven minilaterals may have underlying geopolitical agendas, ASEAN’s engagement with these groups should be conducted strategically, ensuring that Southeast Asian interests are represented and that outcomes benefit ASEAN members. Such engagement will increase ASEAN’s exposure, and ensure it is involved in, or at least be consulted on, for all significant initiatives in the region and not be sidelined.

Another reality that ASEAN has to come to terms with is the intensifying US-China competition. Multilateralism in Southeast Asia has become caught up in the larger global contestation between the two superpowers, the outcome of which will decide the form and function of the future regional order. ASEAN’s long held stance that it sees both powers as important strategic partners and does not wish to ‘pick sides,’ while understandable, only perpetuates the image of ASEAN as passive and indecisive. Instead, ASEAN should take a more active approach by playing up its strong diplomatic ties with both Beijing and Washington. It could position itself as an ‘honest broker’ that can act as an intermediary and mediator between the two powers. Indeed, Southeast Asia has already gained a reputation as the preferred ‘neutral’ venue where geopolitical rivals can meet. The 2015 meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping was held in Singapore, while the first and second summits between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un took place in Singapore and Vietnam respectively. Rather than shying away from US-China issues, it could emphasise the role of its forums like the EAS and ARF as venues for leaders of the two sides to meet and engage. This would help to enhance ASEAN’s role and prestige not only in the region but globally.

 

Strengthen the Financial Independence of Members

China has been able to sway ASEAN’s policy and decision-making in its favour due to its position as the single largest source of trade, investment, and tourism for many of its member states. Hence, strengthening the financial independence of ASEAN members is crucial for enhancing ASEAN’s ability to make impartial decisions that serve the interests of its stakeholders.

In this regard, ongoing efforts to deepen intra-regional trade and economic integration between ASEAN members are steps in the right direction. The implementation of trade-related initiatives including the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement and the ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement have sought to reduce trade barriers like import duties and non-tariff measures, with the aim of achieving a “competitive, efficient, and seamless movement of goods within the region” by 2025.[24] Improving intra-regional trade would not only strengthen interdependence and bilateral relations between ASEAN members, but would also contribute to the protection of each state’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, this goal remains very much a work in progress. Despite ASEAN’s efforts, the proportion of intra-regional trade has remained relatively stagnant over the last decade, hovering at around 23 percent.[25] This underscores the need for further research and the development of more innovative strategies to enhance intra-regional trade.

Another approach for ASEAN is to continue diversifying its external trade and investment partnerships. The conclusion of multilateral free trade agreements (FTA) like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), will enhance economic ties amongst participating members by reducing trade barriers and streamlining regulations. Likewise, though negotiations for an EU-ASEAN FTA were suspended in 2009, several bilateral FTAs have been concluded between the EU and various ASEAN members, with additional agreements currently under negotiation. These bilateral FTAs could lay the groundwork for the eventual region-to-region FTA which will be in the economic interest of both institutions.

Lastly, ASEAN should seek to further diversify its sources of development finance. Between 2015 and 2022, Southeast Asian states received $255 billion in official development finance (ODF) in the form of grants and concessional loans which went towards supporting the expansion of infrastructure, heath, and education services around the region.[26] A significant proportion of this financial assistance has traditionally come from China, which has been a contributing factor to the Asian giant’s considerable influence in Southeast Asia. Thus, Southeast Asian states could seek to rely more on the region’s other longstanding development partners, including multilateral banks like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, as well as bilateral partners such as Japan, South Korea, European countries, Australia, and the US.[27]

Diversifying ODF from China offers advantages beyond simply mitigating geopolitical risks. As China primarily funds sectors such as transport, energy, and communications, engaging other partners is essential for a more comprehensive development profile. For example, Japan and the World Bank are the key sources of ODF for water and sanitation projects in Southeast Asia.[28] The US focuses on health, governance, and environmental protection programmes,[29] while India offers assistance in more diverse areas, including agriculture, information and communication technology, and disaster management.[30] By engaging with these varied partners, Southeast Asia can pursue a more balanced and sustainable development path.

Another issue is that China’s development assistance often takes the form of large infrastructure projects, which are then financed through Chinese loans. This has created challenges for host countries like Pakistan, Zambia, Kenya, and Laos, which have found themselves struggling to repay these loans, impeding their long-term economic growth and development prospects.[31] In contrast, borrowing from multilateral banks like the World Bank typically comes with lower interest rates, greater transparency, and a stronger focus on debt sustainability.[32] Other partners like India and the US even provide most of their funding in the form of grants that do not require repayment, further easing the financial burden on recipient countries.[33]

Conclusion

ASEAN finds itself at an important crossroads. In the midst of rapidly changing regional dynamics and shifting perceptions, ASEAN needs to be nimble and be willing to adopt new approaches in order to maintain its cohesion and rebuild its reputation. Successfully doing this will allow it to once again be regarded as an effective platform for states to pursue their national interests in the region. Being perceived as an organisation of utility and value by regional states is crucial for ASEAN to retain its place as the central platform for multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia. Failure on the other hand, will lead the bloc to be gradually overshadowed and fade into irrelevance.

Undeniably, regardless of what happens to ASEAN, intractable challenges facing the region, be it the South China Sea disputes, or the intensifying US-China rivalry, will likely continue to persist. The failure of multilateral institutions to properly address these issues have led to growing perceptions that they are no longer relevant and should be marginalised. The irony is that multilateral cooperation is precisely what is needed for states to navigate such an increasingly volatile environment filled with uncertainties. To that end, ASEAN, for all its deficiencies, remains a useful diplomatic tool. The key condition, of course, is that ASEAN bridges the gaps that have divided its members and once again presents itself as an effective organisation worthy of support.

 

[1] See Seng Tan, “ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus: Multilateralism mimicking minilateralism?” in Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN, eds. Bhubhindar Singh and Sarah Teo (New York: Routledge, 2020), 120.

[2] Sarah Teo, “Could Minilateralism Be Multilateralism’s Best Hope in the Asia Pacific?” The Diplomat, December 15, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/could-minilateralism-be-multilateralisms-best-hope-in-the-asia-pacific/

[3] Drew Thompson and Byron Chong, “Built for Trust, Not for Conflict: ASEAN Faces the Future,” United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 477, August 2020, pp.14-15, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/20200826-sr_477_built_for_trust_not_for_conflict_asean_faces_the_future-sr.pdf

[4] Thompson and Chong, “Built for Trust, Not for Conflict,” p.15.

[5] Tan, “ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus,” p. 121.

[6] Collin Koh Swee Lean, “The Malacca Strait Patrols: Finding Common Ground,” RSIS Commentary, April 20, 2016, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co16091-the-malacca-strait-patrols-finding-common-ground/

[7] Francis Chan and Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines launch joint operations in Sulu Sea to tackle terrorism, transnational crimes,” The Straits Times, June 19, 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/indonesia-malaysia-and-philippines-launch-joint-operations-in-sulu-sea-to-tackle-terrorism

[8] “ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement,” ASEAN Regional Forum, July 23, 2009, https://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ARF-Vision-Statement-2009.pdf

[9] Chetra Chap, “ASEAN Remains Divided Over China’s Assertiveness in South China Sea,” Voice of America, September 12, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/asean-remains-divided-over-china-s-assertiveness-in-south-china-sea/7264923.html

[10] Manuel Mogato and Simon Webb, “ASEAN Deadlocked on South China Sea after

Cambodia Blocks Statement,” Reuters, July 24, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1050F6/

[11] Evan Laksmana, “AUKUS mixed reception a symptom of strategic fault-lines in Southeast Asia,” East Asia Forum, October 17, 2021, https://eastasiaforum.org/2021/10/17/aukus-mixed-reception-a-symptom-of-strategic-fault-lines-in-southeast-asia/

[12] Sanchari Ghosh, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ is here. Yet “Asia-Pacific” lives on,” The Interpreter, May 3, 2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indo-pacific-here-yet-asia-pacific-lives

[13] Joanne Lin, “Advancing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific Beyond Indonesia’s Chairmanship,” ISEAS Perspective 2024/9, February 2, 2024, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2024-9-advancing-the-asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific-beyond-indonesias-chairmanship-joanne-lin/

[14] Vannarith Chheang, Selected Works: Contemporary Perspectives on Cambodia and the Asia Pacific Volume II, comp. Sombath Sovannary (Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017): 99.

[15] Gilang Kembara, “ASEAN States and the South China Sea Disputes: Going it Alone or Together?” IDSS Paper, October 9, 2023, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/ip23072-asean-states-and-the-south-china-sea-disputes-going-it-alone-or-together/

[16] Kai He, “Contested multilateralism 2.0 and regional order transition: causes and implications,” The Pacific Review 32, no.2 (2019): 216-217.

[17] Vannarith Chheang, “Minilateralism in Southeast Asia: Facts, Opportunities and Risks,” in Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, eds. Bhubhindar Singh and Sarah Teo (London: Routledge, 2020): 115.

[18] Chheang, “Minilateralism in Southeast Asia,” 108.

[19] Mark Beeson, “Asia's competing multilateral initiatives: quality versus quantity,” The Pacific Review 32, no.2 (2019): 253.

[20] He, “Contested multilateralism 2.0 and regional order transition,” 217.

[21] He, “Contested multilateralism 2.0 and regional order transition,” 218.

[22] Beeson, “Asia's competing multilateral initiatives,” 252.

[23] Joanne Lin and Laura Lee, “Minilateral Cooperation in ASEAN May Help it Overcome Challenges in Multilateralism,” ISEAS Perspective 2023/16, March 8, 2023, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2023-16-minilateral-cooperation-in-asean-may-help-it-overcome-challenges-in-multilateralism-by-joanne-lin-and-laura-lee/

[24] “Trade in Goods,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, https://asean.org/our-communities/economic-community/trade-in-goods/

[25] ASEAN Stats, “Intra-Extra ASEAN Trade, by Selected Flows, Reporters & Products 2023,” ASEAN Stats Data Portal, https://data.aseanstats.org/dashboard/imts.hs2

[26] Alexandre Dayant, Grace Stanhope, Jia Deng and Roland Rajah, “Southeast Asia Aid Map: 2024 Key Findings,” Lowy Institute: Southeast Asia Aid Map, June 2024, https://seamap.lowyinstitute.org/analysis/2024/key-findings/

[27] Alexandre Dayant, Grace Stanhope, and Roland Rajah, “Infrastructure finance competition heating up,” Lowy Institute Southeast Asia Aid Map, 2023, https://seamap.lowyinstitute.org/analysis/2023/infrastructure-finance-competition-heating-up/

[28] Dayant, Stanhope, and Rajah, “Infrastructure finance competition heating up.”

[29] Alexandre Dayant, Grace Stanhope, and Roland Rajah, “Traditional partners still dominate official development finance” Lowy Institute Southeast Asia Aid Map, 2023, https://seamap.lowyinstitute.org/analysis/2023/traditional-development-partners/

[30] Alexandre Dayant, Grace Stanhope, and Roland Rajah, “China, India, and the Middle East as emerging development partners,” Lowy Institute Southeast Asia Aid Map, 2023, https://seamap.lowyinstitute.org/analysis/2023/emerging-non-traditional-partners-china-india-middle-east/

[31] Bernard Condon, “China’s loans pushing world’s poorest countries to brink of collapse,” Associated Press, May 19, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/china-debt-banking-loans-financial-developing-countries-collapse-8df6f9fac3e1e758d0e6d8d5dfbd3ed6

[32] Scott Morris, Brad Parks, and Alysha Gardner, “Chinese and World Bank Lending Terms: A Systematic

Comparison Across 157 Countries and 15 Years” CGD Policy Paper 170, April 2020, p.25-27, https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/chinese-and-world-bank-lending-terms-systematic-comparison.pdf

[33] Dayant, Stanhope, and Rajah, “Traditional partners still dominate official development finance”; and Dayant, Stanhope, and Rajah, “China, India, and the Middle East as emerging development partners.”

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.