Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury

Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury is a David Rockefeller Fellow at the Trilateral Commission and a Non-Resident Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum. He is the author of The China Factor: Beijing’s Expanding Engagement with Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Routledge, 2023).

 

Bilateral relations between India and China have long been characterized by a complex interplay of strategic competition and latent interdependence. Following the October 2024 border patrolling agreement and subsequent diplomatic engagements, an opportunity emerges for both nations to explore collaborative frameworks across multiple domains. While historical tensions and geopolitical rivalries persist, the evolving global economic and environmental landscape presents strategic windows for measured cooperation that could potentially transform their relationship from purely competitive to strategically complementary.

The India and China relationship appears to be thawing after a border patrolling agreement on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh was announced on October 21, 2024. This was followed by an official bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Russia, which was their first formal meeting in five years.[1]   

Relations had reached their lowest in recent years due to the military standoff that began in Eastern Ladakh in the summer of 2020 followed by a deadly clash in June 2020 in the Galwan Valley. Both China and India accused each other of violating existing border agreements and accused either country’s militaries of crossing the LAC, giving rise to clashes. India’s stance, that China’s actions had violated existing border agreements, prompted New Delhi to explicitly link border stability with overall bilateral relations, departing from the earlier position of compartmentalizing border issues and economic engagement.

The India-China bilateral relationship also exists within a complex web of overlapping regional and global frameworks that simultaneously foster cooperation and competition. Their membership in multilateral organizations like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) creates parallel tracks of engagement alongside bilateral tensions, with both nations strategically leveraging these platforms for influence. The two countries’ competition to represent the Global South has intensified as both position themselves as champions of developing nations in international forums.[2] This rivalry has gained additional complexity as Western powers, particularly the United States and European Union, have embraced India as a democratic counterweight to China’s expanding influence, creating asymmetric external relationships that shape bilateral dynamics. While China faces increasing criticism and containment from Western nations, India has successfully cultivated strategic partnerships with these same powers without compromising its traditional policy of strategic autonomy.

This divergent positioning in the global order creates both constraints and opportunities, as India can potentially leverage its Western relationships for negotiating leverage with China, while Beijing may view deeper engagement with New Delhi as strategically valuable in counterbalancing Western isolation attempts. The contours of this relationship will continue to evolve as both nations navigate the shifting tectonics of great power competition, regional security arrangements, and the emerging multipolar global order—with implications extending far beyond their shared contested border.

 

Post October 2024

The October 2024 agreement was the result of two meetings between the Indian and Chinese foreign ministers, 17 rounds of diplomatic meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, and 21 rounds of military talks at the Corps Commander level over four years. Over the course of these meetings, five of the seven points of conflict on the LAC since the clash at Galwan had seen the disengagement of Indian and Chinese forces and the creation of buffer zones to reduce the potential for direct confrontation. These disengagement protocols involved the mutual withdrawal of military forces from proximity positions. This latest agreement pertained to the remaining two friction points at Depsang and Demchok in Eastern Ladakh in order to move towards restoring the situation to what it was pre-April 2020. It is important to note that patrolling has not yet resumed at the other friction points where the buffer zones were created.[3]

This agreement on patrolling has led to successful disengagement and is expected to lead to de-escalation and de-induction in Eastern Ladakh where thousands of troops remain to be stationed on each side.[4] De-escalation is necessary to reduce the levels of hostility and tensions while de-induction would involve the return of troops on both sides to their locations prior to the clash in Galwan. The two sides also agreed to resume dialogue at the special representatives and foreign secretary-vice minister levels.

Subsequently, following the October announcement and the Modi and Xi meeting, in December 2024 Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval travelled to Beijing to resume the Special Representative mechanism after five years with his counterpart Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Doval also called upon Vice President, Han Zheng. Doval and Wang agreed to move towards normalising ties starting with cross-border cooperation and exchanges, including the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, data sharing on trans-border rivers, and border trade, demands which the Indian side had put forward. Data sharing on trans-border rivers has become especially important since the December 2024 announcement of constructing the world’s largest hydroelectric dam on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo, which flows from Tibet into India.[5] Any effect on downstream flows can have serious strategic implications and exacerbate bilateral ties.[6] In January 2025, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri went to Beijing to resume the bilateral Foreign Secretary-Vice Minister mechanism.  

At the same time, after the special representatives meeting, readouts from both sides reiterated the differences of how the two countries view the border issue. India stated the “need to ensure peaceful conditions on the ground so that issues on the border do not hold back the normal development of bilateral relations” while China said the border issue should be handled appropriately so it does not affect the development of the overall relationship.[7] These quotes highlight the two countries remain consistent on how they view the situation on the border, despite the October 2024 thaw. India places a stable border as paramount as China advocates for the border issue to be separate from the rest of the bilateral relationship.

Briefing the parliament in December 2024, before Doval’s trip, India’s foreign minister S. Jaishankar provided an update on bilateral relations.[8] He reiterated the Indian government’s position that maintenance of peace and tranquillity in border areas was a pre-requisite for the development of bilateral ties and while disengagement has been successfully achieved, he did not suggest it implies a return to normalcy in relations. The minister added that disengagement allowed the consideration of other aspects of bilateral ties in a calibrated manner, while prioritising national security interests. Emphasising the importance of security considerations in different dimensions of the relationship could have important implications going forward, particularly in the economic realm.

While this thaw is a welcome development, it does not signify a strategic shift away from India’s rivalry with China and the trust deficit continues at both policymaking and public discourse levels. Although political relations have “improved a little bit,” as stated by the Indian foreign minister[9], the relationship remains fragile. On the border too, the buffer zones which were created remain in place and next steps remain to be seen.[10]

Given the enhanced military presence and permanent border infrastructure constructed by both sides since 2020, the agreement does not automatically return the situation to the pre-2020 status quo. Furthermore, the strategic implications of China’s expanding engagement in South Asia have also been of concern to New Delhi as well as an increasing presence in the Indian Ocean region.[11] New Delhi has also taken several internal and external measures to balance China since 2020.[12] Lastly, the Chinese decision to hold live-fire exercises by the Xinjiang Military District near Eastern Ladakh during Doval’s visit as well as establishing two counties in the disputed region of Aksai Chin, also in Eastern Ladakh, demonstrates that de-escalation still involves a considerable military presence in the border region.[13]

Nevertheless, the positive developments offer certain opportunities for India and China to work together across certain avenues. Such cooperation could play a role in rebuilding trust, reducing conflict, ensuring continuous communication, and economic benefits.  

 

Navigating Economic Complexities

The economic relationship between India and China has been characterized by a delicate and evolving dynamic of strategic caution and underlying interdependence. The recent escalation of economic tensions between India and China wasn’t primarily triggered by the border crisis. India’s apprehension towards Chinese economic involvement intensified in April 2020 when it came to light that the People’s Bank of China had raised its stake in HDFC, India’s largest bank by market capitalization, to over 1%, having taken advantage of the bank’s depressed stock prices during the pandemic.[14] This led to the release of Press Note 3 by the Indian government which scrutinised investments from countries India shared a land border with, ostensibly aimed primarily at China without naming the country.[15]

The Ladakh border standoff and Galwan valley clashes further solidified India’s approach to reduce the country’s vulnerability to potential economic coercion by China. . The government implemented a comprehensive strategy of economic distancing. This included banning 320 Chinese apps, including TikTok.[16] The Indian government rejected ten Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) applications in FY21, thirty-three in 2022, and fifteen in 2023, while fourteen FDI proposals were put on hold. Investigations were also launched against Chinese telecommunications companies like ZTE, Huawei, OPPO, Vivo and Xiaomi over allegations of tax evasion and money laundering. Chinese firms were excluded from government tenders and Indian private companies that do business with the government were warned against using Chinese products.[17] Furthermore, Chinese FDI into India fell from US $494.8 million in FY15 to US $10.5 million in FY 23 and from Hong Kong fell from US $344.84 million in FY16 to US $78.4 million in FY23.[18]

Paradoxically, economic realities continue to bind the two nations. China became India’s largest trading partner in fiscal year 2023-24, with bilateral trade reaching US $118.41 billion, albeit with a significant trade imbalance of US $101.7 billion in imports from China. To address this issue amongst others, the Finance Ministry’s 2023-2024 Economic Survey offered a nuanced perspective, suggesting that increasing FDI from China could be more advantageous than traditional trade, particularly in the context of global supply chain reconfiguration.[19]

It propagated a “China plus one” manufacturing strategy presenting a potential avenue for pragmatic cooperation. The survey argued that attracting Chinese investments could help India leverage global manufacturing opportunities, especially as the United States and Europe shift their immediate sourcing away from China. It would be more effective to have Chinese companies invest in manufacturing in India and then export to the West. This approach suggests a path forward that balances national security concerns with economic pragmatism—a delicate yet potentially transformative economic diplomacy.

However, in July 2024, few months before the landmark border agreement, India’s commerce and industry minister, Piyush Goyal, stated the government was not looking at a review of the cautious policy regarding FDI from China.[20] While India’s commerce and industry leadership maintains a cautious stance on Chinese investments, the underlying economic dependencies suggest an inevitable, if complicated, economic interdependence.

As India’s economy continues to expand, the potential for strategic economic collaboration remains, navigating a complex landscape of national interests, global economic realignments, and strategic considerations. However, the Indian government may continue to exercise caution, prioritising the security of India’s domestic economic sector from excessive dependencies on imports from China in critical sectors that can create vulnerabilities. According to the Global Trade Research Initiative, the overall share of China in India’s industrial product import is 30% while for some products the reliance is over 70%. Additionally, China is the largest supplier of electronics, machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and textiles.[21] Such caution became a reality in January 2025 when reports emerged that China suspended travel for Chinese Foxconn staff to work in India and delayed equipment shipments to the iPhone factories.[22] Subsequently, Indian electronics, solar, and EV sectors also face delays due to China’s export restrictions on key inputs and machinery.[23] This shortage of advanced machinery, crucial for expanding production, is causing delays and setbacks for Indian manufacturing.  

Amid global “de-risking” from China, Beijing also perceives India as a beneficiary of supply chain shifts, with companies relocating to India under the “China Plus One” strategy. In response, China has tightened export restrictions on manpower and specialised equipment to hinder India’s ability to capitalise on this trend. This reflects a broader policy of economic competition, aiming to preserve China’s position as the world’s manufacturing powerhouse while delaying India’s emergence as an alternative. Additionally, the significant trade surplus China maintains with India, reflects China’s policy of leveraging its manufacturing dominance to penetrate the Indian market with low-cost goods, particularly in electronics, machinery, and pharmaceuticals. Beijing encourages this export-driven approach to sustain economic growth at home, even as it resists opening its own markets to Indian goods like IT services and agricultural products, the latter of which has various trade barriers and stringent import regulations.

 

Economic Tensions and Opportunities

In the complex landscape of Sino-Indian economic relations, strategic opportunities emerge despite persistent geopolitical tensions. Economic security considerations have the opportunity to prompt a unique approach to bilateral engagement, characterized by selective openness and strategic caution.

India and China find themselves at a critical juncture where their distinct economic challenges could potentially transform into collaborative opportunities. China’s domestic economy is confronting significant overcapacity and seeks alternative manufacturing destinations, while India aims to expand its industrial base and global economic integration. This convergence creates a strategic window for mutually beneficial economic cooperation, particularly in non-strategic sectors.

While maintaining stringent restrictions on investments in sensitive domains, both nations can explore synergistic pathways. India could serve as an attractive manufacturing hub for Chinese enterprises, leveraging its lower labour costs, skilled workforce, and growing middle class population. Simultaneously, Chinese investments could help India address its trade deficit and facilitate deeper integration into global supply chains. This approach offers a pragmatic framework for economic interaction that balances national security imperatives with developmental goals.

The potential for cooperation extends beyond mere transactional benefits. By strategically reimagining their economic relationship, India and China can create a model of engagement that mitigates geopolitical tensions while advancing their respective national interests. The global economic landscape, increasingly characterized by protectionist measures from Western powers, further underscores the importance of such bilateral economic strategies.

 

India’s Cautious Reopening

In a significant policy development, India has signalled a nuanced recalibration of its approach to Chinese investments, particularly in the electronics manufacturing sector. An inter-ministerial panel approved investment proposals from Chinese companies in August 2024, marking a subtle yet strategic pivot amidst the ongoing border tensions before the October 2024 patrolling announcement.[24]

The approvals, which include investments from Luxshare—a prominent Apple vendor—and a joint venture between Indian company Bhagwati Products (Micromax) and Huaqin Technology, reflect a pragmatic response to industry pressures for supply chain diversification. This move suggests a carefully managed approach to economic engagement, characterized by strict safeguards and an emphasis on local value addition.

In another example in November 2023, SAIC Motor, a Chinese state-owned automotive company that owns the MG Motors brand, formed a strategic partnership with India’s JSW Group to collaborate on electric vehicle manufacturing.[25] The joint venture would also undertake new initiatives to increase local sourcing and production capacity. Such a model would help MG Motors expand in India and support the JSW Group’s desire to enter the electric vehicle market and could serve as a template for other Chinese firms operating in India. In the same month, India also relaxed visa restrictions for Chinese professionals and technicians.

These decisions represent a sophisticated balancing act between national security concerns and economic imperatives. By implementing rigorous screening mechanisms and prioritizing local economic benefits, India is crafting a nuanced framework for selective economic cooperation with Chinese enterprises. A comprehensive framework could thus require foreign manufacturers to establish joint ventures with Indian companies instead of operating wholly-owned subsidiaries, thereby ensuring domestic participation and oversight. This could be coupled with mandatory technology transfer agreements, enabling Indian partners to develop indigenous capabilities in electric vehicle manufacturing. Such arrangements should incorporate strict local manufacturing requirements to boost domestic production capacity and create employment opportunities. Additionally, export commitments could be built into these agreements, positioning India as a manufacturing hub for global markets while helping balance bilateral trade. This approach allows for strategic economic engagement while maintaining critical protective boundaries, potentially setting a new precedent for managing complex bilateral economic relationships in a geopolitically sensitive environment. At the same time, Chinese products in key and critical infrastructure will continue to be viewed with suspicion and efforts to de-risk and reduce dependencies will remain.  The pharmaceutical sector presents another compelling opportunity for enhanced India-China economic cooperation. India’s demonstrated expertise in production and cost-effective manufacturing processes positions it well to serve the Chinese market. China’s demographic trajectory of an aging population and expanding healthcare requirements creates a natural market opportunity for Indian pharmaceutical products. However, significant regulatory obstacles persist in China, with Indian pharmaceutical companies encountering complex and time-consuming approval processes within the Chinese regulatory framework. Moving forward, any meaningful expansion of pharmaceutical trade would necessitate substantial regulatory reform, including streamlining China’s drug approval procedures and working toward greater regulatory congruence between pharmaceutical governance systems. To this end, the momentum from the First India-China Drug Regulation Meeting that took place in June 2019 could be built upon.[26]

The evolving economic relationship between India and China represents a delicate choreography of strategic caution and pragmatic interdependence. The ongoing recalibration of economic interactions—characterized by careful screening, local value addition, and measured openness—reflects a sophisticated diplomatic strategy that could potentially serve as a template for managing intricate international economic relationships in an increasingly fragmented global landscape. While challenges and suspicions persist, the potential for mutually beneficial economic collaboration remains a critical avenue for both nations to explore, balancing competitive instincts with collaborative potential.

 

Climate Challenges and Bilateral Cooperation

India and China face critical climate challenges that threaten their ecological, economic, and social stability, primarily centred on water resource depletion, agricultural vulnerability, and extreme weather events. Both countries confront significant risks from rising temperatures, including glacial retreat in the Himalayan region, disrupted monsoon patterns, increased frequency of droughts and floods, and potential large-scale population displacement. The economic implications are profound, with enormous investments required to transform industrial processes, develop clean energy infrastructure, and protect vulnerable populations in densely inhabited coastal and agricultural zones.

While India and China face distinct challenges due to the effects of climate change, they ultimately share critical climate vulnerabilities. Their collaborative approach and individual strategies will be crucial in determining not just their own ecological futures, but potentially influencing global climate adaptation strategies. For several decades, the two countries have cooperated at international and bilateral levels on climate change despite a rivalry and competition on other fronts.[27] The extent to this cooperation, however, has had mixed results over the past few years due to the state of bilateral relations amidst various tensions.

The first instance of bilateral cooperation on the environment was during Indian Prime Minster PV Narashimha Rao’s visit to China in 1993.[28] In 2009 a climate change agreement was signed to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on climate change and an India-China Working Group on Climate Change was established. A 2010 MoU on green technology aimed at exploring low-carbon technology solutions. The India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue in 2012 emphasized cooperation on energy efficiency, water-saving technologies, and environmental protection.[29] A further proposition to collaborate was enunciated upon during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China in 2015 and featured in the Joint Statement on Climate Change between India and China.[30] The final point of the joint statement elaborated upon the importance of bilateral partnership on the global efforts to address climate change and the need to enhance high-level bilateral dialogue on climate policies and multilateral negotiations.

The Doklam crisis in 2017 followed by the 2020 standoff along the LAC soured political relations and created an environment of heightened tensions and distrust. Cooperation was halted or limited across several aspects of the relationship. In this light, with a new phase of bilateral relations after the October 2024 agreement, the two countries have the opportunity to work together on climate diplomacy.

To this end, we can already see such efforts. During COP 29 in Baku, India along with China were part of a group of emerging economies that proposed discussing what they regarded as protectionism by developed countries. Brazil, South Africa, India and China have long stated the European Union’s plans for a carbon levy on imported products like steel and cement would unfairly penalise their economies. India stated unilateral trade measures in the name of climate action were “discriminatory, [and] harm multilateral cooperation.”[31] Such coordination, albeit at a multilateral level, is necessary on issues affecting both countries. This was not the first COP where the two countries had similar views. India’s environment minister had stated in 2009 that the two countries had agreed to “co-ordinate their petitions before every major international gathering on climate change.”[32] Earlier, at the 2007 COP in Bali, India and China had similar views on rich nations taking deeper cuts in emissions.

As two of the largest developing countries, India and China can take the lead on presenting a unified stance of climate justice and historical emissions, and advocate for more substantial climate finance commitments for the developed world. Given their interest in the Global South, India and China can work together to champion the interests of Global South countries in climate negotiations and create a collaborative platform for knowledge sharing among developing nations including technology sharing mechanisms.

While India and China have worked on combating climate change together in the past, the potential for renewed cooperation remains significant. Together, the two countries can establish climate cooperation as a non-sensitive confidence-building measure, create transparent and non-controversial channels of communication, and demonstrate global leadership through collaborative climate action. 

Successful climate cooperation between India and China extends beyond bilateral relations. Their collaborative approach could significantly influence global climate adaptation strategies, providing a model for how developing nations can collectively address environmental challenges. By presenting a unified stance on climate justice, historical emissions, and substantial climate finance commitments, these nations can reshape international environmental discourse. The depth of cooperation in these areas could serve as a model for global climate collaboration, demonstrating how complex geopolitical relationships can be navigated through shared environmental challenges.

The climate crisis presents a pivotal opportunity for India and China to transcend their historical geopolitical tensions and forge a collaborative path forward. By leveraging their shared vulnerabilities and complementary capabilities, these two major developing nations can potentially reshape global climate diplomacy, offering a strategic model of cooperation that balances national interests with collective environmental imperatives. Their ability to coordinate diplomatic efforts, share technological innovations, and present a unified stance in international forums could not only address their own ecological challenges but also provide a transformative template for how nations with complex relationships can unite in confronting global existential threats. As the world grapples with increasingly severe climate impacts, the India-China climate collaboration represents a critical experiment in multilateral environmental governance.

 

The US Factor in India-China Relations

India-China tensions have been a critical factor in shaping India’s relationship with the US, creating a complex triangular dynamic that both constrains and catalyses diplomatic engagement. While the deepening alliance with Washington strengthens New Delhi’s negotiating position vis-à-vis Beijing, particularly on border issues and regional influence, it simultaneously presents India with a delicate balancing act rooted in its tradition of strategic autonomy. The US has employed both enticements—advanced defence technology transfers, intelligence sharing, and support for India’s global ambitions—and subtle pressures to draw India into its strategic orbit as a counterweight to China. On the economic front, increased US investment and American support for “friend-shoring” initiatives presents opportunities for India to capture manufacturing relocating from China, while participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) aims to reduce dependency on Chinese supply chains. The technological dimension is equally significant, with cooperation in domains like semiconductors, AI, and quantum computing enhancing India’s competitive position.[33] For India, this partnership offers tangible benefits in military modernization and strategic leverage vis-à-vis Beijing yet simultaneously risks triggering heightened Chinese assertiveness along their disputed border and in India’s neighbourhood. Beijing views these developments with suspicion, interpreting joint naval exercises and defence agreements as part of a broader containment strategy.[34] This perception significantly complicates diplomatic efforts to stabilize Sino-Indian relations, as China questions whether India’s actions reflect independent strategic calculations or coordination with American regional objectives.[35]

India’s careful navigation of this triangular relationship involves managing Chinese concerns while extracting maximum strategic benefits from its partnership with the US without surrendering its decisional autonomy—a delicate diplomatic challenge that requires constant calibration as geopolitical circumstances evolve. The success of India’s balancing approach will ultimately depend on its ability to convince Beijing that improved relations with Washington need not come at China’s expense, while simultaneously maintaining sufficient strategic independence to pursue rapprochement with China when circumstances allow.

 

Conclusion

To meaningfully build trust with India, China could take several concrete steps that demonstrate a genuine commitment to bilateral cooperation. These could include creating more level playing fields for Indian companies seeking to operate in the Chinese market, thereby addressing long-standing economic asymmetries. China could also extend strategic diplomatic support by considering India’s candidacy for permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which would signal a significant shift towards recognizing India’s global strategic importance. Furthermore, supporting India-led multilateral initiatives like the International Solar Alliance would provide a tangible avenue for collaborative action, showcasing China’s willingness to work constructively with India on global challenges. Such actions would not only help rebuild trust but also create meaningful pathways for constructive engagement, moving beyond historical tensions and towards a more cooperative bilateral relationship.

From the Indian side, efforts can be made towards the resumption of direct flights, further loosening visa restrictions, and resuming the cross-posting of journalists between the two countries. Additionally, reducing hurdles for investments in non-sensitive areas would highlight the importance of strengthening economic relations. During the Foreign Secretary-Vice Minister meeting in January 2025, progress was made when the two countries agreed to resume direct flights and agreed on improving access to journalists from both sides. While these efforts are more technical than strategic decisions, India could debate doing more to reassure China about its multi-aligned foreign policy and strategic objectives for UNSC and NSG membership support.   

The trajectory of India-China relations remains delicately poised between strategic caution and pragmatic collaboration. As both nations navigate the intricate challenges of the 21st century—ranging from economic reconfiguration to climate vulnerabilities—their ability to construct constructive engagement mechanisms will be pivotal and continued political dialogue is critical. For China, the October 2024 agreement signalled efforts to stabilise relations as it prepares for a second Trump presidency amidst domestic economic concerns and for India, the agreement can restart the inflow of Chinese FDI into its manufacturing sector.

Ultimately, by prioritizing shared interests, developing transparent communication channels, and maintaining a balanced approach to national security and economic opportunities, India and China can potentially establish a model of bilateral relations that takes into account historical adversities and contributes meaningfully to global stability and development while continuing to work towards the current thawing of relations.

 

[1] “Transcript of Special Briefing by Foreign Secretary on Prime Minister’s Visit to Russia (October 21, 2024),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 21, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/38441/Transcript+of+Special+Briefing+by+Foreign+Secretary+on+Prime+Ministers+Visit+to+Russia+October+21+2024.

[2] Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury, “India’s Voice for the Global South: Strategies in a Multipolar World,” in Filippo Fasula and Nicola Missaglia ed., “Competing for the Global South: Asia and the Quest for Leadership in a Multipolar World,: Italian Institute for International Political Studies, November 28, 2024, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/competing-for-the-global-south-185032; Linda Calabrese, “From Belt and Road to FOCAC: China’s Expanding Influence in the Global South,” in Filippo Fasula and Nicola Missaglia ed., “Competing for the Global South: Asia and the Quest for Leadership in a Multipolar World,: Italian Institute for International Political Studies, November 28, 2024, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/competing-for-the-global-south-185032.

[3] Snehesh Alex Philip, “NSA Ajit Doval to travel to China to restart Special Representatives talks on border issue,” The Print, December 16, 2024, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/nsa-ajit-doval-to-travel-to-china-to-restart-special-representatives-talks-on-border-issue/2405594/.

[4] Shubhajit Roy, “India-China LAC Agreement: What this means, why experts are advising caution,” The Indian Express, October 25, 2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-china-lac-agreement-what-this-means-why-experts-are-advising-caution-9637516/.

[5] “China approves construction of hydropower project in lower reaches of Yarlung Zangbo River,” Xinhua, December 25, 2024, https://english.news.cn/20241225/3b1298a2f02d4428bd76e65929571cd3/c.html.

[6] Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury, “Water and the Exacerbation of India-China Relations,” St Antony’s International Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2023): 122-136.  

[7] “23rd Meeting of the Special Representatives of India and China,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 18, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38805/23rd_Meeting_of_the_Special_Representatives_of_India_and_China; “The Special Representative on the Sino-Indian Border Issue met in Beijing,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 18, 2024, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202412/t20241218_11501558.shtml.

[8] “Statement by External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar in Lok Sabha,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 3, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/38665/Statement+by+External+Affairs+Minister+Dr+S+Jaishankar+in+Lok+Sabha.

[9] Rezaul H Laskar, “India should have balanced approach to trade with China, says Jaishankar,” Hindustan Times, December 5, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-should-have-balanced-approach-to-trade-with-china-says-jaishankar-101733409080432.html.

[10] Jabin Jacob, “Path to normalisation of India-China ties not easy,” Deccan Herald, October 26, 2024, https://www.deccanherald.com/india/path-to-normalisation-of-india-china-ties-not-easy-3249957.

Read more at: https://www.deccanherald.com/india/path-to-normalisation-of-india-china-ties-not-easy-3249957

[11] Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury, The China Factor: Beijing’s Expanding Engagement in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (London: Routledge), 2023.

[12] Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury, “India’s Response to a Rising China,” East Asia Institute Background Brief No. 1802, December 5, 2024.

[13] “Sharp Arrow Attack - Live Ammunition Training Video of a Rocket Artillery Detachment of a Regiment of the Army,” Xinhua, December 20, 2024, http://www.news.cn/milpro/20241220/53b48a2e74e74c14b50183e21288fd6b/c.html; “Two new counties established in Xinjiang,” Xinhua, December 28, 2024, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202412/28/content_WS676f56ebc6d0868f4e8ee55e.html.

[14] Rajesh Mascarenhas, “China’s central bank buys 1% stake in HDFC,” Economic Times, April 13, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/chinas-central-bank-holds-1-stake-in-hdfc/articleshow/75104998.cms?from=mdr.

[15] Press Note No. 3, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, https://dpiit.gov.in/sites/default/files/pn3_2020.pdf. 

[16] Divya Bhati, “Full list of Chinese apps banned in India so far: PUBG Mobile, Garena Free Fire, TikTok and hundreds more,” India Today, August 21, 2022, https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/bgmi-garena-free-fire-tiktok-and-more-banned-in-india-check-the-full-list-1990048-2022-08-19.

[17] Abhinandan Mishra, “India cracks down on Chinese tech, bans 17 companies,” The Sunday Guardian, February 25, 2024, https://sundayguardianlive.com/top-five/india-cracks-down-on-chinese-tech-bans-17-companies.

[18] Ashutosh Kumar, “Rejecting China,” Fortune India, November 4, 2023, https://www.fortuneindia.com/long-reads/rejecting-china/114650.

[19] Economic Survey of India 2023-2024, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.

[20] “No review of policy on Chinese FDI: Goyal,” Financial Express, July 31, 2024, https://www.financialexpress.com/policy/economy-no-review-of-policy-on-chinese-fdi-goyal-3569297/.

[21] “An Examination of India’s Growing Industrial Sector Imports from China,” Global Trade Research Initiative, April 29, 2024, https://gtri.co.in/gtriFlagshipReportsd.asp?ID=39.

[22] Selina Cheng, Viola Zhou, “Foxconn stops sending Chinese workers to India iPhone factories,” Rest of World, January 10, 2025, https://restofworld.org/2025/china-foxconn-factoriesfoxconn-stops-sending-chinese-workers-to-india-iphone-factories/.

[23] PTI, “China’s export curbs to impact electronics, EV firms in India: GTRI,” Business Standard, January 16, 2025, https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/china-s-export-curbs-to-impact-electronics-ev-firms-in-india-gtri-125011600528_1.html.

[24] Kiran Rathee, “Forbidden no more: India begins OKing Chinese proposals,” Economic Times, August 22, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/forbidden-no-more-india-begins-oking-chinese-proposals/articleshow/112691334.cms?from=mdr.

[25] “SAIC Motor and JSW Group announce a strategic Joint Venture to accelerate growth with focus on green mobility,” JSW, https://www.jsw.in/groups/saic-motor-and-jsw-group-announce-strategic-joint-venture-accelerate-growth-focus-green.

[26] “Press Release: First India-China Drug Regulation Meeting,” Embassy of India, Beijing, China, June 2019, https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibejing_listview/Mzkz#:~:text=However%20our%20exports%20of%20pharma,regulators%20from%20both%20the%20sides.

[27] Robert Mizo, “India, China and Climate Cooperation,” India Quarterly Vol 72, No. 4 (2016): 375-394.

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.