Yuhan Zhang

Yuhan Zhang is principal economist at The Conference Board’s China Center.

November 14, 2025

Following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, Sino-Western economic ties appeared to strengthen for many years. However, in recent years, the global economic landscape has become increasingly complex, with rising trade tensions between China and many of its trading partners, including, significantly, the US and EU, the latter of which began to systematically impose tariffs on China, as well as other anti-dumping/anti-subsidy measures, from 2011 on. These ongoing Sino-Western tensions are influenced by numerous non-economic issues, including territorial disputes, WTO compliance complaints, intellectual property concerns, and military activities, all of which have further strained international relations.

The deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and China, the world’s two largest economies, has become a matter of global concern. Trade conflict between the two countries continues to escalate, coupled with intensifying great power competition that includes military posturing.

In academia, Wang Jisi, one of China’s leading international relations scholars, reflects on the shift:

“Twenty years ago, I was quite optimistic about the potential of cooperation. In recent years, however, I have become deeply concerned about the deterioration of China-U.S. relations and the risk of conflict – so much so that I now describe the bilateral state as a ‘hot peace.’”.[1]

Harvard’s Graham Allison warns that the two countries are edging toward the historical “Thucydides Trap,” in which a rising power’s ambitions collide with an incumbent’s dominance.[2] Susan Shirk of the University of California, San Diego echoes that pessimism, observing “a downward spiral toward a very hostile relationship”.[3]

This policy brief asks a pressing question: Despite the evolving “strategic competition”, can some degree of economic cooperation still exist between the U.S. and China?

Cooperation, broadly defined, refers to "the act of working together to one end". As liberal institutionalism emphasizes, cooperation does not necessarily suggest harmony nor imply that states have identical, or even broadly similar interests. Rather, it involves active policy coordination to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes​.[4] Conversely, competition – or rivalry – entails "seeking or endeavoring to gain what another is endeavoring to gain at the same time", often resulting in zero-sum dynamics.

In this study, I examine why cooperation has deteriorated, what is at stake if the downward spiral continues, and what potential pathways could (re)align U.S. and Chinese economic interests in the years ahead.

This article narrows its focus to U.S.-China relations because of the unique and pivotal role this major bilateral relationship plays in shaping international economic stability and governing critical transnational issues in the global system, albeit many of the same issues apply to EU-China relations and Chinese foreign relations generally.

In the U.S.-China case, the interconnectedness of their two economies—should it diminish or disappear—has profound ramifications for other countries and multinational corporations, affecting everything from global supply chains to technological standards and platforms to financial markets. Focusing on U.S.-China relations, for the purposes of this article, enables a more targeted analysis of the specific mechanisms, challenges, and opportunities that exist for cooperation in a context that is too often framed by broader, sometimes tangential geopolitical issues.

Studying U.S.-China relations from economic dimensions as a standalone subject is essential because it allows for an in-depth exploration of the pragmatic and systematic pathways through which these two countries can re-engage in mutually beneficial ways on the economic front. By narrowing the scope, the article avoids conflating the nuances of the bilateral economic relationship with the complexities of multilateral issues, such as WTO compliance or global security concerns, which, while important, may obscure some of the actionable insights that could, in theory, be achieved at the economic level, security, defense, and many other concerns notwithstanding. It goes without saying that, if military conflict were to ensue between the U.S. and China, for whatever reason, the prospects of economic cooperation would become dim to nil. This paper assumes that military conflict is avoided and that security and defense concerns remain elevated but stable, as appears to be the case at the time of writing.

1. Why Has U.S.-China Economic Cooperation Frayed?

With China’s WTO accession, U.S.-China economic engagement deepened dramatically, yielding benefits for consumers and firms in both countries​.[5] However, in recent years, cooperation has declined, and tensions have risen. China’s industrial policies have contributed to excess capacity and trade surpluses in sectors such as solar and automobiles, leading to what has been described as a “lopsided entanglement” with the West.[6] U.S. economic concerns over key issues like trade imbalances and asymmetric market access have become more pronounced.[7] Both countries have engaged in punitive trade actions against each other since 2018. Moreover, security and defense concerns have greatly complicated economic issues, prompting both sides to prioritize the security of critical supply chains.  

In early April 2025, the U.S.-China tariff dispute intensified, with both sides keen to demonstrate resolve to their respective domestic audiences. Amid the broader trade tensions between China and the West, including the European Union, both sides continued to escalate their positions. Although a temporary, 90-day agreement[8] was reached in May and extended for another 90 days in August[9] to November 10 to reduce tariffs – bringing general U.S. tariffs down to 30% and China's to 10% – trade tensions continue to simmer.

Beyond trade, strategic distrust weighs heavily on U.S.-China economic relations. Leaders on both sides now prioritize national security concerns in their approach to the technology trade and the inputs that could be used for dual-use products, military and civilian. This has resulted in export controls on such technologies and intermediate goods, with the U.S. limiting China’s access to certain advanced technologies, such as 5G and chips,[10] while China has imposed export controls on rare earth elements and key minerals essential for producing superconductors, aircraft components, electronic devices, and medical devices.[11] There has also been growing regulatory scrutiny of foreign firms operating in each country. These developments have disrupted the technology trade and reduced the scope of the Sino-Western commercial cooperation in “high-tech” sectors.

Domestic political dynamics have also shaped the environment for cooperation. Public opinion on bilateral relations remains largely unfavorable, with a slight decrease in negative views over the past year.[12] Concerns about trade restrictions and their impact on economic development are often discussed in the media, contributing to the broader climate of caution and suspicion. This mutual wariness has complicated efforts to rebuild economic ties.

Worse yet, there has been a systemic shift away from institutional-level cooperation. Key mechanisms that once facilitated dialogue, such as the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, have fallen dormant, although there are some diplomatic efforts to stabilize relations, including the late 2023 summit and recent meetings between U.S. officials and Chinese high-echelon officials to reopen trade talks.

2. Risks of Non-Cooperation and Global Consequences

If the U.S. and China continue down the path of economic hostility, there is a potential risk of entering a Cold War-style non-cooperation scenario, characterized not only by competition but by deliberate disengagement and ideological hardening, which could be uneconomical. In such a scenario, economic interdependence, once a stabilizing force, takes on a very different meaning. Traditionally, strong trade and investment ties created incentives for restraint, as both sides would face significant costs from disruption. However, as competition intensifies, interdependence is increasingly seen through a lens of risk: concerns arise over reliance on Chinese manufacturing and critical minerals in the U.S., while China may view dependence on U.S. markets and advanced technologies as a strategic concern. This shift can lead to a reevaluation of economic ties, and tariffs, export controls, investment restrictions, and technological decoupling all come into play to reduce economic engagement and interdependence. The ramifications of this shift are both immediate and enduring.

At the economic level, a hard decoupling would act as a structural drag on growth, raising costs for producers and consumers in both countries. U.S. tariffs have fanned inflationary pressure in the U.S.[13] Chinese countermeasures may affect global supply chains, as companies need to adjust their production strategies to navigate tariffs. Additionally, non-tariff measures by China could have broader economic effects, potentially affecting productivity. China’s emphasis on “self-reliance” – a policy that has become greatly amplified due to U.S.-China strategic competition – may lead to a less open economic approach, which could, in turn, impact the overall innovation environment.

This economic bifurcation – meaning the gradual fragmentation of previously integrated global production networks – will also accelerate geopolitical polarization. A more severe U.S.-China rupture would sever not just trade but also research collaboration, investment flows, and person-to-person ties. Third countries could find themselves caught between incompatible regulatory systems and trade blocs. The erosion of interdependence between the U.S. and China may eventually weaken an important stabilizing factor in the relationship and heighten the risk of greater security conflicts.

At the global level, perhaps the most profound risk of hostile, U.S.-China “non-cooperation” is that it will reduce the global capability of nations to address pressing transnational challenges. Climate change, pandemics, financial contagion, and artificial intelligence governance all require at least minimal coordination amongst great powers. In an environment of sustained rivalry, joint problem-solving becomes politically untenable, leaving the global commons ungoverned and vulnerable.

3. Potential Pathways for U.S.-China Economic Cooperation

Despite heightened tensions, there are still mechanisms that could possibly foster cooperation, ranging from narrowly scoped, short-term compromises to long-term, more stable engagement. Given the prevailing atmosphere of distrust, however, cooperation, if it occurs, will likely proceed incrementally: initial agreements will need to be modest and tactical, but, if they prove reliable, they may lay the groundwork for more substantive collaboration in the future. An important point to highlight here is that collaboration doesn’t have to be friendly; it just needs to be effective.

3.1 Tactical Cooperation

Tactical cooperation denotes limited, pragmatic efforts targeted at specific issues or carried out below the national level. These are essentially “short-term deals executed within the context of rivalry”. Several tactical avenues are available:

Tariff De-escalation

One straightforward step is for Washington and Beijing to de-escalate and ideally roll back tariffs. This could involve expanding tariff exemption lists or the removal of certain duties. Industry has voiced strong demand for such measures: U.S. companies have put in “more than 1,000 requests for exemptions from tariffs on manufacturing equipment” imported from China as they need these products to “build their products in the U.S.”.[14] Indeed, there are often no other sources, and it will take years to build them.

Easing tariffs on both sides will reduce costs for consumers and producers, providing an economic boost and a tangible sign of goodwill. However, given the prevailing political pressures, any tariff rollback might be framed as reciprocal (each side claiming it won concessions) rather than a unilateral olive branch.

Recent developments between May and August 2025 showed some encouraging signs. The U.S. and China agreed to extend their 90-day tariff truce until November and substantially lowered tariff rates during this period. Beijing also relaxed its export controls on rare earths, leading to an increase in exports to the U.S.,[15] while Washington approved the export of H20 and MI308 chips to Chinese firms under monitored licensing arrangements.[16] These steps have not resolved the underlying trade dispute or altered the deeper strategic rivalry, but they provide short-term relief for industries, reassure volatile markets, and demonstrate that reciprocal compromises remain feasible even amid political tensions.

Issue-Specific Agreements

The U.S. and China can pursue issue-specific agreements in areas of mutual interest. One promising area is counter-narcotics cooperation, particularly addressing the global synthetic drug trade. The U.S. is facing a public health challenge related to fentanyl use. The Chinese government has recently stated that it has an interest in regulating chemical exports related to the fentanyl trade in order to maintain its global reputation for compliance and alignment with international norms.[17]

U.S.-China coordination on addressing the synthetic drug issue could take several forms:

• Technical Dialogues and Information Exchange: Establishing a working-level bilateral mechanism between regulatory and law enforcement agencies, such as the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and China’s National Narcotics Control Commission, to share best practices, seizure data, and trends in chemical diversion.
• Precursor Chemical Monitoring: Enhancing transparency in the trade of dual-use chemicals through coordinated oversight of exporters, real-time alerts on suspicious shipments, and improved customs collaboration.
• Financial and Digital Tracing: Promoting exchanges on tracking illicit financial flows and the role of e-commerce or digital platforms in synthetic drug distribution.

These activities are narrowly defined, avoid ideological flashpoints, and offer positive externalities, including public health benefits for both sides.

Another underutilized but essential avenue is macroeconomic coordination. As the two largest economies, the U.S. and China wield significant influence over global financial stability. Even amidst strategic rivalry, communication between central banks and finance agencies can help prevent financial contagion, stabilize expectations during market volatility, and coordinate debt restructuring for vulnerable developing economies. Regular macroeconomic dialogues between U.S. and Chinese central bankers and high-echelon finance officials could provide a technical, low-visibility, high-value platform to mitigate shared vulnerabilities.

Subnational Partnerships

Provincial governments and municipalities can still pursue trade and investment even while national relations sour, and they are doing so. For example, despite national tensions, the State of California has continued its trade with China. In 2024, China continued as California’s third-largest export destination, and Chinese exports to California totaled $122.06 billion.[18] These ties diversify channels of engagement and can cushion bilateral shocks.

Limitations

While tactical measures are valuable, they face constraints. A flare-up, such as a geopolitical incident or hostile election-year rhetoric, can quickly cause tentative agreements to unravel. For example, a subnational economic deal could be nullified by new federal sanctions. Moreover, tactical deals often address symptoms like tariffs and export controls rather than the root causes of conflict. They tend to be short-term fixes that can stall further deterioration but can hardly, by themselves, transform the relationship. Political turnover is another risk: a cooperative initiative pursued by one administration or local government might be abandoned by the next. Finally, tactical initiatives may be viewed with suspicion domestically. As noted, public skepticism in the U.S. toward China – and vice versa – means that even pragmatic cooperation, like business joint ventures, can be criticized or viewed with suspicion.

The tactical agreements reached since May 2025, including tariff reductions and easing of export controls, underscore these limitations. While they provided short-term relief for industries and markets, they have not addressed the underlying sources of U.S.-China tensions. Thus, these efforts, while essential to “stopping the bleeding”, are inherently limited in scope and durability. They need to be complemented by deeper, more strategic forms of cooperation if a stable economic relationship is to be restored.

3.2 Long-term Pathways for Substantive Cooperation

To have long-term, durable economic cooperation, the U.S. and China need to coordinate and strengthen their mutual ideological understanding, focus on non-strategic sectors, and adjust their respective economic development paradigms such that cooperation, to some degree, can be structurally integrated into the policy and economic fabric of both countries.

Normative Foundations

Long-term commercial interdependence is difficult to sustain amidst mutual demonization. Expanding educational exchanges, “sister-city” programs, and think-tank visits can narrow perception gaps and cultivate epistemic communities that can serve to moderate policy swings.

At the elite level, leaders can articulate a modus vivendi that affirms each country’s right to prosper under its chosen political system, thereby defining rivalry as bounded rather than existential.

While their impact is limited in scale, regularized, high-level dialogs open the space for many channels of communication to live underneath. They also humanize the relationship for the respective publics.

Economic Cooperation in Non-strategic Sectors

Another key pathway towards substantive cooperation lies in differentiating economic sectors by strategic sensitivity. Decoupling is likely to continue due to national security concerns about high-risk sectors such as AI, semiconductors, quantum computing, and 5G/6G. These areas have limited space for cooperation – even within the “small yard, high fence” framework – as both the U.S. and China prioritize domestic capacity, resilience, and control, and as technological development continues to blur the boundaries of “the yard” and the efficacy of any “fences”.

By contrast, non-strategic industries – including agribusiness, tourism, retail, consumer goods, and general manufacturing – offer substantial room for economic cooperation and alignment. These sectors are largely free of any security concerns and generate clear, politically viable benefits in terms of jobs, investment, and trade volumes for both sides. Prioritizing these sectors allows both sides to show domestic audiences concrete gains while ring-fencing sensitive domains.

Multinational Corporations as Stabilizing Agents

While traditional analyses of U.S.-China economic cooperation often center on state-to-state dynamics, such a framework alone is insufficient to capture the complex mechanisms underpinning sustained bilateral engagement. Multinational corporations (MNCs) serve as pivotal non-state actors whose influence extends beyond commercial interests to both structural stabilization and norm diffusion.

MNCs contribute to bilateral economic stability through long-term operational investments that generate institutional memory and facilitate cross-cultural fluency. These firms serve as conduits for regulatory dialogue, investor and consumer engagement, and public relations across jurisdictions. By navigating and reconciling divergent regulatory regimes, MNCs create a transnational flow of information that is often beyond the reach of formal diplomatic channels. In doing so, they help institutionalize healthy economic interdependence and reduce the likelihood of zero-sum approaches to strategic competition.

Furthermore, MNC activities offer tangible economic benefits, such as employment and capital investment, within both the U.S. and Chinese domestic spheres, creating material disincentives for unilateral decoupling. This anchoring effect reinforces economic pragmatism among policymakers who might otherwise favor confrontational postures.

Importantly, many Western-based MNCs now integrate Environmental, Social, and Governance objectives into their operational strategies, hence aligning themselves with broader international expectations and norms. Their operations in China thus facilitate the dissemination of global standards in labor rights, environmental regulation, and corporate transparency. [19] As such, MNCs function not merely as economic intermediaries but as norm conveyers and good practice advocates. Their cross-border presence promotes incremental convergence in the countries they touch.  

Adjustments of Development Models

Structural rebalancing within China – shifting from investment-driven and export-led growth toward higher domestic consumption – would narrow the bilateral trade imbalance and reduce the geoeconomic pressures that fueled friction with major trading partners.[20]   Such a development model transition would not only align with Beijing’s stated goal of “dual circulation” – emphasizing domestic consumption – but would also ease concerns in Washington, Brussels, and other capitals regarding trade imbalances and market access issues. By addressing these longstanding issues, China would create political and economic space for more constructive engagement with the U.S. and the West at large, including multilateral reforms, such as the revitalization of the World Trade Organization.[21]  

Admittedly, this adjustment is not without obstacles. China faces structural hurdles, such as moderating household income growth, rising household debt, and low consumer confidence, all of which hinder bold rebalancing.[22]

Similarly, the U.S. could benefit from reducing its reliance on consumption and global supply chains by reinvesting in domestic manufacturing, technology, and supply chain resilience. Yet, such a shift faces political and institutional challenges, including partisan divisions and structural market factors. Policy uncertainty also arguably makes it difficult for American MNCs to commit to long-term bets on expanding domestic manufacturing.

Substantive cooperation will be difficult and slow, requiring long-term vision, robust political will, and skillful policy making. But historical precedent – such as U.S.-Soviet cooperation on arms control and space exploration at the height of the Cold War – shows that strategic rivals can find common ground. Moreover, today’s economic interdependence between the U.S. and China is far deeper and more complex than that of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, making full decoupling unrealistic: China still holds approximately $780 billion in U.S. Treasury securities,[23] and Chinese goods comprise 13-14% of U.S. imports.[24] American firms remain deeply embedded in Chinese supply chains, while the Chinese market remains vital for many U.S. businesses.[25] Thus, building durable cooperation is not only desirable but arguably necessary to manage interdependence in a way that benefits both nations and the global economy. Prior Cold War logic does not apply.

4. Conclusion

Large-scale and widespread economic estrangement between the U.S. and China is not merely inefficient; it is destabilizing. Strategic competition – even strategic rivalry – may define the current era, but it need not preclude targeted, pragmatic cooperation. History shows that even bitter adversaries can still find ways to work together.^[26]

In today’s context, although the geopolitical climate has hardened and a range of non-economic issues—such as security disputes, intellectual property concerns, and regulatory frictions— continue to complicate relations, decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable. The world’s two largest economies remain deeply interwoven, and the scale and urgency of global challenges demand some level of, if not very significant, coordination.

Tactical measures such as tariff de-escalation, issue-specific agreements, and subnational partnerships can halt the downward spiral and rebuild trust incrementally. Long-term cooperation, meanwhile, will depend on deeper structural shifts within both countries’ economic models, norm diffusion through multinational firms, and the cultivation of people-to-people ties.

This is not a call for a return to naïve engagement and wishful thinking about political and economic convergence. It is a call for disciplined, strategic cooperation – anchored in realism, guided by shared interests, and driven by the recognition that rivalry need not lead to ruin. U.S. and Chinese leaders must reimagine coexistence: ignoring the idea of harmony, embracing fair competition, and committing to deliberate, professional coordination. Relations in this era of great power competition need not be hostile; “mutually accommodative” relations are just fine, and it is unarguably doable, even amidst spirited, even heated competition.

The path forward is narrow but essential. Re-engaging economically is not appeasement, but a practical means of fostering stability and addressing shared global challenges. Cooperation between the U.S. and China is not only beneficial for the two superpowers themselves, but also indispensable for the fast-evolving business, technological, and policy environments in which all countries must find their footing.

References

[1] China US Focus, “Interview with Wang Jisi: better future is possible but uncertain”, January 13, 2025. https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/interview-with-wang-jisi-better-future-is-possible-but-uncertain

[2] Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ s Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.

[3] Tai Ming Cheung and Susan Shirk, “The State of the World, Ep. 1: China”, Talking Policy Podcast, The UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, January 15, 2024.

[4] Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, 1984.

[5] Council on Foreign Relations, “The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship”, April 14, 2025. The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship | Council on Foreign Relations

[6] Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World. Penguin Random House, 2018; Barry Eichengreen, “Resetting US-China Economic Relations”, September 10, 2024. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/possibilities-for-us-china-economic-cooperation-by-barry-eichengreen-2024-09

[7] Erik Lundh and David Hoffman, “‘Huge’ Trade Deficit Smaller than Thought”, Research Brief, The Conference Board, April 5, 2018. China Center Research Brief: 'Huge' Trade Deficit Smaller than Thought;  The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Continues the Suspension of the Heightened Tariffs on China”, August 11, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/08/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-continues-the-suspension-of-the-heightened-tariffs-on-china/

[8] The White House, “Joint Statement on U.S.-China Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva”, May 12, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/05/joint-statement-on-u-s-china-economic-and-trade-meeting-in-geneva/

[9] The White House, “Further Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates to Reflect Ongoing Discussions with the People’s Republic of China”, August 11, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/08/further-modifying-reciprocal-tariff-rates-to-reflect-ongoing-discussions-with-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

[10] Yuhan Zhang, “China’s 5G and supercomputing industrial policies: A critical (comparative) analysis”, Global Policy, 14(5), 2023. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.13239

[11] Ministry of Commerce of China, “The Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs announced the decision to implement export controls on some medium and heavy rate earth-related items”, April 4, 2025. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2025/art_9c2108ccaf754f22a34abab2fedaa944.html

[12] See, for example, Pew Research Center, “Negative Views of China Have Softened Slightly Among Americans”, Pew Research Center, April 17, 2025. Negative Views of China Down Slightly in US in 2025 | Pew Research Center 

[13] Dana M. Peterson, Erin McLaughlin, and Yelena Shulyatyeva, “US Tariff Announcements and Implications”, Brief, The Conference Board, April 4, 2025. https://www.conference-board.org/publications/tariff-announcements-full-analysis

[14] NBC News, “How Trump’s tariffs are causing pain for some U.S. manufacturers”, May 9, 2025. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/economics/trumps-tariffs-are-causing-pain-us-manufacturers-rcna204786

[15] CEIC, “China Premium Database: International Trade”, Accessed on August 20, 2025.

[16] The Hill, “Nvidia in ‘dialogue’ with US government on next-gen chip sales to China”, August 22, 2025. https://thehill.com/policy/technology/5466192-nvidia-ai-chip-export-china/

[17] Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Costa Rica, “6 facts about fentanyl”, March 19, 2025.6 facts about fentanyl

[18] California Chamber of Commerce, “Trading Partner Portal: China”, accessed on May 9, 2025. https://advocacy.calchamber.com/international/portals/china/

[19] David Hoffman, “The Dutiful Company”, The Wire China, December 5, 2021. https://www.thewirechina.com/2021/12/05/the-dutiful-company/

[20] Michael Pettis, The Great Rebalancing, Princeton University Press, 2015.

[21] Barry Eichengreen, “Resetting US-China Economic Relations”, Project Syndicate, September 10, 2024. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/possibilities-for-us-china-economic-cooperation-by-barry-eichengreen-2024-09

[22] Yuhan Zhang, “China’s Real Estate Market: Where do things stand? What can be expected in 2025?”, The Conference Board, March 26, 2025. https://www.conference-board.org/publications/China-Real-Estate-Market-What-can-be-expected-in-2025

[23] The Treasury Department of the United States, “Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities”, accessed on May 15, 2025. https://ticdata.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/slt_table5.html

[24] U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Trade Statistics”, accessed on May 15, 2025. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/trade; Office of the United States Trade Representative, “China Trade Summary”, accessed on May 15, 2025. https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china#:~:text=U.S.%20goods%20imports%20from%20China,(%2416.3%20billion)%20over%202023.

[25] Yuhan Zhang, “U.S.-China Trade and Investment Cooperation Amid Great Power Rivalry”, Policy Essay, The Asia Peace Program, National University of Singapore, March 3, 2023. https://ari.nus.edu.sg/app-essay-yuhan-zhang/

[26] Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, 30(2), 1978. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/cooperation-under-the-security-dilemma/C8907431CCEFEFE762BFCA32F091C526

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.