Aayush Garg
The shortlisted essay for the UWCSEA-APP Peace Essay Competition

The two ancient civilizations, India and China, separated by the Himalayas but bounded by culture, religion, philosophy and trade. Historically, the two civilizations have dominated the global economy emerging as centres of global output and lucrative spice/silk trade [Desjardins]. Until the Zenith of European colonialism, the two nations had seen little to no conflict with each other due to the geographical barriers that separate them. Colonialism gave birth to several areas of conflict between the two nations - the independence of Tibet and the inheritance of modern states with borders previously claimed and owned by the Chinese [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. The conflict between the two modern configurations of the ancient civilizations is a result of a plethora of colonial and post-colonial issues.

The divergence in the ideals of Nehruvian India and Maoist China that were established at the birth of their nations have played a significant role in the rising tensions across the Himalayan mountain range. This is an important aspect to consider due to the reinstating of a brewing Cold War between the U.S. and China where Democratic India has chosen to align itself with China’s main competitor . On the other side, China has aligned itself with India’s hostile enemy - Pakistan, providing it with Military and Economic aid [Palmar] and trying to spread its influence across India’s neighbours. With China attempting to establish itself as the next global and undisputed superpower - it sees India as a competitor and threat to its attempts to stake its claim to the title. The easiest method through which the two nations could see the normalisation of relations would be through increased economic interdependence and the proliferation of healthy competition between the two states. This was seen between 2004 - 2014, with trade exponentially rising nearly 50% year on year (2006 - 2008) [Khanna]. During this period, the two countries saw the rejuvenation of religious and cultural ties with the opening up of the Nathu La passage for religious tourism. We see that the increasing proximity of economic ties was directly parallel to the improving relationship between the two countries that saw very limited conflict during this period. I would say that continuing this path might disincentivise the two states from engaging in any sort of military conflict as they would have more to lose than gain. However, to counter this, we still see clashes between the two nations despite their deep economic ties (trade nearly totalling higher than $100 billion).

It is my opinion that economic interdependence must come alongside several ideological concessions to ensure the border security along either side. Positive peace cannot be achieved if either side continue to act as realist state actors - vying for hegemony and stagnating in a state of a security dilemma. Decades after colonial rule, the two nations are still grappling with its effects - with China attempting to regain its former glory after the century of humiliation [Bahl] and India still creating its development story while tackling border issues created by colonial powers. As long as the two nations grapple with this inertia and an aggressive China attempts to avenge its humiliation and retake what it sees as its ‘rightful place’ in the global order - a peaceful solution is impossible. While it is unlikely that China will denounce its ambitions for Hegemony - the most pragmatic short term solution is for India to distance itself from challenging the power and focus on the growth of its people. This would mean taking steps to distance itself from the mariyad of criticism and lectures the west gives to China and distancing itself from antagosing comments on China at multilateral forums like QUAD. India’s increasing global presence and anti-China position contributes further to China’s distrust of the Indian government and the state that sometimes encourages it to conduct displays of force as seen in 2020 at Galwan Valley [Altman]. In the short run, if India employs a more softer version of diplomacy in International forums, refuses to antiganise China (on issues like Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the South China Sea), reduces its positioning as pro-US and anti-China as well as approaches China to increase its economic ties - peace might be possible. Owing to the precedent of economic growth China has set, India working passively to the benefit of its people rather than attempt to compete with a more powerful and aggressive China - it can defend its self-interest and set the stage as a future world power (creating a multipolar world as opposed to a bipolar one).

However, this would require India to firstly relieve its claims over Aksai Chin or reduce its possessiveness over territories it has lost. Unfortunately, this too is not entirely possible considering the widespread Indian jingoism amongst the Indian populace and the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party controlling the government in Delhi. [Palmar] It is unlikely that nationalism would allow what will be perceived as a ‘surrender’ to China and would lead to further political turmoil within the Indian state. The other issue that arises is that of India’s personal interest and security. If India attempts to cosy up to China, it will also have to reduce its fight for influence in its neighbouring nations. A reduction in its influence and control could pose a threat to its national security, especially, with its complex and hostile history in its neighbourhood. Furthermore, the growing issue of water security due to China’s continuing damming of Indian rivers [Krishnan] that originate in Tibet denies any chance of peace. If India is to back down and adopt a more neutral foreign policy it may lose out on chances to further its personal interests and ensure the long-term security of its people and resources.

The Indian and Chinese governments cannot continue down the path they have been treading for the past century as it is unsustainable and heads towards long-term conflict. The two sides must concede certain claims, ideologies and beliefs as the continued polarity only spells doom for the two nuclear-powered nations.

Works Cited

Altman, Dan. "What the History of Modern Conquest Tells Us About China and India’s Border Crisis." War on the Rocks, 9 July 2020, warontherocks.com/2020/07/what-the-history-of-modern-conquest-tells-us-about-chin a-and-indias-border-crisis/.

Bahl, Raghav. "Why Is China Expansionist And India Pacifist? Colonial History, Part-I." BloombergQuint, 11 July 2020,

www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/why-is-china-expansionist-and-india-pacifist-coloni al-history-part-i.
"British Invasions Probed As Root Cause of Tibetan Separatism." 中华人民共和国外 交部, www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cgman//eng/xwdt/t426541.htm.

Desjardins, Jeff. "Over 2,000 Years of Economic History in One Chart." Visual Capitalist, 9 Mar. 2019, www.visualcapitalist.com/2000-years-economic-history-one-chart/.
Khanna, Tarun. "China + India: The Power of Two." Harvard Business Review, 1 Dec. 2007, hbr.org/2007/12/china-india-the-power-of-two.

Krishnan, Ananth. "China Gives Green Light for First Downstream Dams on Brahmaputra." 8 Mar. 2021, www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-gives-green-light-for-first-downstream-da ms-on-brahmaputra/article34014912.ece.

Palmer, James, and Ravi Agrawal. "Why Are India and China Fighting?" Foreign Policy, 16 June 2020, foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/16/why-are-india-china-fighting-ladakh-skirmish/.

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.