Tanvi Kothari
The shortlisted essay for the UWCSEA-APP Peace Essay Competition

After a somewhat stagnant two years, there is a reemergence of the peace dialogue between Thailand’s government and the separatist insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional. This conflict, stemming from the invasion of the Malay sultanate Pattani and subsequent assimilation of the Muslim-majority population, has been ongoing for centuries with no apparent sign of long-term peace agreements or settlements between the two parties. And as expected, there is no significant breakthrough in the negotiations to settle the insurgency in the Deep South or end the brutal crackdown of military rule in the region - the issues that lay at the heart of this conflict have not been addressed, in addition to the unending violence between the two actors and cases of Human Rights abuses on both sides being unearthed. A settlement of this conflict is not only necessary, but imminent for Thailand’s democracy and state sovereignty, especially with increasing interstate tensions in the Asia Pacific region.

This essay argues that rather than implementing assimilation policies, continuing the Junta’s ‘Iron Fist’ rule over the population, and proposing inevitably transient unilateral ceasefires, Thailand’s government should aim to pursue a new and different form of peace-building to rework the tenuous relationship between itself and the BRN - to address the key issues at the root of the insurgency.

Exacerbated violence from the insurgent group has been ceaseless for the last 17 years - and it shows no signs of slowing, despite the obstacles presented by the ‘State of Emergency’ during the pandemic. Thailand’s response to the insurgency and its application of conflict resolution can be characterised as a two pronged approach of carrot-and-stick - hard power and military repression coupled with the less prominent non-violent approach of soft power, which has proven to be increasingly ineffective for its government. Since the start of the insurgency, both BRN and the Thai military have contributed to the 7200 civilian lives lost in just two decades, and the focus on expanding military power has cost Thailand’s government over US$8.6 billion in the last two decades. And although the new opportunity for open dialogue seems promising, none of the many attempts at negotiation have been successful, largely due to the government’s tendency to associate decentralised administration with partition, and BRN’s unwillingness to participate in civil discourse. Without fully casting aside the methods of conflict resolution implemented to resolve this problem thus far, it is time to consider alternative governance structures which could restore peace to Thailand’s Deep South more effectively.

Direct Diplomatic Negotiations

Amidst discussions of peace talks and establishment of joint working groups, it is important to also create a clear framework for the issues to be addressed, to ensure that both parties achieve their non-negotiable and valued objectives. Thailand’s leadership has been equally averse to constructive peace talks in the past as BRN, with former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva publicly ruling out negotiations as a form of conflict resolution and current Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha periodically expressing doubts about its effectiveness.

By focusing less on confidence-building measures and more on covering the substantive areas of governance, education, and legitimacy for the Muslim-majority region that are the roots of the conflict, the government can better tackle the demands of the insurgent group and thus reduce the violence driven by the frustration caused by the draconian ‘assimilation’ policies in place today.

The discussions, facilitated by a third-party state (Malaysia) have allowed BRN to state their priorities - for the recognition of a legitimate Malay Pattani identity, allow the region to develop its own education programme to include the history of their culture, and install Melayu as one of the official languages of Thailand. These demands have existed since the beginning of the invasion of the Pattani region, and the government’s sustained lack of acknowledgement has driven the insurgency’s increased aggression.

The negotiations may also benefit from a more direct approach instead of constant mediation from ostensibly neutral third parties, which has had the effect of internationalising the conflict and call forth the possibility of foreign intervention, as well as making it more challenging for Malaysia to remain an impartial actor between BRN, consisting of a culturally Malay population, and its neighbouring state and economic partner, Thailand.

Reduced Reliance on Military Force

This conflict has been handled mainly using force and aggression, which encourages the cycle of violence to continue to take more civilian lives and take a large toll on the government’s funds.

One of the key factors behind BRN’s sense of injustice is the apparent impunity given to the military, despite their human rights violations. The 2005 ‘Emergency Decree’ implemented in much of the Deep South region has allowed government officials to almost never be held accountable for routinely detaining suspects in the region and torturing them without charge.

The overreliance on military force in this particular conflict has not yet yielded effective outcomes for the government. Low-ranking military personnel are given inadequate training to combat the attacks of the insurgent groups, and are unfamiliar with the culture or terrains of the Deep South. It has thus been concluded that military power alone, despite the significant revenue invested into it, cannot defeat the militant group, and there have been increasing numbers of Thai soldiers killed by militants.

By reducing the counterinsurgency’s dependence on hard power and force alone, especially with agreements to reduce violence during negotiations, the government may be able to invest into gradual decentralisation in the southern region and appoint a new administrative body, as established previously (albeit somewhat ineffectively) by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, which would allow a non-violent government to monitor the progress of the violence and liaise directly with the leaders of BRN.

Discontinuation of Assimilation Policies

The root of this conflict lies in the archaic policy of assimilation, put in place and enforced aggressively since the very beginning of the 20th century. This policy includes the ban on teaching Melayu in local schools, the refusal to acknowledge the Pattani people as a legitimate community, and using normative power to enforce the mainstream Buddhist religion instead of their Islamic religion, which they consider to be a direct infringement upon their cultural identity. Failure to conform to these policies and values has led to brutal military punishment.

The Pattani Malay people, and BRN, have been one of the only minority groups in the state to resist assimilation and challenge government authorities. Now, with an open channel for discussion and negotiation, delegates representing the insurgent group are able to put forth their values and desires to end the assimilation efforts, so that even if there is no progress made in decentralisation of the government, the Muslim population and civilians in the Deep South are able to keep their cultures and their right to practice religion in exchange for the reduction of violence and threats to civilians.

On BRN’s part, there have been efforts to explore ‘nonmilitary means’ as a way of conflict transformation. By adapting to online platforms and forums during the pandemic, representatives from both parties have made efforts to communicate ideas through nonviolent means.

Growing tensions between the government of Thailand and Barisan Revolusi Nasional show that new policies and changes to their counterinsurgency approaches are required to achieve long-lasting, sustainable peace for both actors. Whether current or future leaders in Thailand will have the ability to identify the governmental structures and policies contributing to the conflict and be willing to engage in compromise for the long-term goal of ending violent struggles in its Deep South remains to be seen. But the emerging dialogue between the two opposing sides, even if on a shaky foundation, suggests that there is hope for peacebuilding initiatives in this restive region after all.

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.