The Anchorage Meeting Will Buy America Needed Time

By Douglas Paal
Douglas Paal is Distinguished Fellow in the Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Republished in South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3127100/washington-needs-time-repair-trumps-damage-us-china-talks-and-its

MARCH, 25, 2021

Global media had a rare treat March 18-19, watching China’s and America’s top diplomats depart from normal diplo-speak and score points off each other in Anchorage, Alaska.  Accusing each other of violating protocol and etiquette, they squared off over perceived signs of disrespect, hegemonic behavior, interference in internal affairs, and more.

But when the cameras were gone and the diplomats had boarded their planes, their meetings (the public session, plus three private sessions) were described as “a high-level strategic dialogue that both sides believe was timely and helpful and deepened mutual understanding.”

What gives?  Fans of professional wrestling might recognize the process:  ‘I will pretend that you beat me to a pulp, if you pretend that I took you within an inch of your life.’  Both their audiences will be happy.  In today’s terms, China has shown itself standing up to American bullying at long last, and the U.S. will show it is not going to take China’s aggression and cheating anymore.  The media and commentators in both countries ate it up.

So, was it all just a show for home consumption?  No, some serious business got done.  As the Chinese Xinhua new service summarized, without being disputed by the U.S.:

The two sides agreed to follow the spirit of the Xi-Biden telephone   conversation on Feb. 11 to maintain dialogue and communication, conduct mutually beneficial cooperation, avoid misunderstanding and misjudgment, forestall conflict and confrontation, and promote sound and steady development of China-U.S. relations.

Both sides expressed the hope to continue such type of high-level strategic communication.

Both sides committed to enhancing dialogue and cooperation in the field of climate change, and they agreed to establish a joint working group on climate change.

The United States reiterated its adherence to the one-China policy on the Taiwan question.

The two sides discussed making reciprocal arrangements for the COVID-19 vaccination of each side's diplomats and consular officials.

They agreed to hold talks on facilitating activities of each other's diplomatic and consular missions and personnel, as well as on issues related to media reporters, in the spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit.

The two sides also discussed adjusting relevant travel and visa policies according to the epidemic situation, and gradually normalizing personnel exchanges between China and the United States.

They also exchanged views on a series of other topics, including economy and trade, military, law enforcement, culture, health, cyber security, climate change, the Iranian nuclear issue, Afghanistan, the Korean Peninsula and Myanmar, and agreed to maintain and enhance communication and coordination.

In other words, the Chinese and American top diplomats agreed to tackle the range of global and bilateral issues that have bedeviled the U.S.-China relationship in recent years.  The scope of agreement covers many issue areas from which the previous Trump administration had unilaterally walked away, from climate change to closing missions to denying visas to journalists.  So from Beijing’s perspective, a case can be made that the new administration under Biden, despite the vituperation in Alaska, was opening the possibility of retreating to a more pragmatic relationship with Xi Jinping’s government.

Beijing could also show that the days of perceived unequal relations with Washington, a legacy of 200 years of Chinese weakness, were now behind them.  China, too, can set the terms of the debate.

As headlines arrive daily about China’s economic prowess, growing trade and aid relationships, and new military capabilities, one might miss the key point in the list of “strategic dialogue” accomplishments: Taiwan.

The Trump administration pursued a hybrid Taiwan policy.  Trump himself did not seem to care much about the place, as John Bolton’s memoir showed.  But Trump’s lieutenants pursued an approach intended to strengthen unofficial and official connections with the island, while vaguely assuring Beijing that it was operating within the framework agreed to by previous administrations: to pursue a “one China policy,” governed by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiqués with China, and the unilateral U.S. “six assurances” to Taiwan.  Toward the end of the Trump term, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo seemed to be trying to throw the entire history of the relationship out the window as he left office, when he ordered State Department guidelines on business with Taiwan to be discarded. 

It was important to Beijing to make sure this did not happen.  From the earliest days of relations with the U.S., the Taiwan issue has been front and center for Beijing.  Chinese leaders proved willing over time to be quite flexible on Taiwan with the U.S. for strategic, economic or other purposes, but they could never permit undermining of the ultimate dream of “reunifying” with Taiwan. Doing so would invite domestic destruction of the Communist Party’s pretensions to its claim to realize the dream of Chinese nationalism, a core buttress for their regime.

Since Joe Biden was elected, he has also continued some of the hybrid behavior of his predecessor’s administration.  He has echoed the strong views in favor of Taiwan coming from both parties in Congress.  In the face of Chinese military patrols near Taiwan, Biden’s spokesperson pronounced support for Taiwan to be “rock solid.”  Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly called on Paraguay’s government not to switch relations from Taipei to Beijing.  Taiwan is said to be included in a planned “summit of democracies” later this year.

But, when Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen placed a congratulatory phone call to Biden, Blinken took the call instead, avoiding the controversy incurred when Trump personally accepted a similar call in 2016.  In early February, the Chinese news agency reported State Department spokesman Ned Price affirming the “one China policy” of the U.S.

So Biden’s team wants to have its cake – sounding tough on Taiwan – while eating it, too –not pushing Beijing over the edge by abandoning the one China policy.

Is this a good thing for China but a bad thing for the U.S.?  Not in my view.  The U.S. needs Biden to repair much of the damage done internationally by Trump, and not to make things unstable in the meantime.  Visiting allies, virtually gathering the Quad (leaders of the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia), restoring American reliability, all these recent actions will help.  But the U.S. has to reach deep within itself to deal with the pandemic, right social wrongs, and restore competitiveness.  These are the work of years, not days.  Keeping the peace in the Taiwan Strait meanwhile is not a high price to pay to buy the time necessary.  It is statesmanship.

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.