Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia: Roots and Responses

By Noor Huda Ismail
Visiting Fellow, S. Rajaratnam Institute of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.

Republished in South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3107637/reduce-terrorism-indonesia-needs-use-credible-voices-reformed and in print format in Suara Pembaruan (30 October 2020) and Koran Jakarta (3 November 2020)

OCTOBER, 28, 2020

Indonesia has experienced a series of deadly terrorist attacks from jihadists seeking to establish an Islamic state since the early 2000s. The worst terror strikes were the Bali bombings in 2002 which killed 202 people. To deal with this problem, we must understand its deep roots and recent boosts. Fortunately, there are solutions within grasp, if we understand the problem well.

The roots are deep. The militant struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia dates back to the 1940s when Darul Islam (House of Islam) fought for its establishment.  At its height in the 1950s, Darul Islam was reputed to have control over vast swathes of territories in Aceh, South Sulawesi and West Java. Although Darul Islam was neutralised in the 1960s, its off-shoots and splinter groups which included the Jemaah Islamiyah, have continued the struggle to this day. The idea of establishing an Islamic state is still prevalent among some ordinary Indonesians.  A Ministry of Defence study revealed that 23% of high school and university students in Indonesia agree with the idea of an Islamic state or caliphate for Indonesia.

These deep roots have been bolstered by the more recent arrival of hardline Salafi ideas from the Middle East. These ideas have challenged and undermined syncretic indigenous practices that have long contributed to the development of a pluralistic culture and religious tolerance in Indonesia. Radical ideas are being purveyed through home-based pengajian (religious classes) attended by small groups of 10-15 people.  This appears to be the preferred mode among jihadists and their supporters as such pengajian classes are more difficult for the authorities to monitor or regulate, unlike pesantrens or schools.  It is considered a safer way of forming cells and mobilising the ‘faithful’ as attendance is by invitation only via restricted chat groups on Telegram.

The internet has also made things worse. The speed, accessibility and decentralised nature of the Internet enlarges the potential audience of violent extremism (VE) propaganda. The intertwined online and offline elements of VE propaganda and recruitment enable the creation of a collective identity among potential recruits through what is termed as the “echo-chamber” phenomenon, helping to reinforce individual grievances and radical ideology, and providing the intent and capability to commit acts of terrorism.

While the internet has become a key part of the problem, it can also become a key part of the solution. As targeting and identification of potential at-risk individuals purely through online methods may prove difficult, any effort to track them must simultaneously target both online and offline domains. This can be done by encouraging “credible voices” as mentors to approach at risk individual, build communication, and helping them to leave their radical networks.

These mentoring activities should implement the three principles of Heart, Hands, and Head  or  “the Triple H Approach”.  The “Heart” approach is aimed to secure the clients’ trust in their mentors. A “Hand” approach is designed to help clients channel their energies into new direction and activities as well as engaging new networks. The “Head” approach is designed to persuade the clients to consider different life-priorities and steer away from their old violent radical ways.

The “Triple H approach” has been implemented with success by reformed extremists. One good example is Arif Tuban – a reformed convicted terrorist - who helped Syahrul, a returned ISIS fighter from East Java, Indonesia to become disillusioned with ISIS’ lies and their “un-Islamic behaviours” (such as beheadings).  Syahrul told the Indonesian court that an ISIS recruiter told him that as a good Muslim, he had to help his oppressed brothers and sisters. Moreover, he was promised that he would be paid. He was also told that he could come back home safely once the mission has been accomplished.

After his release from prison, Syahrul was helped by Arif to gradually integrate himself back into society.  To implement the first principle of the mentoring, which is “Heart”, Arif introduced himself as a former convicted terrorist who managed to start a new life. This way, Arif could earn trust from Syahrul since they shared a similar life trajectory as a former convicted terrorist. Then, Arif embarked on the second steps of the mentoring with the “Hand” principle or giving the client social skills. In this context, Arif encouraged Syahrul to develop his business aspirations through making and selling a new candy.

Finally, after knowing that Syahrul had developed the social networks, practical skills and changed mindset to truly become a positive father, husband, community member and businessman, Arif then embarked on the last principle of the mentoring which is “Head” or revisiting the old ideology. In this regard, Arif asked Syahrul to participate in social activities such as involving him in P/CVE (preventive/ counter violent extremism) discussions with various university campuses, local community service organisations (CSOs) engaged in P/CVE, and village organisations.  

Through this public engagement, Arif encouraged and provided an opportunity for Syahrul to become a guest speaker in various prevention activities, including with the national counter-terrorism agency. Arif also helped Syahrul in restoring his community reputation by introducing him to the local police and involving him in joint assistance activities. This opened up opportunities for him to become acquainted with community leaders and to have new social networks and platforms to channel his aspirations in public engagement, both offline and online.

This is a story of two individuals, Arif and Syahrul. However, this is a story that can be replicated hundreds of times if there is a national programme to do so. There is a clear urgency to intensify the de-radicalisation efforts to stem the recruitment of vulnerable youths, women and children both in online space as well as offline areas such as religious classes. In the online space, it is not enough for the government and social media companies to adopt only ‘negative supply-side measures’ by removing (or suppressing) online violent extremism (VE) propaganda. These measures, while helpful, do nothing to address the continued demand for VE propaganda. This demand is driven by socio-political grievances and theological exhortations. Therefore, strong ‘positive demand-side measures’ are also needed to proactively engage individuals and communities flirting with VE ideology. The use of reformed convicted terrorists in Indonesia in ‘positive demand-side measures’ should be further developed in scope and sophistication as these former terrorists have a unique potential as “credible voices” in countering VE ideology.

A stronger national effort to profile the “credible voices” of former terrorists would help to persuade potential recruits to pause and think again before joining the cause. Making this a major national priority would help significantly reduce the threat of terrorist attacks in Indonesia.

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.