Beware of Munich

By Khong Yuen Foong
Khong Yuen Foong is the Li Ka Shing Professor of Political Science at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore and the author of the acclaimed book, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965.

Republished in the Straits Times: https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/beware-of-munich

FEBUARY, 22, 2021

How do wars start? Sometimes, it’s because leaders apply the wrong lessons of history.  U.S. President Lyndon Johnson (1963-1968), for example, scribbled to himself while deliberating whether to intervene massively Vietnam, “To give in = another Munich. If not here—then Thailand.”  Johnson’s old friend Senator Mike Mansfield repeatedly warned him that Vietnam was not “another Munich” but Mansfield’s warnings fell on deaf ears. The net result was a war lost,  over 50,000 American soldiers killed,  and millions of Vietnamese killed.

The Biden Administration should exercise caution about its favourite lessons of history as it begins thinking of new strategies towards Asia.  Clues about the Biden Administration’s thinking on the strategic challenges and opportunities in Asia can be gleaned from a 2019 Foreign Affairs article by Messrs. Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan.  In that article, Campbell and Sullivan, the new administration’s “Asia Czar” and National Security Adviser respectively, laid out a levelheaded  road map--compared to the “fire and fury” approach of the Trump administration-- on co-existing with Asia’s risen power, China. This co-existence “would involve elements of competition and cooperation” with China; for the U.S. to achieve the most favorable outcomes, it should leverage on its strengths as well as harness the efforts of U.S. allies and partners to “shape China’s choices across all domains” in ways conducive to peace and stability. 

Hearteningly, Campbell and Sullivan reject the relevance of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War analogy in their road map: containment is unlikely to work for reasons detailed in the article.  They do, however, draw on many lessons from the Cold War to manage the U.S.-China competition to prevent it from spiraling into military conflict.  Identifying Taiwan and the South China Sea as two of the most dangerous flash points in Asia—and threats to their co-existence model-- they argue for the importance of maintaining a sustainable deterrence posture in East Asia, the utility of setting up military hot lines, codes of conduct, and concluding arms control agreements to regulate the military competition and to prevent accidents from spiraling out of control.  These measures helped prevent a direct U.S.-Soviet military clash during the Cold War.

I would like to add one item to their list of do’s and don’ts: be wary of “the lessons of history” invoked by key decision-makers in the event of a military crisis or confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea. Here I focus on the “lessons of history” most frequently invoked by American decision makers; it will be interesting to find out from Chinese foreign policy specialists about the “lessons of history” favored by the Chinese leadership.  The “lessons of history”—usually encapsulated in the form of a historical analogy such as “no more Munichs” or “this is another Vietnam”—affect decision outcomes by framing the nature of the challenge; in so doing they provides “answers” about the gravity of the stakes, the morality of action/inaction, as well as the action to be taken and its probability of success.  When invoked, these “lessons” can play an important role in structuring the decision outcome.  In the two “hot” Asian land wars that America fought during the Cold War—Korea (1950-53) and as indicated above, Vietnam (1965-75)—the lessons of the 1930s, encapsulated in the Munich analogy, were invoked in the internal deliberations to assess the nature the challenge, the stakes, and to prescribe a strong military response. 

Munich, for Johnson’s generation, referred to the 1938 meeting between British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler in Munich, where the former acceded to Hitler’s demands on the Sudentenland (in Czechoslovakia).  Forever stigmatized as “appeasement” thereafter, the strategic lesson American decision makers drew from Munich was that the stakes were extremely high (for Europe, the US, and world peace); in suing for peace but at the price of not defending the Czechs, Chamberlain whetted Hitler’s appetite, and made World War II inevitable. The policy takeaway is that it would have been better to show dictators like Hitler the mailed fist at Munich—even if it meant war in 1938—than to appease them because accommodating the Hitlers only meant a more disastrous war later.

To be sure, we are now almost a century past the Munich years and there is a plethora of other historical analogies that American policymakers can draw on, from “the lessons of Vietnam” to those of Afghanistan, and of course Iraq; these latter analogies warn against fighting unwinnable wars in faraway lands.  Yet Munich remains an important part of America’s historical repertoire—an analogy that can be easily triggered--when it comes to confronting autocrats. 

Munich has a special hold on the American imagination for three reasons.  First, it tells America the kind of great power it sees itself to be: one that acts with great resolve and able/willing to act in time to prevent a greater disaster later.  Second, and related to the first reason, it is also a code word for the importance of maintaining one’s prestige and credibility—Britain’s reputation as a great power was irreparably damaged after Munich—allies would no longer believe in its guarantees and assurances.  This consideration about losing prestige and credibility was also crucial in the U.S. decision to fight in Korea and Vietnam—a major worry on the U.S. part was that if it failed to save South Korea and South Vietnam, her allies and adversaries in Europe and Asia would no longer take the U.S. word seriously.  In his first foreign policy speech, President Joseph Biden spoke about the importance of “reclaiming our credibility and moral authority.” Third, Munich is also attractive because it is based on an unproven assumption or counterfactual: that Hitler would have been stopped if Britain had been more resolute at Munich, and that World War II would have been avoided.  It is a controversial assumption, but the point is that it allows the policymaker using the analogy to insert his predicted outcome into the narrative. And that narrative is one that amplifies the importance and utility of a forceful response.

The point being made here is not that it is never justified to go to war.  Rather it is that when a major crisis in the Taiwan straits or the South China Sea punctuate the U.S.-China competition, decision-makers should exercise great caution in relying on historical analogies—especially Munich—to “evaluate” the stakes and options.  For international relations specialists have found that in general, historical analogies have tended to lead policymakers astray. This is so because historical analogies, by highlighting the similarities between the past and the present, will obscure or miss out crucial differences. There may be good reasons for showing resolve and perhaps even fight, but it is better to arrive at those conclusions without referencing Munich.  The Munich mindset inflates the stakes, assumes moral certainty, and propels one along a military path based on a counterfactual.  It is safer for the U.S. and the rest of the world to assess the situation in terms of a sound understanding of the facts surrounding the case, clearly articulated strategic principles, and the relevant international laws or norms. Therefore, if “Munich” is invoked in a future East Asian crisis, red lights should go flashing in our minds; we need to warn all involved “Beware of the Munich analogy!”

---

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.