An India-Pakistan ceasefire that can stick

By Ameya Kilara
Ameya Kilara is Director, South Asian Leadership Initiative at Inter Mediate, London, U.K. She is a lawyer and conflict resolution expert, who has also received multiple awards for her work on India-Pakistan dialogue and peacebuilding initiatives in Kashmir.

Republished in South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3134162/how-india-and-pakistan-can-make-ceasefire-agreement-stick

MAY, 20, 2021

A rare piece of good news on India-Pakistan made headlines at midnight on 25 February 2021 – a joint statement between Indian and Pakistani officials renewing their commitment to the 2003 ceasefire. This pressed a pause button on a rapidly deteriorating bilateral relationship. The joint statement was the product of secret backchannel talks between the two governments.

The Indian Army Chief confirmed that not a single round was fired (barring one incident) for the whole month of March following the ceasefire joint statement. This is the most significant reduction in violence achieved at the Line of Control (LoC) over the past decade. If it sticks, it could become the foundation for a long-awaited India-Pakistan dialogue.

The fragility of ceasefire agreements was brought home, however, by a second incident of firing along the LoC, which took place on May 3, just over two months after the agreement. Both countries accused each other of violating the ceasefire.

Ceasefires tend to be notoriously fragile. Like good marriages, lasting ceasefires are not just standalone commitments. Rather, they are underpinned by a network of positive steps to build trust, cultivate habits of dialogue and enlarge the pie of shared benefits for the parties involved and their constituents.

Challenges to an India-Pakistan ceasefire

The ability of India and Pakistan to arrive at, and then to consistently maintain a ceasefire, is further impeded by domestic political compulsions in both countries, as well as a deep mistrust between their security establishments. To sustain the ceasefire, the leaders of both countries will have to anticipate and overcome at least three key challenges.

In India, a spectacular terror attack like Pulwama or Uri will put pressure on Prime Minister Modi, from the Indian public and political parties, to end talks and retaliate. In Pakistan, leaders will be under continuous pressure from military and religious hardliners accusing them of capitulating to India and betraying the Kashmir cause, if they were to agree to a ceasefire.

Finally, given the long-standing alienation and disaffection among the Kashmiri people and strong local support for militancy in some pockets, several Kashmiri groups may perceive a ceasefire as an India-Pakistan deal that excludes them.

Steps to sustain the India-Pakistan ceasefire

Even though the challenges remain, it is possible for both sides to take a series of mutually reinforcing steps to help insulate the India-Pakistan ceasefire from the challenges outlined above.

A narrative on terrorism

First, Prime Minister Modi and his advisors will need to frame a domestic public narrative to accompany the ceasefire. This narrative should link the image of strong leadership with the courage to pursue peace, despite attacks by ‘enemies of India-Pakistan peace’, which is what violent terrorist groups should be portrayed as. This will involve a subtle shift away from portraying Pakistan as the ‘enemy’, to assigning blame to particular groups alone. Government statements, after any terror attacks, should declare that India will not allow its peace efforts with Pakistan to be deterred by groups, that are antithetical to peace in the region.

There are lessons to draw in how the Indian political leadership has justified keeping diplomatic and military negotiations open with China, even after arguably more serious military confrontations at the India-China border, since June 2020.

Agreeing to a crisis response plan

Second, in the event of crisis situations such as an escalation at the LoC or a terror attack in India, backchannel interlocutors, delegated by both countries, should agree in advance to a series of steps to deescalate and keep talks going. These steps could include joint statements by the two governments immediately condemning an attack; activation of bilateral channels of communication; efforts to moderate hostile rhetoric by government officials; and perhaps bolder measures such as a joint investigation team to identify perpetrators .

A verification mechanism with discreet international support

Third, the concerns of the Indian security establishment, that a ‘soft approach’ on terror will create perverse incentives for the Pakistani state to ramp up support for terrorism, need to be allayed. This is where international allies trusted by both countries can play a role. A mechanism, where specific costs and consequences are brought to bear on those responsible for terror attacks, can be evolved. A judicious mix of carrots and sticks will need to be deployed, including conditions-based military aid; trade and economic incentives; membership into international groupings such as G7 and the UN Security Council; as well as sanctions on members of governments, as well as individuals and institutions held responsible for terror attacks. The mechanism would need to win the confidence of both sides by demonstrating objectivity, taking serious action on terrorism without scapegoating Pakistan, and avoiding any impression that India has permitted external intervention on Kashmir.

Timely reciprocal gestures

Fourth, to help the Pakistani leadership overcome the impression among their domestic constituents that the ceasefire was a unilateral concession on its claim to Kashmir, India will need to make a visible and timely reciprocal gesture. This could be in the form of a visit by Prime Minister Modi to Pakistan for the SAARC summit, or an announcement of positive political steps, such as restoring statehood of the current union territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

Early consultations with the Kashmiri people

Fifth, people living on either side of the LoC should be consulted early on and brought into a parallel track of dialogue. Consultations can begin with issues relating to the practical implementation of the ceasefire, such as the positioning of bunkers to accommodate local concerns, de-mining efforts in priority areas with schools and homes, and aid for victims of cross-border shelling.

The India-Pakistan conflict has adversely impacted the populace in both Pakistan and Indian administered Kashmir for decades; it is also directly related to the separatist movement in Kashmir. As confidence grows between India and Pakistan, the Indian and Pakistani governments will need to take political stakeholders in Kashmir on board as well. This can be achieved by designing an inclusive dialogue that accommodates the core issues for the Kashmiri people: fear of losing their identity, anger at past atrocities, and the desire for a dignified settlement. This will also be crucial to ultimately addressing the continuous threat of violence from insurgent groups. If handled sensitively and early on, people affected by the conflict could become helpful partners rather than spoilers in the India-Pakistan dialogue.

Sequencing CBMs

Finally, governments should carefully sequence confidence building measures (CBMs) to build trust incrementally. Previous Kashmir-specific CBMs such as cross LoC trade, suspended since 2019, can be revived. New CBMs could also be crafted to respond to current challenges, such as a Covid 19 CBM to allow the virtual exchange of local information and resources on pandemic responses involving civil society, universities, doctors, technical experts, and bureaucrats in both Pakistan and Indian-administered Kashmir.

CBMs related to the wider India-Pakistan relationship, such as cross-border religious tourism, cross-border environmental cooperation, and resumption of border trade, can then be slowly pursued.

The February ‘21 ceasefire between India and Pakistan has the potential to form the basis of a historic opening for peace at a time when the region is desperately in need of some relief. However, a sustainable ceasefire will require a carefully planned and sophisticated political and technical architecture, comprising elements outlined above, to overcome domestic political compulsions in both countries and the concerns of the affected populations on both sides of the LoC in Kashmir.

---

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.