Countering the threat of Islamist extremism in Southeast Asia

By Kumar Ramakrishna
Kumar Ramakrishna is Associate Professor and Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Republished in the Straits Times: https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/countering-the-threat-of-islamist-extremism-in-south-east-asia

JULY, 16, 2021

In spite of the apparent defeat and decline in Al Qaeda and ISIS in the Middle East, violent extremism linked to the two terrorist organisations continues to pose an ideological and security threat to Southeast Asia. As the recent Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report compiled by Singapore government indicates, following the “demise of its so-called caliphate”, ISIS has “re-envisioned the caliphate as an overarching global state rather than one territorially confined to Iraq and Syria”.  Southeast Asia remains a key part of ‘the global state’ in ISIS’ re-envisioning of the caliphate. Unless efficiently tackled by the ASEAN governments, the repercussions can be extremely volatile for the region.

While the imposition of border controls and lockdowns measures, as part of COVID-19 measures, have helped reduce terrorist activity and recruitment, extremist groups and ideologues in Southeast Asia also took advantage of the pandemic to ramp up their activities. During the holy month of Ramadan in 2020, Ali Kalora, the leader of the East Indonesian Mujahidin (MIT), called the virus a “curse” for the Indonesian authorities. In the past two years, MIT’s terrorist activities in Sulawesi have resulted in the killing of several policemen and civilians.

There is also an additional fear that the impending withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in September 2021 risks turning that region once again into a safe haven for terrorists. This could also mean a potential resurgence of Al Qaeda-inspired and affiliated extremism in Southeast Asia.

Contours of the extremist threat in Southeast Asia

ISIS’ growing footprint in this region can increasingly be discerned through four key indicators. The first is the significant growth in terrorist attacks by ISIS-inspired, self-radicalized individuals. Indonesia witnessed at least 29 terrorist attacks and 25 foiled plots since 2019, most of them carried out by small ISIS-inspired cells and lone militants. This was exemplified by the March 2021 ‘lone wolf’ attack on the Indonesian National Police Headquarters by a young female college drop-out. She was reportedly radicalized online by ISIS propaganda.

A second indicator is the steady growth of women, youth and family networks in active combatant roles. In October 2020, an Indonesian woman was arrested in Jolo, the Philippines, on charges of plotting a terror attack. Both her husband and parents were found to have been involved in terrorist activities in Jolo. Her parents had, in January 2019, carried out a suicide bombing attack on a church in Jolo, for which ISIS claimed responsibility. The attack killed at least 23 civilians. In March 2021, a newly-married couple, linked to the pro-ISIS Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD), conducted a suicide bombing attack on a church in Makassar, South Sulawesi, injuring 19 parishioners.

A third indicator is a possible uptick in the return of Southeast Asia-based foreign fighters back to the region. More than 50 Malaysians could reportedly be returning home from Syria in the coming months. These potential returnees are expected to include trained extremists who, as the Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report states, are “more ideologically hardened, skilled in attack tactics and connected to terror networks”.

The fourth indicator is the continued role of ideological ecosystems, such as educational and religious spaces, as well as individual online influencers and social media networks in propagating extremist narratives. In Indonesia for instance, despite pandemic restrictions, members of the JAD have continued to conduct closed-door sessions. Despite multiple arrests of members and senior leaders since 2019, the older Al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network remains active in Indonesia through its established network of  schools and charitable foundations.

A Two-track strategy to counter the extremist threat

The ASEAN governments require sustained mutual engagement to identify and implement actionable solutions to counter the threat of Islamist extremism in the region.  Such a strategy should involve two tracks: a ‘hard’, shorter-term counter-terrorist track and a ‘soft’, medium to longer-term counter-terrorism track.

The counter-terrorist track involves a range of customized military and enforcement measures to address the evolving threat within and across ASEAN jurisdictions. This has certainly been ongoing. In 2020, the Philippines passed a more potent, albeit controversial anti-terrorism act. The act considerably expanded the definition of terrorism to include activities that incite terror and extremism, such as provocative speeches and proclamations. It also accorded sweeping powers to the government to arrest those suspected of engaging in terror activities. Malaysia unveiled a new cyber security strategy in 2020, which seeks to counter the online presence of extremist networks.

ASEAN governments have also increased international and inter-agency collaboration. In 2020, an Interpol-led operation involving Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, was conducted to secure maritime travel routes against exploitation by terrorist groups. Likewise, since October 2020, Malaysia’s police and armed forces have been conducting joint exercises aimed at securing the waters off East Malaysia against possible terrorist activities.

Nevertheless, a complementary counter-terrorism track is needed to better address the underlying political and socioeconomic factors that fuel extremism. The conflict in Marawi, Mindanao in 2017 between Islamist separatist insurgents and the Philippine military led to the displacement of over a million civilians. Without active and continuous intervention by the Philippine government, in the form of social stability, economic development and security, disgruntled Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) may radicalize, replenishing the ranks of pro-ISIS extremist networks. 

A promising recent development has been increasing consultations between UN agencies and ASEAN governments on rehabilitation and reintegration of returning foreign fighters and their families. Effective returnee rehabilitation and reintegration programs must include post-release employment opportunities, programs to facilitate the re-integration of returnees with their families and communities, as well as the provision of sound religious counselling. ASEAN governments should also engage local communities, particularly the youth and women, in projects that can generate impactful counter-narratives to the appeal of violent Islamist ideology.

 Finally, there is a need to systematically map out the ideological ecosystems that sustain regional extremist networks. As mentioned, a considerable diversity of interlocking extremist ideological ‘transmission nodes’ exist, ranging from charismatic individual influencers, educational and religious entities, to social media platforms and physical closed-door study sessions, amongst others. Grasping how extremist ideas actually spread regionally can help governments and other stakeholders design targeted countermeasures to stem such flows, and ultimately undermine the resilience and regenerative capacity of extremist networks.

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.