China and India: More New Diplomacy

By Kanti Bajpai
Kanti Bajpai is the Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS).

Republished in South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3146504/hope-china-india-border-dispute-turn-megaphones-sensibly-reduce

AUGUST, 26, 2021

A year ago in July 2020, in a short essay for the Asia Peace Programme (APP), I suggested that China and India needed “a new diplomacy”. The old diplomacy consisted of four main elements; regular summitry; military confidence-building measures (CBMs); border negotiations; and trade. My suggestion was to abandon high-profile summitry for now, to turn to back-channel diplomacy between politically trusted envoys instead, and to replace border patrolling with virtual patrolling that relies on remotely controlled airborne vehicles (drones, UAVs), sensors, cameras, and satellites.

A year later, this new diplomacy can be supplemented by further new diplomatic initiatives which are based on modest confidence building. Before I deal with those, it is worth saying that of the four elements of the old diplomacy, at least two still subsist: the old CBMs that were negotiated between 1993 and 2013; and trade. Particularly in India, there has been a view since the events of July 2020 that the CBMs have been rendered useless. This has been accompanied by calls for an economic decoupling from China including trade – India should, in this view, quickly move towards self-reliance in key areas or seek alternative suppliers.

In fact, though, the old CBMs still have value: the general commitment to negotiations and discussions between both military and civilian authorities in the case of border confrontations is the basis for the military disengagement talks currently in progress; and specific constraints on military actions and behaviours continue to be observed such as the avoidance of provocative air flights near the border and artillery and other firing close to the border.

In July 2020, in Galwan, it was another CBM that prevented escalation of the fight into a wider and more violent conflict. The two armies had long ago agreed that advance border patrols would not carry more than a modicum of arms and would in any case stop short of using them in case of a local dispute. As a result, the Galwan fracas saw the two militaries resort to hand-to-hand fighting, ensuring thereby that casualties were kept low.

In the wake of the Galwan incident, India moved to a limited economic decoupling with from China. It banned over one hundred mobile phone apps, introduced rules that increased the vetting of investments from China, and reviewed and/or cancelled tenders from Chinese firms.

However, despite these measures, in 2020-21, China-India trade remained at a very robust $77 billion (even if this represented a reduction from $85 billion the previous year). Significantly, in the first half of 2020-21, China-India trade exceeded US-India trade. India imported $58.7 billion worth of goods from China, which is more than it imported from its next two biggest trading partners, the US and UAE, combined. In addition, reports suggest that Chinese companies continue to apply for foreign direct investment permission in India and that the Indian government is not routinely rejecting these applications.

Nevertheless, clearly, the old CBMs and trade and investment will not altogether stabilize China-India relations and defuse the continuing eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation in eastern Ladakh. At least three things would help to add momentum to the ongoing talks and negotiations.

First, both sides need to end megaphone and publicly aired diplomacy. They have already taken steps to do so since the crisis events of July 2020. Accusatory and denunciatory language in public has receded over the months; but it needs to be sustained. In addition, it would be helpful to put a lid on the public announcements of every round of talks – when they are scheduled to be convened, who sat at the table, and what was achieved or not achieved. Delhi and Beijing also need to stop leaks that reveal the purported statements and stances adopted by the two sides during diplomatic and military talks.

Second, sensible force reductions in Ladakh would help stabilize the military relationship in this brittle sector. The two sides apparently now have up to 200,000 troops on the Ladakh front. These are backed by light tanks, artillery, and drones (drone are particularly in evidence on the Chinese side). Both sides may also have moved up aircraft as well. In my recent book, India Versus China: Why They are Not Friends, I argued that they are prone to misread each other’s military moves in the border areas. This suggests that with the enormous amount of force deployed in the remote heights of the mountains the conditions for a firefight are higher than ever, with the danger of escalation.

Thinning their forces in the entire theatre would help reassure the two militaries. Force reductions may not have to be rigidly and mechanically symmetric. Chinese infrastructure and the flat terrain of Tibet allows the PLA to move forces quickly. India’s weaker infrastructure and highly mountainous approaches to the border slows down deployments. Arms reductions will therefore need to be done with sophistication and a sense of the achievable. Its benefits are not just material but also psychological, signaling a desire for a return to more normal border management.

Third, beyond Ladakh, the two sides have large force deployments in the so-called eastern sector of the border, in what India calls Arunachal Pradesh and what China calls South Tibet, and therefore this could be the next flashpoint. India controls the state, China lays claim to most of it. The claims and counterclaims here are much larger than in Ladakh. It is well to remember that this was the most active theatre of conflict during the 1962 war. Satellite imagery shared in the Indian media over the past several months seems to indicate that China is creating new villages in areas that India claims.

The area also got high-level attention on the Chinese side. President Xi Jinping visited Tibet at the end of July, the first trip by a Chinese President in over 30 years. He inspected new infrastructure connecting Lhasa right up to Nyingchi and traveled to Nyinchi which adjoins Arunachal Pradesh. Both Lhasa and Nyingchi have Theatre Command Units. Nyingchi is only 335 kilometers from Tawang, which is home to one of the most important Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. The Yarlung Tsangpo (the Brahmaputra river in India) flows through Nyingchi, and upper riparian China is constructing major dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo.

If conflict were to occur in this sector, it will almost certainly be more violent given the stakes. India and China need to ensure that they avoid a heightening of tensions here. At the very minimum, they need to keep force deployments at present levels and not increase them. Regular local commander meetings here, as provided for in their original confidence building measure going back to 1993 and 1996, as a preventative initiative would help as well.

These are modest proposals. They do not ask too much of either side. They are without prejudice to their respective positions on the final delineation of the border. Nor do they involve any humiliating one-sided concessions. India and China cannot stand still on their border quarrel. As two rising powers, their sense of pride and position will not allow it. Before they return to border negotiations towards a final settlement, they must “undo the knot” they tied in the summer of 2020 in Ladakh and stabilize the military situation.

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.