Managing expectations: Indonesia navigating its international roles

By Shafiah F. Muhibat
Dr. Shafiah F Muhibat is the Deputy Executive Director for Research at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Republished in South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3208062/asean-chair-indonesia-must-proactively-manage-ties-between-us-and-china

JANUARY, 27, 2023

"Indonesia, as Chair of the G20, will surely take advantage of the G20 achievements and follow up priority issues as Chair of ASEAN," the spokesperson of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated to the media shortly before the start of the G20 Summit. Given the success of the G20 Summit, it is understandable that there were immediate calls for Indonesia to repeat the success ‘formula’ at ASEAN too.

G20 and ASEAN are different organisations, that is for sure. But they face the same challenges with regards to the current geopolitical dynamics. Southeast Asia is no stranger to strategic competition, but Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rising tensions between the United States and China have exposed divisions in the region.

As the US-China rivalry is set to heat up further, ASEAN remains in danger of getting caught in the crossfire or being made to "choose" between the two great powers. ASEAN, therefore, faces the challenge of maintaining mutually beneficial relations with both the powers, even as it continues to uphold ASEAN centrality. Indonesia, as the largest country in the region, has been loyal to its “independent and active” foreign policy doctrine, which means that it has stayed away from choosing a side between the major powers. So what can we expect of Indonesia’s ASEAN Chairmanship, especially with regards to great power rivalry?

During the Cold War, when smaller countries were forced to join the ideological camps led by either the United States or the Soviet Union, Indonesia’s founding fathers perceived that the newly independent country should not side with either bloc. In terms of foreign policy, this translated into working together with fellow smaller countries in a regional grouping instead of voluntarily complying with the great powers’ leadership. ASEAN is one concrete example. Indonesia initiated the establishment of ASEAN together with its Southeast Asian counterparts, and was a strong advocate for the first ASEAN Summit in 1976 and the ASEAN Political Security Community in 2003.

Now, as Indonesia begins its ASEAN Chairmanship in 2023, it is clear that great power rivalry is once again the predominant challenge in Southeast Asia. COVID-19 has only exacerbated the issue.

At the 16th East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2021, Indonesian President Joko Widodo called for an immediate end to rivalry among major powers in East Asia in order to create security and stability. It was then the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, and he was concerned that such rivalry made it difficult for the major powers to take united action against global challenges like the pandemic. He said that the "more effective handling of the pandemic needs a conducive situation, specifically through stability, security, and peace”, but lamented that “there have been no signs of concrete action to put a halt to the rivalry.”

Indonesia has always sought to balance its interests while navigating the uncertainties of great power rivalry. Indonesia has had complex relations with both the US and China, and both countries have in the past been partners and threats. Some experts have questioned whether Indonesia is really remaining neutral, arguing that Indonesia is seemingly moving closer to China. Nonetheless, for Indonesia, it has long been a priority to ensure that Southeast Asia remains free from the negative impacts of great power rivalry. In 2018, it called for a collective ASEAN response to great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. At the handover of the ASEAN chairmanship in November 2022, President Widodo again emphasised his concern over the rapid deterioration in Sino-U.S. ties, which has led the two powers to vie for influence in the fast-growing region. He affirmed that ASEAN must become “a peaceful region and anchor for global stability, consistently uphold international law and not be a proxy (for) any powers… ASEAN nations should not let the current geopolitical dynamic turn into a new Cold War in our region.”

The theme of Indonesia’s chairmanship is ‘ASEAN matters: epicentrum of growth’. The first part of the theme represents a pushback against the challenge to ASEAN centrality posed by the heightening tensions among the major powers. ASEAN faces the threat of its global and regional role declining in the coming era of great-power competition, and of fading relevance to the development and future of its members. Also, while ASEAN supports open, inclusive multilateral initiatives, the trend towards mini-lateralism has raised concerns. Such developments might undermine the existing ASEAN-led mechanisms, which rely on ASEAN’s convening power to bring competing powers to sit together and work through tough issues.

The theme and Widodo’s statements suggest that Indonesia’s focus during its chairmanship will be on maintaining geopolitical balance in the region, economic growth and building ASEAN’s institutional capacity and effectiveness. While these goals are a continuation of existing ASEAN efforts, expectations of Indonesia are – as always – running high.

Indonesia’s success as ASEAN chair will be assessed partly based on how it manages the strategic implications of the US-China rivalry on Southeast Asia, and partly based on how it manages internal turmoil, including Myanmar and ASEAN reform. However, as Indonesia is itself walking a fine line in maintaining mutually beneficial relations with both the powers, there is very little that it can do to ensure that the other nine ASEAN countries will ‘succeed’ in the same struggle. The ten Southeast Asian countries have different relations with the two major powers and different approaches to the geopolitical situation. Navigating their relationships with China is especially complex as there are competing geostrategic and geoeconomic priorities.

Despite these difficulties, Indonesia and its ASEAN partners should not be passive in response to growing and subtle pressures from both the US and China. It should begin to proactively deflect these pressures. One way of doing so is for Indonesia to draft a short statement declaring that ASEAN would like to work simultaneously with both the US and China to handle pressing global and regional challenges, like climate change, pandemics, and global financial crises. This statement could be issued at the East Asia Summit (EAS), which will feature the participation of both US and Chinese leaders, as well as the leaders of ASEAN countries.

In theory, the US may not be comfortable with such a trilateral statement. In practice, it may welcome it. It is well-known that the Biden Administration would like to cooperate more with China on major global challenges but is constrained by the strong anti-China sentiment domestically within the US. At the same time, China has also indicated that it favours greater cooperation with the United States. Hence, if ASEAN were to propose a three-way partnership between ASEAN-US-China to solve global challenges, this will give the US and China a face-saving way of participating in common endeavours to handle global challenges.

Such a proposal would also foster greater unity among the ASEAN countries. If successful, it would demonstrate ASEAN’s ability to set the agenda, achieve consensus on solutions, and bring countries together. Doing so would demonstrate that ASEAN centrality remains and ASEAN continues to be the essential key element in the broader regional architecture of Southeast Asia.

Can Indonesia see this through as chair? It’s a tall order. If Indonesia were to push for it, it will have to get the support of the nine other ASEAN countries and US and China. This can be done.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.