Countering Moro Youth Extremism in the Philippines

By Joseph Franco
Joseph Franco is a Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, Singapore.

Republished in South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3183937/marcos-jnr-should-look-beyond-jihadist-ideology-stop-islamic

JUNE, 27, 2022

In 2017, there was protracted conflict between Islamic State-linked violent extremist organisations (IS-linked VEOs) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). IS-linked VEOs captured the Southern Philippine city of Marawi, with the intent to establish a wilayah in the Bangsamoro region. Bangsamoro is home to the Muslim-majority Moro community. In response, the AFP laid siege to the city. After a five-month long siege, between May and October 2017, the AFP managed to recapture the centre of Marawi. Over a thousand people died in the siege. Over a million people were displaced from their homes. Could such a clash happen again? This is the key security question that the new government under President-elect Ferdinand Marcos Jr. will have to grapple with.

Many people believe that the next phase of violent extremism in Southern Philippines may emerge due to developments in the Middle East and Central Asia, especially the re-emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. This fear is misplaced. Jihadist ideology is not the main driving force of extremist recruitment in the Bangsamoro. In fact, studies (such as those conducted by The Asia Foundation, as well as the author’s fieldwork) have shown that the main driving forces are rising poverty and a lack of local socio-economic opportunities for Moro youth.

Five years after the battle for Marawi in 2017, the underlying socio-economic issues that triggered the siege remain unresolved. A new phase of violent extremism may emerge in the region if the incoming government does not urgently address critical socio-economic concerns in the Bangsamoro region.

Large portions of Marawi’s centre lie in ruins. Thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) continue to languish in refugee camps. Government reconstruction funding has prioritised showcase projects such as sporting and government complexes. Residential areas in the so-called ‘most-affected area’ (MAA) of Marawi remain conspicuously empty and desolate. The limited number of housing units are built in inaccessible suburbs of the city, complicating efforts for IDPs to restart their pre-conflict livelihoods and to seek gainful employment.

In late April 2022, the Duterte administration after much delay, finally ratified the Republic Act 11696 (RA 11696) or the ‘Marawi Siege Compensation Act’. RA 11696 is however just the start of a long, likely litigious process to compensate private property owners. The incoming administration of President-elect Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has yet to articulate how he intends to fast-track the rebuilding of Marawi or to expedite compensation as promised by RA 11696. In the run up to the May 2022 polls, Marcos Jr. instead stated that the reconstruction was almost complete, without offering details.

Beyond the issues facing the rehabilitation of Marawi, the incumbent legislators and executives of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) face challenges in translating promised improvements to quality-of-life into reality for their constituents. The Bangsamoro Transition Authority’s (BTA) term was extended until 2025 from its original 2019-2022 transition period. The critical task for the BTA was the enactment of several laws that would enable the BARMM to run the region.

To date, only three of the six critical Bangsamoro codes have been enacted: the Administrative Code (October 2020), the Civil Service Code (February 2021), and the Education Code (May 2021). However, important codes covering elections, local government, and revenue are still being worked out by the Bangsamoro Parliament. On top of these organisational issues, the Bangsamoro’s Chief Minister has repeatedly called for the national government to fulfil its promise to fund post-conflict normalisation as well as buy back weapons from demobilised Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighters.

These unresolved socio-economic concerns may well drive a resurgence in extremist recruitment among Moro youth, more so than the influence of foreign ideologies. Overemphasis on the impact of foreign ideologies and overinvestment in counter-ideological solutions, as seen in the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, could lead to suboptimal results.

First, the incoming President should immediately articulate his vision for the reconstruction of Marawi and particularly the MAA, beyond merely citing the initiatives purportedly completed by the outgoing Administration. There should be priority on alleviating the conditions of IDPs. Refugee camps are potential areas for VEO recruitment. Unemployed and destitute Moro youths have reported being approached by VEO members, the latter promising cash payments in exchange for membership.

At the same time, further delays to the reconstruction of Marawi may provide propaganda fodder for IS-linked VEOs. Jihadist narratives in the Philippines would often paint Philippine security forces as occupiers and destroyers of the rich religious heritage of Marawi, the country’s first and only Islamic city. The sight of Marawi in ruins are likely to make individuals vulnerable to VEO recruitment even more receptive to jihadist propaganda. 

Second, Manila should reiterate its commitment to supporting the BARMM in providing resources for the process of normalisation. Delays in demobilising MILF fighters and reducing the supply of illicit firearms in Mindanao could provide an opening for VEOs to recruit and replenish manpower lost during the 2017 Marawi siege.

If the normalisation track falters, former MILF fighters may end up using their weapons and know-how to engage in illicit activities such as extortion and kidnap-for-ransom activities. Previous peace agreements with other secessionist and communist groups in the Philippines have seen similar dynamics play out. Former armed cadres and cells could either fold into existing organised criminal groups or become ‘private armies’ operated by local politicians for electoral intimidation.

At the same time, Marcos Jr. 's administration should extend a conciliatory hand to the BARMM. During the May 2022 polls, the BARMM’s ruling party opted to endorse the candidacy of Vice President Leonor Robredo, and concurrently hinted that the Bangsamoro people should not vote for candidates that would bring back abuses of the past. It was a veiled reference to the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Sr., whose declaration of martial law in 1972, led to abuses against Filipino Muslims. One way for the national government to regain the trust of the BARMM constituency is to support capacity-building initiatives, such as providing legislative and administrative support to ensure the prompt passage of the three remaining codes (covering elections, local government, and revenue) essential to the functioning of the BARMM.

Ultimately, focusing on rebuilding Marawi and enabling the BARMM to govern effectively could bring about meaningful changes to the region’s socio-economic conditions. In turn, better life outcomes for Bangsamoro youth will make them more resilient against VEO recruitment and mobilisation efforts.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.