India-Pakistan: Peace by Pieces

By Kanti Bajpai
Kanti Bajpai is the Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS).

Republished in South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3159097/india-and-pakistan-can-achieve-peace-pieces-if-they-start-small

DECEMBER, 8, 2021

India and Pakistan are famous for quarrelling incessantly and periodically going to war. In fact, however, since 1947 they have cooperated and made peace many times over. Ironically, even Indians and Pakistanis fail to remember this history and to take encouragement from it. Today, a big bang, comprehensive settlement of core disputes is politically unviable. Peace by pieces is more plausible. Delhi and Islamabad can and should dust off putative agreements on Sir Creek, Siachen, and trade and investment to lay the foundation for more ambitious agreements on core disputes.

A Brief History of India-Pakistan War and Peace

The record of India-Pakistan cooperation and peace initiatives is impressive. By 1964, the two countries had solved virtually every bilateral problem – except for Kashmir. This includes the Indus Rivers water-sharing agreement, which was signed in 1960. This agreement has been honoured by both countries, even in times of hostilities. Even on Kashmir, bilaterally and through the UN, they came close to a solution. The day Jawaharlal Nehru died in November 1964, Sheikh Abdullah, the undisputed leader of Valley Kashmiris, was in Pakistan with a message from the Indian prime minister, as part of ongoing negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir. Following Nehru’s death, these negotiations were abandoned.

After 1964, India and Pakistan went to war in 1965, 1971, and 1999. They have had several war-scares as well: in 1986-87, 1990, 2001-2, 2008, and most recently, in 2019 after the Pulwama terrorist attack in Kashmir and Indian retaliation in Balakot. However, India and Pakistan have also signed peace treaties and agreements: Tashkent, after the 1965 war; and Simla, after the 1971 war. When tensions ran high after their nuclear tests in 1998, they signed the Lahore Declaration in February 1999.

Even in war, India and Pakistan have tacitly cooperated. They have never resorted to strategic bombing of population centres. They have treated prisoners-of-war correctly. Violence during hostilities has been limited, and casualties have been low. In 1988, they signed an accord by which they exchange a list of nuclear facilities annually and are pledged not to attack each other’s reactors.

From 1998 to 2012, India and Pakistan negotiated on Kashmir, security (read terrorism), other territorial disputes, and trade and investment. Between 1998 and 2008, they instituted a “back-channel” between the leaderships that nearly produced a Kashmir solution. Despite Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s promise not to negotiate until Islamabad satisfactorily tackles cross-border terrorism, Indian and Pakistani leaders and officials, including the National Security Advisors (NSAs), have intermittently met.

Sceptics may argue that the many India-Pakistan agreements are “smoke and mirrors”, signifying little. If so, virtually all agreements between rivals lack much credibility. In fact, the desire for peace, both at the elite and mass level in South Asia, is substantial going by the repeated efforts at cooperation.

“Peace by Pieces” or a “Big Bang Peace”?

How can India and Pakistan construct a stable long-term peace? Should they aim for “peace by pieces” or a “big bang peace”? Should they solve those disputes that are easy to solve and then move on to the bigger ones; or should they go directly to the core disputes?

The record shows that they have tried both methods. Clearly, the big bang approach has failed: specifically, Kashmir and cross-border terrorism remain the main conflicts. After India’s decision in August 2019 to abolish Kashmir’s special constitutional status and after the Pulwama terrorist attack, discussion on both core issues is off the table, for India and Pakistan, respectively. If peace by pieces is the more viable path ahead, agreements on two persisting territorial conflicts, Sir Creek and Siachen, and on trade and investment already exist. They could immediately be actioned and change the atmospherics around India-Pakistan relations.

Sir Creek is an old dispute, and the two sides came to an agreement on it several times going back to the early 1990s. It is an easy enough conflict to resolve. Using the Thalweg principle of international law, the creek can be divided down the middle and the resulting line can be extended out into the Arabian Sea to which it is connected to define the offshore boundary. India walked away from the original agreement. Delhi can, with no great cost, dust it off and sign.

Siachen is thought to be the third largest glacier after the Arctic and Antarctic. Here again, India and Pakistan came to an agreement in the 1990s. India is in substantial possession of the disputed glacier. This is a dubious advantage: hundreds of troops have died or been disabled at the 5400-metre heights. India’s claim that control of Siachen is vital because it overlooks the Karakoram Highway is unconvincing. Given the treacherousness of the heights, Siachen provides no strategic benefit. A solution is in plain sight: Indian and Pakistani troops would pull back to lower ground; and satellites, ground sensors, and patrols would prevent fresh incursions.

Finally, Pakistan must be the first mover on trade. It has always denied Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India, largely on security and political grounds. As a result, bilateral trade is usually no more than two percent of their total trade. Trade will benefit both sides and is happening anyway through the Gulf. A bilateral trade deal with India will benefit Pakistani consumers and businesses, increase its tax revenues, and earn Islamabad goodwill. Pakistan has been farsighted in allowing Indian investment. A trade deal could get India to revise its investment regime for Pakistani businesses.

Conclusion

Peace by pieces will not ensure a sustained peace. A stable, long-term peace will require Kashmir’s final status and cross-border terrorism to be addressed squarely. On the other hand, dealing honestly with both these issues requires much stronger governments in India and Pakistan. Agreements on Sir Creek, Siachen, and trade and investment are “on the table” and could be signed with little further discussion or bargaining. They could create public goodwill in both societies which could prepare the ground for more ambitious agreements. Delhi and Islamabad have a history of not holding all issues hostage to resolution of core disputes. They can build on that history.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.