US-China rivalry will be stern test for Vietnam's diplomatic juggle

By Nguyen Cong Tung
Nguyen Cong Tung is Assistant Professor, Department of East Asian Studies, National Taiwan Normal University 

Republished in The Straits Times: https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/us-china-rivalry-will-be-stern-test-of-vietnam-s-diplomatic-juggling-act.AUGUST, 29, 2023

The increasing tensions between the United States and China are reshaping the geopolitical and security landscapes in regions where these two major powers compete for greater influence.  

Recent analyses by international relations scholars have contended that the hedging ability of many small and middle powers is eroding, since Washington and Beijing expect these states to make a decisive move to secure economic benefits or security assurances from one major power or the other.   

Vietnam has long been seen as a typical hedger in Southeast Asia, given the multidirectional foreign policy it adopted following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Despite facing mounting pressure to take sides, Vietnam has managed its relations with Washington and Beijing relatively well.  

The 'four-nos' defense policy 

The first pillar of Vietnam’s approach is to stick to its long-standing policy of having no military alliances, while being more flexible and pragmatic in its diplomatic tactics. The ‘four-nos’ defence policy highlighted in the 2019 Vietnam National Defence White Paper forms the basis of the policy: ‘no military alliances,’ ‘no siding with one country against another,’ ‘no foreign military bases,’ and ‘no using force or threatening to use force in international relations.’  

This policy essentially rationalises Vietnam’s official position vis-à-vis both superpowers. Thus, in official diplomatic discourse, Vietnamese leaders have reiterated that Vietnam does not and will not take sides.  

Nevertheless, the rhetoric has subtly changed over time. Since 2021, Vietnamese leaders, including Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, have begun stating that Vietnam “chooses what is right and just, and does not take sides.” While this might not be the US or China’s preferred stance, it does represent a form of compromise for Hanoi. 

Significantly, terms such as ‘right and just’ (lẽ phải, công lý) are remarkably flexible, offering ample room for interpretation. This signals to Washington and Beijing that, while adhering to the ‘four-nos’ policy, Vietnam remains open to the possibility of advancing security cooperation with one external power in cases where its ‘rightness and justness’ and national interests are violated by the other. Similar rhetoric can also be found in the 2019 Defence White Paper.  

Vietnam’s responses to recent incidents in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes can attest to this. More specifically, Vietnam selectively bolsters cooperation with the US to promote its maritime capabilities. It hosts US aircraft carriers and supports US freedom of navigation operations in the Paracel Islands, particularly when China pressures Vietnam extensively in SCS disputes. These actions do not inherently contravene the ‘four-nos’ policy.  

A second critical tenet of Vietnam’s strategy is to remain autonomous in foreign policymaking, by any means. The Political Report of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s 13th National Congress in 2021 reaffirmed Hanoi’s pursuit of an independent, self-reliant, and multilateral foreign policy.  

Guided by this principle, Vietnam constantly asserts that its development of its relationships with the US, China, or any other country is a sovereign matter, and should not be interpreted as aligning with one against the other. Thus, neither China nor the US can intervene in Vietnam’s relations with the other power.  

History teaches Vietnam that it is too risky to rely on a great power against another, as its national interests are often sacrificed once two great powers reach a rapprochement. Cognizant that Washington and Beijing have their own strategic calculations, Vietnam seeks to convey to both sides that its autonomy serves the interests of both powers and contributes to the regional balance of power.  

A non-autonomous and dependent Vietnam would only increase the burden on whomever it chooses as an ally and heighten the risk of conflict between the two major powers.  

'China first, America later' 

Geography also plays a part in Vietnam’s approach to foreign policy. Vietnam is situated adjacent to China which had colonised it for over 1,000 years. This makes it an imperative for Vietnam to take China’s reactions and interests into consideration before engaging with the US or other external powers. For example, Vietnam has been reluctant to upgrade its relationship with the US to a strategic level, primarily due to concerns that such a move might be perceived by China as a signal of strengthened defence and security cooperation between Vietnam and the US directed against Beijing.  

History once again guides Vietnam. It knows that if it displays sufficient deference and skilfully acknowledges China's (superior) power, Beijing will then give room for Hanoi to manoeuvre. Vietnam understands this quite well.  

The prerequisite to any Vietnamese attempt to strengthen cooperation or elevate relations with the US is to stabilise relations with China first. A very simple logic here is: “China first, America later.” That is why many Vietnamese leaders, in their dealings with their Chinese counterparts, have sought to demonstrate that China holds the ‘top priority’ in Vietnam’s foreign policy. 

Actions speak louder than words. Ahead of the expected upgrade of ties between Vietnam and the US to a ‘strategic partnership’, several high-ranking Vietnamese leaders made strategic visits to China. For example, General-Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited Beijing in October 2022 and Permanent Member of the Secretariat Truong Thi Mai visited Beijing in April 2023.  

Through these diplomatic overtures, Vietnam sought to convey to China its enduring commitment, assuring Beijing that while it may forge closer bonds with the United States down the road, China will remain Vietnam's top priority. 

Hanoi's strategic manoeuvre is geared towards preserving China's prestige and honour, thereby casting Beijing in an unfavourable light should it choose to obstruct the advancement of Vietnam's relationship with the United States. 

Simultaneously, Vietnam extends reassurance to the US by constantly referring to it as a ‘leading important partner’ and by expressing a willingness to deepen their partnership. In a meeting with U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in Hanoi on July 20, 2023, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh stated that Vietnam has always considered the United States as one of its most important partners. As a result, Washington has become more patient in its dealings with Hanoi, as its long-term significance to Vietnam is highlighted and assured.  

Interestingly, Vietnamese party leaders often remind China of their fraternal party-to-party ties while, at the same time, state leaders take charge of expressing positive statements on the growth of Vietnam-US relations. This balanced approach aims to convey to the two superpowers that Vietnam’s development of the relationship with one side will not jeopardise its existing relationship with the other.  

The potential hurdles 

Vietnam's intricate diplomatic juggling act is not devoid of complexities. 

Among them is the potential to irk one superpower while strengthening ties with the other, consequently facing heightened pressures from both quarters. In the face of increasing tensions between the two powers, both Washington and Beijing might find themselves somewhat discomfited, perceiving that Hanoi is leveraging their influence without much in return. 

The US constantly expresses concerns about trade imbalances with Vietnam, even labelling it on its monitoring list for currency manipulation in 2020 and 2021.  

Additionally, US officials have hinted at potential tariffs on imported goods from Vietnam if the latter does not strictly crack down on the rebranding and rerouting of Chinese goods. On the other hand, Chinese leaders, in their dealings with their Vietnamese counterparts, have urged Vietnam to adhere to the socialist path amidst Hanoi’s strengthened relations with the US.  

Vietnam’s multidirectional approach also faces a potential challenge. In its endeavours to establish friendly ties with a multitude of nations, and to maintain an equal distance from all major powers, Vietnam runs the risk of not developing meaningful relationships with any single nation. 

Consequently, in scenarios where its interests in the South China Sea are threatened, no country, including the United States, may feel an obligation to stand up for Hanoi. Lacking formal alliances with Vietnam, no nation desires to antagonise the US or China or to be inadvertently drawn into conflicts between Vietnam and either superpower. 

However, these challenges can still be managed smartly and effectively.  

Vietnam's continued engagement with both superpowers through dialogue is critical. This needs to take place as it bolsters its own capabilities and strategic values. As long as Vietnam maintains its independence and autonomy, its strategic values remain apparent in the eyes of both superpowers.  

At the same time, Vietnam can align its balancing efforts with those of other ASEAN countries. It should tailor its policies and responses toward the US and China to be in tandem with the broader ASEAN consensus, which highlights the significance of ASEAN Centrality in promoting regional peace and cooperation. 

Within this framework, Vietnam, along with the regional grouping, can send a concerted message to both superpowers that they should not pressure ASEAN into picking sides. Only a unified ASEAN, rather than a divided one, can truly serve the long-term interests of the two superpowers and their reputation in the region.  

While Vietnam’s strategy to navigate the US-China rivalry has proven effective so far, it is still too early to assess whether this approach can be sustained. Its success is contingent upon how far the rivalry between the US and China will go. It is equally contingent on the US and China adopting a wiser approach in managing middle powers like Vietnam, who want to chart an independent path.  

Instead of trying to force Hanoi to choose a side, they should acknowledge that a Vietnam that respects their respective core interests and does not take negative actions against both is a reasonably happy outcome. 

---

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.