Can the Belt and Road Initiative bring peace to China and ASEAN?

By Selina Ho
Selina Ho is Assistant Professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

Republished in South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3167110/can-belt-and-road-initiative-bridge-peace-gap-between-china-and

FEBRUARY, 15, 2022

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to create land and sea connectivity via a web of infrastructure that facilitates the flow of people and goods. This vision of connectivity is shared by the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) states. It did not come from China alone. ASEAN countries themselves have ideas about connectivity. For instance, the idea of a pan-Asia railway did not originate from China but from Malaysia and ASEAN itself. ASEAN also has a Masterplan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025. The BRI was launched at a time when long-standing regional aspirations for connectivity converged with China’s desire to play a larger role on the international stage facilitated by its expanded financial and technological capacity.

This happy convergence of aspirations and interests does not however guarantee that the BRI would ensure peace between China and the ASEAN states. Almost nine years after the launch of the BRI, relations between China and ASEAN, while largely stable, have not markedly improved. Rather, suspicions of China have grown as China’s foreign policy under President Xi Jinping took on a posture that is nationalistic and confrontational. The South China Sea dispute looms large in China-ASEAN relations as China’s display of military muscle and establishment of outposts on artificial islands increase the threat perceptions of Southeast Asian claimant states. While Beijing would prefer to keep its territorial disputes separate from its overall ties with ASEAN countries, in the eyes of ASEAN states, Beijing’s economic might is linked to its military might. As a result of China’s more strident foreign policy, suspicions of China’s intentions and the political and economic leverage it could exert through the BRI have increased. An annual survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute showed that trust in China among Southeast Asian countries has fallen over the years.

Moreover, while infrastructure could be a boon to developing countries, it could also be a source of dependency. Infrastructure is a source of power, both in material and non-material terms. Materially, infrastructure, such as roads and railways, plays a significant role in power projection and war-making. In the non-material dimension, infrastructure has the effect of constructing identities through discourse and structural power. It can entrench asymmetrical power relations and weaker states may identify as subordinate states and subsume their interests to those of a stronger state. Infrastructure is thus a vehicle of Chinese power projection, further worrying ASEAN states. While desiring to reap the benefits of China’s growth, ASEAN countries are simultaneously fearful of over-reliance on Beijing leading to compromises on their sovereignty.

In addition, the BRI projects have entailed societal and environmental costs for host countries. Beijing’s efforts to reach out to and incorporate ethnic Chinese living in ASEAN countries as part of its plans for the BRI have led to rising ethnic tensions. Local populations also chafe at the influx of Chinese workers. Questions have arisen over whether local populations benefited in terms of jobs, training, and technological transfers. There are also environmental costs on host countries as construction has led to landslides, floods, and contamination of water supplies. The credibility of environmental impact studies is often questioned as they are usually conducted by the Chinese. These societal and environmental costs have dampened some of the enthusiasm for the BRI although on balance, the thirst for infrastructure in ASEAN countries would likely win out.

The BRI’s development is also occurring against the background of US-China rivalry. While the United States has yet to offer any infrastructure deals or package that could rival the BRI, it has stressed quality infrastructure and has worked with Australia and Japan to launch the Blue Dot Network to compete with the BRI. Regional countries do not want to be caught between the two superpowers. Hence, despite China’s economic largesse demonstrated through the BRI, ASEAN countries are wary of appearing to take China’s side on political and strategic matters.

How then can the BRI help improve China-ASEAN relations?

First, Beijing needs to pay more attention to what is happening on the ground. The BRI comprises a hodgepodge of projects. Beijing does not oversee all the projects, as a result of which undesirable behavior has gone unchecked. The best example is the effect of Chinese investments in Sihanoukville, where Cambodia’s only deep-water seaport is situated. The influx of Chinese money, workers, and tourists has transformed Sihanoukville into an enclave of vices, corruption and crime, leading to widespread resentment among Cambodians. Following years of failing to respond to these ground sentiments, Beijing and Phnom Penh finally made efforts in 2020 to curb some of the excesses. At the request of the Chinese government, the Cambodian government closed the online gambling operations in Sihanoukville. Being sensitive and responsive to local context and developments on the ground, and working with host country governments to mitigate the societal and environmental impact of the BRI would help ameliorate local concerns about the BRI.

Second, China needs to better manage the BRI. It needs to ensure that the procedures for environmental impact assessments are being properly conducted by independent experts and according to international standards. The quality of infrastructure projects should also be upheld and should not be sacrificed in the name of speed. China should also be more transparent with data to counter accusations of “debt trap diplomacy” resulting from the BRI.

Third, China should reduce the inconsistencies in its foreign policy. While the more aggressive aspects of Chinese foreign policy are meant for domestic consumption and are related to its rivalry with the United States, China needs to be mindful of the impact of these moves on perceptions in Southeast Asia in order to maximize the potential of the BRI. After all, Chinese leadership aspirations cannot be fulfilled without followers willing to support its rise and accept its leadership role. The BRI plugs a great need in Southeast Asia’s infrastructure development and the resources China has poured into it should not be squandered. China needs to do more to reassure the region, not through words alone but by its actions. It needs to build trust by toning down its strident policies in the South China Sea, ensure ASEAN centrality, and engage in more productive competition with the United States.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.