Why India-Pakistan relations need a new era of engagement

Discussions surrounding India-Pakistan relations often revolve around two questions: can they manage their rivalry? And what will it take to foster goodwill in bilateral ties? 

While important, these queries obfuscate a critical reality: despite their long-standing animosity, India and Pakistan have occasionally engaged constructively. 

These periods of cooperation, often overlooked and underemphasised, provide insight into how these nuclear-armed rivals might work together, even amid significant tensions. 

This duality of conflict and engagement characterises their postcolonial history, presenting a complex narrative of rivalry interspersed with attempts at collaboration.

The year 2019 serves as a poignant illustration of this conflict-engagement dynamic. In February, a terrorist attack in Pulwama, Kashmir, led to a retaliatory Indian air strike into Pakistani territory, which escalated into an aerial dogfight that resulted in the capture of an Indian pilot. It reportedly took intense backchannel diplomacy from the United States to de-escalate the situation.

Later that year, in August, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government in New Delhi revoked Kashmir’s special constitutional status, which led to a freeze in India-Pakistan relations. Since then, bilateral trade has effectively ceased, diplomatic ties have been downgraded, and people-to-people interactions have been dramatically reduced. 

Pakistan has repeatedly insisted that any dialogue must begin with the restoration of Kashmir’s previous status, while India demands that Islamabad renounce its support for the separatist insurgency in the disputed region, which India terms “cross-border terrorism”. These rigid positions have stalled meaningful dialogue between the two governments since 2019.

Yet amid these tensions, both nations did agree in November 2019 to open the Kartarpur Corridor, allowing predominantly Sikh devotees from India to visit their spiritual leader’s birthplace in Pakistan. This visa-free access demonstrates a different facet of India-Pakistan relations – a willingness to engage despite prevailing hostilities.

This engagement through the Kartarpur Corridor stands in stark contrast to the mutual hostility over Kashmir. In this sense, while Kashmir exemplifies the zero-sum nature of the India-Pakistan relationship, Kartarpur is indicative of the potential, even the desire, for cooperation.

A decade of engagement

Cold War historians have described a phase of “oscillatory antagonism” between the US and the Soviet Union – dating from the end of the Korean war in 1953 to 1969 – that was typified by periods of managed rivalry and cooperation even amid significant tensions. 

India and Pakistan have exhibited a similar pattern, oscillating between hostility and constructive engagement. Following the Kargil conflict in 1999, Pakistan’s then-President Pervez Musharraf sought to redefine relations with India, working with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his successor Manmohan Singh, fostering increased diplomatic dialogue and backchannel negotiations.

In the mid-2000s, these talks produced an innovative and radical framework for resolving the Kashmir conflict, moving beyond entrenched positions. For Pakistan, this meant sidestepping the United Nations-administered plebiscite, while India would shift focus from demanding Pakistan’s cessation of support for Kashmiri separatism. The proposed framework included easing travel restrictions along the Line of Control, demilitarising the area, and granting self-governance to Kashmiris through a joint management mechanism. During this period, in 2007, Prime Minister Singh articulated a vision for open borders across South Asia, where one could have “breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore, dinner in Kabul”.

The 2008 Mumbai attacks did not escalate into a full-blown crisis largely due to the prevailing norm of engagement between the two states. This goodwill helped both nations manage tensions, as seen again in January 2016, when a terrorist attack on the Pathankot airbase in India led to a short-lived yet significant collaboration between Indian and Pakistani security agencies, instead of a rift in bilateral relations.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s unscheduled visit to Lahore in December 2015 to meet his Pakistani counterpart laid the groundwork for this spirit of engagement. His trip, from Kabul to Delhi through Lahore, also echoed Singh’s earlier aspirations. Unfortunately, this visit also marked the tail end of a promising era in India-Pakistan relations.

Finding a way forward

Despite ongoing tensions, an India-Pakistan ceasefire agreement reached in 2021 remains in effect along the Line of Control, showcasing the possibility for cooperation even amid geopolitical tensions. This agreement has led to a significant reduction in hostilities, with the previously volatile border region now largely peaceful for more than three years – demonstrating that India and Pakistan can work together at military and political levels. 

Trade between the two nations has plummeted since 2019, following Pakistan’s suspension of trade relations and India’s withdrawal of “most favoured nation” status, increasing import duties on Pakistani goods to 200 per cent. Ironically, both countries continue to trade indirectly through third countries such as the United Arab Emirates, with India exporting an estimated US$1.2 billion in goods and services to Pakistan last year, while US$3 million in of Pakistani exports went in the other direction.

The success of the ceasefire agreement and continued informal trade suggest a willingness to engage on both sides. Whether a more substantial bilateral engagement akin to that in the mid-2000s can be revived depends on imaginative and courageous leadership in both nations. Such leadership must prioritise a long-term vision over short-term, zero-sum outcomes.

While current tensions suggest a high likelihood of future militarised crises, they do not negate the underlying potential for India-Pakistan engagement. If collaborative efforts were enhanced, the whole of South Asia would benefit.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.