Why have China and India come together?

November 22, 2024

India-China relations turned a significant corner in October 2024. Two sudden developments heralded this change.

First, on October 21, 2024, India announced an agreement with China on resuming patrolling rights in Depsang and Demchok in Ladakh which was denied to it after the military clash in Galwan in June 2020. The resumption of patrolling will be followed by the withdrawal of thousands of Chinese and Indian troops deployed in forward positions since the 2020 clash. The October agreement came after stabilizing buffer zones were created at other conflict points in Eastern Ladakh in 2021-22. The second development was the almost simultaneous announcement that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping would hold a bilateral meeting at the BRICS Summit. The meeting was duly held on October 23.

What caused this positive change in China-India relations? While there is no official account of the reasons, three factors may have led to a détente.

The first likely factor was economic. India’s economy is growing at an average of 7 percent per annum, but if it wants to raise GDP growth to 8-10 percent per annum it needs critical Chinese products (metals, active pharmaceutical ingredients or APIs, and machinery and electricals) as well as Chinese investment. China’s economy is trending to the 3-4 percent per annum growth range. Hence, the Indian economy, as it closes in on Japan’s GDP, is becoming more attractive as an export and investment destination, particularly as China’s economic ties with the West shrink from de-risking strategies.

A second possible factor propelling the detente is the realization that the two sides are in a stalemate. Unless China and India are looking to settle matters on the battlefield, the massive post-Galwan deployments are a waste of men, money, and materiel. Since both sides understand that a decisive military victory in East Ladakh is implausible, the deployments are militarily futile (they have outlived their symbolic value as well).

In addition, both militaries have larger challenges. For India, a two-front conflict, with China and Pakistan simultaneously, would be daunting. New Delhi therefore needs to reduce the greater but more tractable threat, which is China, while building its capabilities to deal with a two-front war and with a powerful, modernizing Chinese military. For China, the much larger military worry is in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Beijing, also, does not want a two-front confrontation.

The third possible cause of the détente is quite a different strategic worry, namely, the United States. India is a strategic partner of the US, primarily because both countries look at China as a threat. Yet, New Delhi is going through a rocky phase with Washington – over American criticism of India’s democratic backsliding, human rights and minority protections, and most recently, allegations that some Indian officials had a hand in an attempted assassination on American soil of a Sikh separatist activist. US intelligence apparently also shared information with Canada over the killing of a Sikh separatist in Vancouver which Ottawa claims was organized by elements of the Indian government. By making up with China, the Modi government may well be signalling the US that it has other strategic options.

For China, relations with the US have continued to slide under President Joe Biden – over trade and technology, internal issues such as Tibet and Xinjiang, Taiwan and the South China Sea, and the formation of the US-Japan-Australia-India coalition in the Indo-Pacific. It is in China’s interest to destabilize that coalition, and nudging India towards neutrality is one way of doing so.

These three factors are significant, indicating that the détente could be sustained and eventually return both countries to the path of normalization. What further steps can India and China take to keep the military détente going to encourage the larger process of normalization?

The first step has already been taken, i.e. the actual resumption of patrolling by both militaries in Depsang and Demchok, with the attendant enabling protocols (smaller patrols, prior notification of patrolling, etc.). Ahead of the two militaries is the resumption of patrolling in Galwan, Pangong Tso, and other flashpoints. Here, the stabilizing measure thus far has been buffer zones to keep the troops apart.

The buffer zones have been helpful. However, both sides may fear secret intrusions into these areas that then become permanent deployments. Monitoring the zones is therefore vital. Patrolling is one means of monitoring. Other means include ground and satellite sensors as well as drones. Drones in turn can be destabilizing since they can “wander” beyond the buffer zones. And of course they can carry ordnance. So, talks will be necessary to determine if the buffer zones in Galwan, Pangong Tso, and elsewhere are enough. It is worth noting that China too has sought patrolling rights, in areas of Arunachal Pradesh where India is in military control. This also will have to be squarely faced.

A second step is to make a partial but real beginning on troop withdrawals. A long hard winter is ahead of the thousands of troops in Ladakh. While a complete pullback – so-called de-induction – cannot occur immediately, a positive move would be de-inducting a not-insignificant portion of the massive deployments. This would bring real and symbolic benefit. The phasing and sequencing of de-induction may not be strictly equal and reciprocal. De-induction is easier for the Chinese military given superior infrastructure and the flatter terrain in Tibet to which they would return. It is harder for the Indian military given poorer infrastructure and the twisting mountain roads that the retreating forces must traverse.

Finally, since there was probably an economic rationale for the détente, the normalization of economic relations needs to occur if both sides are to reap the full benefits of the agreement. Here, India needs to speed up permission for Chinese imports and investments that are not deemed a security risk. It also needs to ease visa restrictions on Chinese business executives and technical experts who service Chinese equipment in India. And China needs to do something about the huge trade imbalance with India which irks and worries New Delhi. It is simply not enough for Beijing to assert that the problem is with Indian businesses that are uncompetitive. If Xi Jinping can do an economic deal with Donald Trump, surely he can do one with Narendra Modi as well.

In short, even though China and India remain suspicious of each other, there is a real opportunity to steer this bilateral relationship back to a positive path.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.