Asia’s middle powers’ activism a plus for regional stability

By Huong Le Thu

Dr Huong Le Thu is Asia Program Deputy Director at the International Crisis Group.

September 25, 2024

As geopolitical crises expand and proliferate, and major powers find themselves preoccupied with mutual rivalry – along with, in many cases, pressing domestic issues – the room for so-called middle powers has grown in the international arena. So much so that some believe it is these middle powers who will be the architects of the new world order, even though their increasingly proactive diplomacy is for now largely uncoordinated.

Middle powers, by no means a new or a uniform concept, are broadly understood as countries that are neither “major” nor “small”, and which are well integrated into the global economy.

But increasingly, the concept is best defined by these countries’ demonstrated energy and proactivity in international affairs, particularly in their respective regions.

The strategic calculus, economic trajectory, and even demographic trends among middle powers differ greatly, but what they do have in common is a growing sense of confidence in the role they can play in shaping the changing world order – particularly in their immediate neighbourhoods.

While these countries are logically first and foremost focused on ensuring their own security and prosperity, they are increasingly expanding their ambitions to broader roles.

The reality of strategic activism among middle powers is often determined not by their size, but by their mindset. Take, for example, Singapore. Despite being one of the smallest countries in the world, the city state has managed to develop close relations with both the US and China, as well as many other middle powers.

As a result of these trust-building efforts, it has been a location of choice for convening meetings between adversaries, including the landmark US- North Korea summit in 2018. As the host of the yearly Shangri-La Dialogue – arguably the most important defence and diplomacy gathering in the Asia-Pacific – Singapore continues to contribute to greater global collaboration, innovation, and connectivity. This diplomatic activism has been very effective in giving it a voice in shaping global policy and narratives.

At the other end of the size spectrum is Australia. While the country has long been protected by both its geographical location and the United States’ security umbrella, Canberra has in recent years come to the view that these are no longer sufficient as its only security. Australia has been increasingly proactive in shaping its preferred environment, through a combination of both active diplomacy and increased deterrence. It has, in particular, doubled down in engaging with the United States and its partners, primarily through the economic and security initiatives of the Quad (along with Japan and India) and Aukus (along with the United Kingdom), to boost its security role in the Indo-Pacific region.

This newfound assertiveness has not gone down well in Beijing and, at times, contributed to a heightened perception of how great power competition between China and the US may spill over to Washington’s Asian allies. Canberra’s desire to shape its neighbourhood, while not detached from the goal of outcompeting China, has also had a constructive role in strengthening defence capabilities of its Pacific neighbours.

Vietnam has also emerged in recent years as one of the more diplomatically proactive actors in the region, successfully managing relations with competing major powers: the US, China, and also Russia.

Hanoi has managed to maintain close relations with China, including in terms of attracting Chinese investments, despite being a party to the South China Sea dispute. In parallel, it has consistently worked with other claimants towards rules-based dispute management, which, despite the long-term and multi-actor nature of the maritime disputes, has yielded some breakthroughs.

In December 2022, Vietnam and Indonesia agreed to delimit their respective Exclusive Economic Zones after 12 years of negotiations, symbolically timing their agreement with the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos). Following this success, Hanoi and Manila, which similarly faces sovereignty challenges from China, have expressed willingness to discuss their overlapping claims in the South China Sea.

Notionally a “pacifist” nation since World War II, Japan has long played a role in the promotion of peace. But growing distrust between China and Japan, fuelled in part by growing tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands dispute, has prompted Tokyo to assume an increasingly assertive – even possibly militaristic – role in the region.

Japan’s leadership in supporting South-east Asia’s – and the more broadly the so-called Global South’s – pursuit of AI-inclusive governance is an example of its contributions to tech standard setting. Following the global successes of its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), it has recently expanded its regional outreach with an Overseas Security Assistance (OSA) programme, through which it aims to support the maritime nations of South-east Asia and the Pacific with training, exercises, and workshops. While the programme is at a nascent stage, its ultimate goal is to contribute to a more stable, or at least less imbalanced, and more prosperous, Indo-Pacific.

Active middle powers are dissimilar in many respects, have distinct national interests, and even sometimes bet on different strategic choices, but in Asia in particular, the ones identified above share a common desire – to live and prosper in a peaceful, stable and less risky environment.

Asia’s middle powers are not selfless. Neither do they aspire to big leadership roles. Determined to protect their sovereignty while balancing their relations between great powers, they take on the causes that are in their interests.

But, in doing so, as they invest in their own capacity to live in an increasingly contested world and manoeuvre growing geopolitical tensions, they can contribute to greater peace and stability in the region.

Their efforts would be even better served by closer cooperation and coordination among them, in order to collectively act as a stabilising force for a more predictable shared environment. In the current turbulent geopolitical arena, with conflicts and crises on the rise globally, their growing footprint in international affairs is essential in preserving regional stability.


The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.

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