India’s Role in a Disordered World

Like most of Asia, India is adjusting to a disordered world, in which conflict is rising, international and particularly multinational institutions are increasingly ineffective, and existing mechanisms for stability such as the international trading system and the nonproliferation regime are being dismantled. With some of the greatest powers displaying contempt for norms and international law, there is no longer a world order, or even a pretense of one. An international system remains—international flights continue, and your cellphone will work around the world—but there are no rules or institutions or inhibitions that prevent the powerful from attacking another country, despite commitments in the United Nations Charter and elsewhere.

The changes in the international system make much harder the fundamental task of Indian foreign and security policy, which is to enable the transformation of India into a modern, prosperous, and secure country. A disordered world is not likely to give India the peace, predictability, and security that India’s development needs. Yet these challenging circumstances also represent a chance to change what we do.

Rather than getting involved  in others’ quarrels or engage in mediation, the greatest contribution that India can make at this time is to continue to manage its own development and security well. By working with its partners and neighbors, it should aim to provide stability in the subcontinent, the Indian Ocean littoral, and southeast and west Asia. In addition, where circumstances permit, India should work to strengthen predictability and stability on international issues critical to India and others’ future.

If this sounds selfish, it is not necessarily so, because there is a clear coincidence of interest between India and most other countries in its extended neighborhood. Besides, none of us, no matter how powerful, can mitigate or profit from international disorder entirely on our own.

In some ways, India, with its tradition of strategic autonomy, is not badly placed to work the new international environment. Now that the post-World War II institutional architecture is defunct, power has become much more evenly distributed. The two most powerful states, the United States and China, together account for less than 50 percent of world GDP and military power today. Amid this flatter distribution of power, there are gains to be had for non-status-quo powers that wish to improve, not overthrow, the present international system.

An absence of order, or world order, does not necessarily mean the absence of an international system, but its fragmentation. The possibilities that open up in such a situation go beyond the opportunistic pursuit of individual agendas that we see all around us: Russia in Ukraine, Rwanda in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel and the United States in West Asia, China in the South China Sea, Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, and so on.

In the midst of disorder, each country will have to instead be much clearer in prioritizing its interests and concentrating on creating good outcomes rather than seeking narrative dominance, status, glory, revenge for history, or other such ephemeral goals.

For India, what this would mean in practice is the building and working of coalitions on issues that matter and that will affect the lives of our people in the future. These issues include renewable energy, maritime security, and the international trading system. Those who are willing and able to contribute will vary from area to area. Such a variable geometry is essential when we cannot rely on the traditional multilateral system for solutions. It does not appear sensible to expect institutions composed of member states to be effective when those states are quarrelling with one another.

Excluding its western reaches, Asia has enjoyed peace for several decades. The result has been historically unprecedented economic development and growth in most of our economies, improving the lives of our people. But after the globalization era, that growth and peace in Asia are threatened not just by political and territorial disputes and flash points within Asia but by great-power rivalry and behavior beyond it.

Consider how the globalized trading system of which Asia was the greatest beneficiary has been ruptured due to U.S. President Donald Trump’s unilateral tariffs. Consider, also, the manner in which the nonproliferation regime is unraveling in northeast Asia, west Asia, and even in Europe. The waning credibility of U.S. extended deterrence; the experience of states like Ukraine, Libya, and Iran, which gave up or lacked nuclear weapons or options; and the nuclear arms race among the greatest nuclear weapon states have led to opinions shifting in Scandinavia, South Korea, Japan, and other countries toward the prospect of acquiring or gaining access to nuclear weapons. There is a common interest among the nuclear weapon states—including India—in preventing further horizontal proliferation.

India has begun adjusting policy by attempting to mend difficult bilateral relations with China. Its government is also working with neighbors in the subcontinent to mitigate the disruption in energy, fertilizer, and other markets caused by the United States and Israel attacking Iran. Most of our neighbors are going through complex social and political transformations, renegotiating their social and political contracts. India is and can be an island of stability and help them to manage these changes successfully and peacefully; improved connectivity and economic integration, for instance, would benefit the entire region.

If Asia is to continue to develop in peace, it is clear that we will have to find new ways of minimizing the harm that the rest of the world does to Asia’s peace and security. We have seen the self-centered and erratic policies of major players in the international system for over a decade now, as well as how badly they have affected the security and economic prospects of the world, particularly in Asia and Africa. There has not been a binding international agreement on an issue of significance for well over a decade. Diplomacy of the highest quality is more essential than ever. And this is where India, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and Asia generally, with its tradition of working across international fault lines and frontiers since the Cold War, can play a role. India’s strategic autonomy has been an active choice.

Rather than neutrality, the disordered world demands the opposite: the application of mind to issues to establish what is in India’s enlightened and common international interest, and to act accordingly. With its tradition of working across political divides and staying away from the constraints of blocs and alliances, India can work with other actors in the international system to build the plurilateral and bilateral links and agreements that are needed to continue the march of progress amid chaos.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.