Asian Peace Programme: by Kishore Mahbubani

Can a G2 order work in a multilateral world?

Kishore Mahbubani and Li Li

Kishore Mahbubani is a Distinguished Fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Asia Research Institute (ARI). Li Li is the Deputy Director of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, China.

The article is first published in the Straits Times: https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/can-a-g2-order-work-in-a-multilateral-world.

 

6  November,  2026

President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United States in September concluded with the US and China pledging to build a constructive relationship of strategic stability. But what drew the most headlines was the grand reception accorded Xi by his host, US President Donald Trump.

Trump personally received Xi on the tarmac, had not one but two red carpets laid out, organised a welcome ceremony involving a military flyover, and hosted the Chinese leader to a state dinner. The pomp and circumstance of their Washington summit, to be followed by two more meetings before year’s end, has revived the debate over a “G2” world.

Are we moving towards a G2-led world order? What exactly does that mean? Crucially, what would such an order mean for the world?

Loose definition and divergent arguments

Trump embraced the G2 concept in his second term, branding his late-2025 meeting with Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, as a “G2 summit”. His frequent and enthusiastic use of the term signaled that he was taking China more seriously as a “near peer”. The message was reinforced at the Washington summit.

Amid the pageantry, the rest of the world, especially US allies and partners, appear to have more concerns than confidence as they keep tabs on this evolving relationship. In recent years, international anxiety has drifted from the possibility of “a new Cold War” to “G-Zero” world (i.e., no international leadership) to “G2”.

The anxiety is understandable in that while the international community certainly does not want to see a replay of the Cold War, a bipolar, G2, world could be even more challenging to navigate.

Small and middle powers retain some leverage in a cold war as they can play the two superpowers against each other to gain economic or security benefits. On the other hand, no country has the capacity to compete with either great power in military might, economic strength, technological leadership, or political influence — let alone both.

The US and China account for over 40% of the global economy in nominal GDP and possess uncontested supremacy in AI. If they were to coordinate with each other, they could simply divide the world into two spheres of influence and set the rules and norms of global governance through bilateral negotiation, bypassing the international community entirely. Multilateral institutions would become obsolete, and the rest of the world would have no choice but to follow the rules set by the US and China.

Such fears may explain why China remains lukewarm on the G2 idea and even rejects it publicly, citing its identity as a developing country and a member of the Global South; its non-aligned, independent foreign policy; and its commitment to multipolarity.

China is concerned that being bracketed with the US will isolate it from the wider world, especially the Global South.

After all, the Global South has long championed multilateralism with the United Nations as its backbone, emphasising equality among nations (regardless of their size or power), inclusive decision-making, and shared responsibility in addressing international issues.

However, whether or not China accepts or uses the term “G2”, a bipolar world is unmistakably emerging as China grows in strength and influence.

That said, bipolarity does not necessarily mean co-hegemony by the US and China.

Multilateralism can work in a bipolar world, and the international community expects the US and China to take the leadership in addressing global challenges. They would likely welcome the G2 framework if it meant greater collaboration between the US and China to improve global governance within the broader architecture of UN-centred multilateralism.

China-US coordination: Crucial in a Fragmenting World

China-US coordination on global governance can benefit the world in several important ways.

First, it can help stabilize China-US relations and lower the risk of Cold War-style confrontation. Increasing the number of bilateral dialogues and improving coordination on global issues can improve mutual understanding and trust, reduce the risk of miscalculations, manage differences, and prevent competition from escalating into confrontation or conflict. Regular China-US summits can play a significant role in this regard.

Second, it is essential for tackling global challenges, especially those in new domains such as AI. As the world’s two AI superpowers, China and the US must cooperate on AI governance. There are growing global concerns that the ungoverned development of artificial intelligence could, in the worst case, lead humanity towards destruction.

China-US competition may fuel technological progress, but only their coordination can shape the direction of this progress and ensure that AI is used for good. The formal announcement at the Washington summit of the China-US AI Dialogue and a bilateral communication channel for AI incidents is an important first step.

Third, the US and China can coordinate to help facilitate multilateralism rather than replace it.

One of the outcomes of Xi’s state visit was an agreement between the two presidents to support and attend each other’s G20 and APEC meetings. While this may seem like low-hanging fruit, true accommodation and coordination between the great powers could have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the world’s existing international architecture.

For example, they could work together to align the global governance goals of the G7, the club of developed countries, and BRICS, the platform of the Global South. They could foster dialogue and cooperation between developed countries and the Global South in multilateral fora such as the G20. China-US accommodation could even improve the effectiveness of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.

In short, even though great power competition between the US and China will continue, the international community does not need to accept that chaos and disruption is a given.

How we are to govern the emerging bipolar world is still an open question. Answering this question will be the defining test for the international community in the years ahead.

Given the many pressing transboundary crises we face in the 21st century, China-US collaboration in improving global governance will be a key factor in ensuring the peace and security of all.


The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.

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